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ABSTRACT 
INTRODUCTION: The purpose of this investigation was to better understand process 
inefficiencies in a Level II trauma center through the identification and classification of 
flow disruptions. Data-driven interventions were systematically developed and 
introduced in an effort to reduce disruptions threatening the optimal delivery of trauma 
care. 
METHOD: Medical human factors researchers observed disruptions during resuscitation 
and imaging in 117 trauma cases. Data was classified using the human factors taxonomy 
Realizing Improved Patient Care through Human-centered Operating Room Design for 
Threat Window Analysis (RIPCHORD-TWA). Interdisciplinary subject matter experts 
(SMEs) utilized a human factors intervention matrix (HFIX) to generate targeted 
interventions designed to address the most detrimental disruptions. A multiple-baseline 
interrupted time-series (ITS) design was used to gauge the effectiveness of the 
interventions introduced. 
RESULTS: Significant differences were found in the frequency of disruptions between 
the pre-intervention (n=65 cases, 1137 disruptions) and post-intervention phases (n=52 
cases, 939 disruptions). Results revealed significant improvements related to ineffective 
communication (x2 (1, n=2076) = 24.412, p=0.00, x2 (1, n=1031) = 9.504, p=0.002, x2 (1, 
n=1045) = 12.197, p=0.000); however, similar levels of improvement were not observed 
in the other targeted areas. 
CONCLUSION: This study provided a foundation for a data-driven approach to 
investigating precursor events and process inefficiencies in trauma care. Further, this 
approach allowed individuals on the front lines to generate specific interventions aimed at 
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mitigating systemic weaknesses and inefficiencies frequently encountered in their work 
environment. 
Keywords:  trauma care, process efficiency, interventions, patient safety  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction and Literature Review 
“If you don’t understand what is causing the problem, you will continue, forever and 
forever, to have to solve the problem.” – Robert Zinser, CEO, International Federation of 
Gynecology and Obstetrics 
Traumatic injury is a major public health problem in the United States. Each year 
more than 192,000 people lose their lives to trauma (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), 2015). In the last decade alone, the number of trauma deaths has 
increased by 22.8%, while the U.S. population increased by only 9.7%, making traumatic 
injury the leading cause of death for all Americans from birth to age 46 (Rhee et al., 
2014). There is a great economic burden associated with fatal injuries as well. In 2013, 
injury-related deaths exceeded $214 billion in combined medical and work-lost costs, 
which is approximately one-third of the total direct and indirect costs associated with all 
injuries (Florence, Simon, Haegerich, Luo, & Zhou, 2015). 
The alarming increase in death rates associated with traumatic injury as well as 
the considerable value of the services offered by the nation’s trauma centers, compels 
researchers to gain a better understanding of the challenges facing providers in the 
effective and efficient delivery of trauma care. Studies have shown that providing 
treatment for the critically injured patient at an urban Level I trauma center reduces 
mortality by 25%, as compared to treatment at a non-trauma center (MacKenzie et al., 
2006). Reports indicate significantly reduced mortality rates for patients properly triaged 
and treated at a regional acute care facility such as a Level II trauma center, in 
comparison to patient outcomes at a non-trauma center (Vickers et al., 2015). A 
substantial proportion of trauma patients are treated in trauma centers designated as Level 
II or lower. Therefore, expanding the research to include Level II trauma centers is 
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paramount to gaining a more comprehensive understanding of the process inefficiencies 
threatening the delivery of care to the traumatically injured patient. 
Medical Error 
The Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) To Err Is Human (Kohn, Corrigan, & 
Donaldson, 2000) report described an incidence of 44,000 to 98,000 preventable deaths 
annually. Since the release of the report 15 years ago patient safety has advanced in many 
ways. For instance, there has been demonstrated improvements in specific areas such as 
hospital-acquired infections. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), hospitals across the country have prevented 2.1 million hospital-
acquired infections, saving 87,000 lives, and nearly $20 billion in healthcare costs from 
2010 to 2014 (HHS, 2015). 
Much of the work dedicated to improving the safety of patient care has focused 
attention on the study of medical error. However, efforts to reduce these errors have 
largely been unsuccessful. A recent review by James (2013) estimated the number of 
deaths resulting from preventable medical errors in hospitals range from 210,000 to more 
than 400,000 per year, which is more than four times the original IOM estimate. In fact, 
Makary and Daniel (2016), extrapolating from several different investigations, placed the 
total beyond 250,000 deaths per year, ranking medical errors as the third most common 
cause of death in the U.S. (Makary & Daniel, 2016). 
Medical Human Factors 
 Given these alarming figures, it isn’t surprising that healthcare professionals have 
turned to the field of human factors to improve the safety and efficiency in the delivery of 
care. In the last few years, human factors researchers have spent a great deal of time in 
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healthcare settings addressing medical mistakes, human error, and work system factors 
using human factors engineering principles. The value of human factors and risk 
management concepts are widely recognized in complex organizations such as the 
military, nuclear power, and aviation. For decades, these high-risk industries have relied 
on the interdisciplinary science of human factors to ensure the effectiveness, safety, and 
ease of performance between humans and the elements of a system in the performance of 
precise tasks (Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (HFES), 2016). 
In recent years, numerous comparisons have been made between cockpit 
operations and how it can translate to increased safety in medicine, particularly in the 
operating room (OR). One such comparison stems from a 2005 report by the Joint 
Commission that found communication failures (i.e., human factors) to be the root cause 
of over 60% of sentinel events. Similarly, in years past, communication breakdowns 
among crew members resulted in 70% of commercial aviation accidents. These 
commonalities suggest that valuable lessons can be learned from aviation and has 
prompted healthcare to attempt to mimic programs that have been credited with 
improving safety in commercial aviation. For instance, adopting crew resource 
management (CRM) and standardizing communications and tools may be an effective 
strategy to reduce medical errors (Karl, 2009; Leonard, Graham, & Bonacum, 2004; 
Lingard et al., 2004). 
Traditionally, healthcare has focused on patient outcomes and sentinel event 
reporting to aid in understanding adverse events and improving patient safety. However, 
these data points lack detail concerning the specific nature of systemic issues (Blocker, 
Eggman, Zemple, Wu, & Wiegmann, 2010; Henrickson Parker, Laviana, Sundt, & 
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Wiegmann, 2009). Analysis of the system allows researchers to identify weaknesses and 
inefficiencies that open the window of opportunity for errors and adverse events to occur. 
This data serves as a much richer body of information on which to base the development 
of remedial interventions. 
Latent conditions present in the system range from failures in organizational 
management to poor tool design to physiological performance limitations such as sleep 
deprivation. These factors are often subtle and seemingly minor in their effects and in 
isolation they may have little to no direct impact on the system overall. However, their 
accumulation, or multiplicative effect, has a strong relationship to negative outcomes and 
potentially threaten the delivery of patient care (Dankelman & Grimbergen, 2005; de 
Leval, Carthey, Wright, Farewell, & Reason, 2000; Reason, 1990; Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2003). In this vein, it makes sense that healthcare would look for other metrics 
to better address patient and system safety. 
Flow Disruptions 
Process inefficiencies have come to be called flow disruptions (FDs). Wiegmann, 
ElBardissi, Dearani, Daly, and Sundt (2007) defined FDs as deviations from the natural 
progression of a task that potentially compromise the safety of the process and/or task. 
Research suggests that efficient care improves patient survival. Flow disruptions, on the 
other hand, threaten this efficiency, presenting distractions, impairments, lost time, and 
workarounds that divert attention from the task at hand. In essence, FDs are symptomatic 
of underlying latent failures somewhere in the system (Blocker et al., 2012). 
 Flow disruptions, in the present context, were first identified in the cardiovascular 
operating room (CVOR) and often consisted of communication failures, external 
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interruptions, and equipment and technology issues. Results from these studies have been 
intriguing from a process efficiency standpoint, empirically linking an accumulation of 
FDs, even seemingly minor ones, to surgical errors down the line. Specifically, teamwork 
and communication failures were found to be the strongest predictors of surgical errors 
(Wiegmann et al., 2007). 
This approach assumes that FDs, or a lack thereof, is indicative of an effectively 
performing system (Healy, Olsen, Davis, & Vincent, 2007). However, this approach 
suffers from a lack of clearly identifiable outcomes and may be misleading when drawing 
conclusions. For example, there could be multiple miscommunications occurring during a 
procedure that do not necessarily impact the patient. Furthermore, while multiple team 
members may experience numerous disruptive events while providing care to the patient, 
these events do not necessarily affect the procedure itself. Likewise, an anesthesiologist 
receiving multiple text messages over the course of a CVOR surgery, however, these 
disruptions do not necessarily interrupt the surgeon or the progress of the procedure. This 
reveals the difficulty faced in isolating those FDs that truly pose discernable threats to 
patient safety as well as the overall process of patient care. Flow disruptions are not 
necessarily major events that immediately or directly impact performance. Rather, they 
are often minor events that can accumulate over time. From a human factors perspective, 
any number of minor disruptive events that occur during the course of patient care may 
have a negative impact on the provider’s ability to counteract subsequent major events. 
Therefore, even the most trivial disruption matters (Palmer et al., 2013; Wong et al., 
2007). 
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Given the potential relationship between FDs and errors, it may be better to 
conceptualize the accumulation of these FDs as threat windows (Boquet et al, 2017b; 
Cohen et al., 2016). Threat windows can be operationally defined as the aggregates of 
FDs and process inefficiencies that plague a system which may open the window for 
errors and adverse events to occur (Boquet et al., 2017b; Cohen et al., 2016). 
By conceptualizing FDs and process inefficiencies as threat windows, researchers 
are better equipped to understand potential threats to patient safety by looking at the 
cumulative sum of disruptions experienced during the delivery of patient care and 
conceivably intervene before an error reaches the patient (Boquet et al., 2017b; Cohen et 
al., 2016). 
Human Factors Taxonomies 
There are a variety of approaches researching system threats that could potentially 
affect patient outcomes and safety. Researchers have used a data collection taxonomy 
known as the Systems Engineering Initiative for Patient Safety (SEIPS) to classify a 
multitude of hazards in the healthcare setting, most notably, during observations in 
cardiac surgical cases (Blocker et al., 2010; Blocker, 2012; Carayon, Hundt, Karsh, & 
Gurses, 2006; Wiegmann et al., 2007). The SEIPS model is comprised of five elements: 
1) tools and technology, 2) organization, 3) person, 4) task, and 5) environment. 
Typically, the source of an FD exists when one or more of these interconnected 
components breaks down (Blocker et al., 2012). 
Other researchers have utilized the Surgical Flow Disruption Tool (SFDT) to 
systematically categorize and measure surgical FDs, or latent factors that contribute to 
adverse events, and their impact on patient safety. The SFDT is an observational 
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taxonomy derived from the SEIPS framework, which incorporates Reason’s (1990) 
model of human error as well as the work of Wiegmann and Shappell (2003). The SFDT 
consists of: 1) environmental factors, 2) teamwork, 3) technology and instruments, 4) 
technical factors, 5) training and procedures, and 5) an “other” category. Although it was 
originally designed for observing cardiac surgical cases (Blocker et al., 2010; Henrickson 
Parker et al., 2009), it has been found to be a valid tool for use in other healthcare 
domains, including trauma care. Application of the SFDT in trauma allowed researchers 
to identify the clinical phases of treatment (resuscitation, imaging, or trauma OR) that 
had a high disruption frequency (Blocker et al., 2012; Blocker et al., 2013; Catchpole et 
al., 2013; Catchpole et al., 2014; Shouhed et al., 2014). Blocker et al. (2012) expanded 
the SFDT and further categorized the type of FDs according to: 1) equipment 
(malfunctions, improper use, unfamiliar equipment, maintenance); 2) communication 
(misunderstanding, communication unheard, case related communication, extraneous 
conversation); 3) external interruptions (extraneous people, phone calls, or intercom 
messages that did not relate directly to the procedure at hand); 4) coordination (personnel 
exchanges, improperly configured equipment, not adhering to surgeon or team 
preferences, and requesting or providing assistance to fellow team members); 5) 
environment (problems with noise, temperature, lighting); 6) patient factors (disruptions 
related to the patient’s unique anatomy such as an excessive amount of unanticipated 
adhesions or scar tissue); 7) technical skills (including poorly executed tasks, 
misinterpretation of relevant information); and 8) training (teaching a new skill, 
correcting an improper action, posing questions to test the knowledge of the team, 
student, or trainee); and 9) other (not specified). 
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Another taxonomy used to identify interruptions in healthcare evolved from an 
analysis of studies found in the interruption literature from other high-risk industries. The 
authors also noted that only a small number of these types of taxonomies have been 
developed (Brixey, Walji, Shang, Johnson, & Turley, 2004). The tool they developed for 
describing instances of human interruption contained the following eight categories: 1) 
source of interruption; 2) individual characteristics of the person receiving interruption; 
3) method of coordination; 4) meaning of interruption; 5) method of expression; 6) 
channel of conveyance; 7) human activity changed by interruption; and 8) effects of 
interruption. The researcher’s preliminary taxonomy focused on the introduction of 
technology, which contributes to new interruptions and the changing work of clinicians. 
It is currently being used to code interruptions observed in an emergency department and 
includes the following 11 categories: 1) signal, 2) technology, 3) initiator, 4) recipient, 5) 
reason to interrupt, 6) cognitive, 7) frequency, 8) context/location, 9) environment, 10) 
outcome, and 11) management techniques (Brixey et al., 2004).   
Realizing Improved Patient Care through Human-centered Operating Room Design 
(RIPCHORD) 
Realizing Improved Patient Care through Human-centered Operating Room 
Design (RIPCHORD) was originally developed by a team of collaborators consisting of 
industrial engineers and healthcare architects with human factors expertise from Clemson 
University as well as cardiothoracic anesthesiologists from the Medical University of 
South Carolina (MUSC). RIPCHORD was initially designed as an architectural 
framework for identifying and classifying workflow disruptions in the CVOR (Palmer et 
al., 2013). The researchers in this study were not interested in exploring medical errors 
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but rather in documenting workflow as it related to human factors and potential threats to 
patient safety. They were specifically observing disruptions to the flow of operations. 
After observing the first surgery, they organized the observational data into human 
factors clusters or similar groupings. The aggregate analysis yielded six distinct clusters. 
These clusters became the RIPCHORD major categories: 1) communication, 2) usability, 
3) physical layout, 4) environmental hazards, 5) general interruptions, and 6) equipment 
failures. The six clusters were then further differentiated into 33 subgroupings using 
affinity clustering, which ultimately became the RIPCHORD minor categories. The 
subgroups were validated and refined using an additional nine surgeries to develop the 
final taxonomic structure, known as RIPCHORD (version 1.0). Palmer et al. (2013) 
concluded that they had “developed a robust taxonomy to describe the quantity and 
location of flow disruptions encountered in a cardiac OR which can be used for future 
research and patient safety improvements” (p. 11). 
Research Objectives 
 The purpose of this current study is to investigate FDs threatening the efficient 
delivery of patient care in a Level II trauma center. More specifically, this investigation 
seeks to answer four questions: 
Q1: Can an FD taxonomy previously used only in the CVOR be successfully 
employed to identify and classify disruptions in trauma care? 
Q2: Do differences in threats exist between different clinical phases of treatment in 
trauma care (resuscitation and imaging)? 
Q3: Can this information be used to develop targeted, data-driven interventions in 
trauma care? 
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Q4: Do these implemented interventions address and potentially reduce the frequency 
of those disruptions threatening the optimal delivery of trauma care? 
This current study employed a multiple-baseline interrupted time-series (ITS) 
design and was divided into four phases: 1) Baseline 1/pre-intervention, 2) Baseline 2/ 
pre-intervention, 3) Intervention, consisting of the introduction of targeted strategies, and 
4) Post-intervention. In a multiple-baseline ITS design data is typically collected at 
multiple time points. Specifically, researchers collect several observations (O) over a 
period of time that spans before and after an intervention, or treatment (X), in order to 
determine if the intervention had an effect. To address threats of internal validity and 
increase the likelihood of more valid conclusions two waves of measurement were made 
prior to the implementation of interventions, thus, establishing a baseline. This method is 
called a double-pretest design, or a multiple-baseline design. This type of ITS design 
attempts to control for selection-maturity in that the groups may be different in some way 
before the interventions were introduced. If the intervention program (post-intervention 
phase) and the comparison group (pre-intervention phase) are maturing at different rates 
this could be noted as a change from baseline 1/pre-intervention to baseline 2/pre-
intervention. This pre-test series allows researchers to directly examine the possibility of 
differences in maturation and potentially attribute post-intervention differences to the 
intervention program (Trochim, 2005). This type of experimental design is considered a 
strong quasi-experimental design as it resembles experimental designs but must use 
quasi-independent variables rather than true independent variables (IVs). In other words, 
subjects cannot be randomly assigned to either an experimental group or a control group. 
Moreover, researchers cannot control which group receives the treatment. One advantage 
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of an ITS design is that it is considered the best quasi-experimental approach for 
evaluating longitudinal effects of interventions as it allows researchers to evaluate the 
impact of a quasi-independent variables under naturally occurring conditions (Bordens & 
Abbott, 2014). 
Pre-intervention and post-intervention phases served as one IV and clinical phase 
of treatment (resuscitation and imaging) was the second IV. The targeted minor 
categories within the major categories of the expanded RIPCHORD taxonomy served as 
the dependent variables (DVs). In effect, disruption data served as an objectively 
measurable outcome and the basis for continuous improvement. 
The strength of this current study was the ability to combine science and practice 
into a living, breathing document. This method allowed researchers to present data in 
real-time; tracking and monitoring results in a quantitative, data-driven manner. A 
comprehensive, systematic methodology such as this may prove more successful and 
lasting in deploying the right interventions to mitigate threats to the delivery of life-
saving trauma care. A schematic of the ITS design is pictured below (see Figure 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1. Multiple-Baseline Interrupted Time-Series (ITS) Design 
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CHAPTER 2 
PRE-INTERVENTION PHASE 
Introduction 
 Unlike the surgical setting, a limited number of investigations have evaluated FDs 
in trauma care. While surgery often follows a predictable and lengthy course, the same is 
not true for trauma care. Trauma resuscitation efforts are unpredictable and fast-paced, 
producing an environment where healthcare professionals must quickly and accurately 
evaluate and diagnose potentially life-threatening injuries in unstable patients with 
incomplete histories. This process is information laden, multi-disciplinary team 
dependent, and relies heavily on clinical skill and the efficiency of the system (Gruen, 
Jurkovich, McIntyre, Foy, & Maier, 2006; Sarcevic, 2009). The multi-disciplinary team 
that typically responds to a trauma alert includes: 1) a trauma surgeon, 2) an emergency 
physician, 3) specialty surgeons (e.g., neurology, orthopedic, ophthalmologic), 4) surgical 
and emergency residents, 5) emergency department nurses and technicians, 6) a 
laboratory technician, 7) a radiology technologist, 8) an orthopedic technician, 9) a 
critical care nurse, 10) an anesthesiologist or certified registered nurse anesthetist, 11) a 
respiratory technician, 12) an operating room nurse, 13) security officers, 14) a chaplain 
or social worker, and 15) a scribe, according to the American College of Surgeons' 
Committee on Trauma (ASC-COT) and as outlined in Resources for Optimal Care of the 
Injured Patient (2014). As defined by Kozlowski and Bell (2003), a team is composed of 
two or more individuals that exist to perform organizationally relevant tasks and share a 
common goal through their specific interdependent roles and tasks. Gruen et al. (2006) 
explains how trauma care also involves concurrent and competing tasks, long hours, and 
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inexperienced medical residents who often work after hours in busy emergency 
departments, making it the “perfect storm” for the occurrence of medical error (p. 371). 
Previous investigations of disruptions in trauma care found communication and 
coordination issues make up approximately half of all FDs in Level I trauma centers 
(Blocker et al., 2012; Blocker et al., 2013; Catchpole et al., 2013; Catchpole et al., 2014; 
Shouhed et al., 2014). There are few other occupations where effective communication 
and coordination is as crucial in saving lives, yet these findings are not surprising 
considering the inefficiencies and weaknesses of the systems within which trauma teams 
must work every day. An interdisciplinary team of researchers used prospective study 
methods to identify system issues throughout the entire trauma care process (multiple 
trauma resuscitation bays, imaging rooms, and ORs) at a Level I center, and then used 
FDs as a metric to develop evidence-based interventions. Their analysis of identified FDs 
suggested an implementation of targeted interventions related to coordination problems, 
communication failures, and equipment issues (Blocker et al., 2012; Blocker et al., 2013; 
Catchpole et al., 2013; Catchpole et al., 2014; Shouhed et al., 2014). Additionally, the 
researchers conducted process mapping, interviews, and safety culture questionnaires to 
define problematic areas and identify solutions. From these interactions, a short list of 
subsystem interventions was developed and deployed, which included equipment storage, 
medication packs, employing a whiteboard, pre-briefing, and teamwork training. 
Observational measures were re-initiated to gauge the effectiveness of the interventions. 
At the Level I trauma center where the study was carried out, researchers found that this 
type of human factors subsystem approach reduced FDs, treatment time, and length of 
patient stay (Catchpole et al., 2014). 
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Despite sustained efforts in safety and quality, preventable deaths in trauma care 
continue to occur at a rate of 2 to 22% (Pucher et al., 2013). However, some estimates of 
preventable trauma-related death rates may be as high as 50% (Cales & Trunkey, 1985; 
Chua, D’Amours, Sugrue, Caldwell, & Brown, 2009). Pucher et al. (2013) conducted a 
retrospective error analysis in order to identify not only the incidence of preventable error 
in trauma care but also the underlying causes of these types of errors. The majority of 
errors identified occurred during the initial phase of trauma patient assessment and care. 
Similar to the findings of numerous studies in healthcare, the largest proportions of errors 
were attributed to human error (Hoyt et al., 1994; Gruen et al., 2006; Chua et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, most of these errors were categorized as either a process or structural 
failure. While only 12.1% of errors were identified as structural failures (e.g., staffing 
issues, lack of equipment, or equipment malfunctions), process errors, or active failures 
accounted for 87.9%. Process errors were identified as the most common recurring error 
and included issues such as failure of assessment, diagnosis, or decision making, as well 
as technical or communication errors. The researchers also found a high prevalence of 
omission errors (62%), or latent failures, which typically are a result of cognitive lapses 
such as recognition or attention failures. They suggested that understanding the nature of 
the errors may be helpful in implementing measures to reduce them. Additionally, they 
cited Reason (1995; 2002), proposing that protocols and checklists are an effective means 
for preventing lapses and errors of omission (Pucher et al., 2013). 
Trauma Center Designations 
There are four levels of trauma care facilities in the U.S. The quality of care and 
clinical outcomes at various levels of trauma centers are expected to be similar. 
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Furthermore, all designated trauma centers must meet specific standards for the provision 
of clinical care to the injured patient as specified by the ongoing verification program 
sponsored by ASC-COT and outlined in Resources for Optimal Care of the Injured 
Patient (2014). The volume of patients and the severity of injury are the major criteria 
distinguishing Level I trauma centers from Level II trauma centers and lower. These 
differences warrant a separate set of ACS criteria (ASC-COT, 2014). Table 2.1 outlines 
the key trauma center requirements by level (see Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1 Key Trauma Center Requirements by Level 
Level I 
Must admit at least 1200 patients annually or have 240 admissions with an Injury 
Severity Score (ISS), an established medical score to assess trauma severity, of more than 
15, which is considered a major trauma (or polytrauma) 
A surgically directed critical care service must be led by a surgeon boarded in surgical 
critical care and critically ill trauma patients should be cared for in a designated Intensive 
Care Unit (ICU) by an ICU physician team 
24-hour in-house availability of the attending surgeon 
A surgeon will be in the emergency department on patient arrival, with adequate 
notification from the field (the maximum acceptable response time is 15 minutes for the 
highest-level activation, tracked from patient arrival) 
Trauma surgeon on call must be dedicated to a single trauma center while on duty as well 
as a published backup call schedule for trauma surgery must be available 
Must participate in a residency training program and fellowships in trauma/surgical 
critical care/acute care surgery 
Must publish 10 to 20 trauma-related, peer-reviewed journal articles within a three-year 
period and demonstrate trauma-related scholarly activities 
Required to be a leader in education and outreach activities designed to help improve 
outcomes from trauma and prevent injury by publicly and professionally disseminating 
information 
Must participate in regional disaster management plans and exercises 
Level II 
Same requirements as Level I trauma centers 
Except that volume and severity requirements do not apply 
Except that research and educational activities do not apply, but are strongly encouraged 
Must participate in regional disaster management plans and exercises 
Level III 
Must have transfer agreements with Level I or Level II trauma centers 
Must have continuous general surgical coverage 
A surgeon must be in the emergency department on patient arrival, with adequate 
notification from the field (the maximum acceptable response time is 30 minutes for the 
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highest-level of activation, tracked from patient arrival) 
Must participate in regional disaster management plans and exercises 
Level IV 
Must have transfer agreements with higher-level trauma centers in the region 
Must have 24-hour emergency coverage by a physician or midlevel provider 
A physician (if available) or midlevel provider will be in the emergency department on 
patient arrival, with adequate notification from the field (the maximum acceptable 
response time is 30 minutes for the highest-level of activation, tracked from patient 
arrival) 
The emergency department must be continuously available for resuscitation, with 
coverage by a registered nurse and physician or midlevel provider, and it must have a 
physician director (providers must maintain current Advanced Trauma Life Support® 
certification and should attend trauma-related continuing medical education (CME) of at 
least 8 hours yearly) 
Must participate in regional disaster management plans and exercises 
 
According to the Florida Department of Health (2017), the state of Florida has 19 
trauma service areas and a total of 33 trauma centers. Of these centers, 10 are Level I, 21 
are Level II, and two are pediatric facilities. The majority of research has been 
concentrated in Level I trauma centers, mainly due to ACS criteria research requirements 
as well as the inherently large patient pool afforded by these institutions. Despite Level I 
trauma centers garnering the bulk of the attention in clinical and patient safety research, a 
significant number of trauma patients are treated in Level II trauma centers or lower. 
Some research has suggested there is improved survival for trauma patients treated at a 
Level I center versus a Level II or lower center (Cudnik, Newgard, Sayre, & Steinberg, 
2008; Demetriades et al., 2005; Demetriades et al., 2006; Glance, Osler, Mukamel, & 
Dick, 2012; Nirula, Maier, Moore, Sperry, & Gentilello, 2010; Scarborough et al., 2008). 
Others research has found no significant difference in mortality between Level I and 
Level II trauma centers (Recinos et al., 2009; Rogers et al., 2011). 
As previously mentioned, the literature describes one research study that focused 
exclusively on FDs and process inefficiencies in trauma care at a Level I trauma center 
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(Blocker et al., 2012; Blocker et al., 2013; Catchpole et al., 2013; Catchpole et al., 2014; 
Shouhed et al., 2014). This current study, on the other hand, investigated process 
inefficiencies observed in a Level II trauma center. Because of the unique differences 
between Level I and Level II trauma centers, it is reasonable to assume that process 
inefficiencies observed at a Level I trauma center may not reflect those seen in a Level II 
trauma center. Understanding the challenges unique to centers other than those 
designated as Level I is just as important in order to ensure quality of care at those 
respective facilities. The empirical study of FDs in a Level II facility broadens the scope 
of inquiry, increasing an understanding of potential interventions these types of facilities 
can employ to improve life-saving trauma services. Furthermore, utilizing a fine-grained 
taxonomy such as RIPCHORD, not previously used in any trauma domain, better 
describes the quantity, location, and variety of FDs encountered throughout trauma care. 
Measuring and Identifying FDs 
To enhance trauma systems in a manner that ensures lasting success in mitigating 
the process inefficiencies threatening optimal delivery of care, researchers must first 
understand the nature and frequency of FDs. A robust approach to the measurement of 
FDs and the threats they pose can identify problems unique to a particular clinical 
treatment area such as resuscitation or imaging (Boquet et al., 2017b), or to a specific 
surgical task, role, or position such as the anesthesiologist, perfusionist, or circulating 
nurse (Cohen et al., 2016). Furthermore, it may prove arduous to implement targeted 
interventions on a local level without using an appropriate and accurate method of 
measuring and identifying process inefficiencies in the first place (Healy et al., 2008). 
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Evaluating a socio-technological system such as trauma services requires 
researchers to use unique measurement methods to precisely detect a wide-range of 
objects, processes, and conditions of the system (Healy et al., 2008). This current study 
submits that the RIPCHORD taxonomy is best equipped to describe and categorize the 
FDs encountered in trauma care. 
Since its inception, the RIPCHORD taxonomy has been used in the CVORs of 
multiple hospitals to identify FDs (Abernathy, 2015; Barbeito et al., 2014; Cohen et al., 
2016; Palmer et al., 2013). Throughout its application, the RIPCHORD framework has 
undergone several iterations and further development by researchers at Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University (ERAU). The most current version of RIPCHORD has been 
expanded to accommodate threat window analysis and is now called Realizing Improved 
Patient Care through Human-centered Operating Room Design for Threat Window 
Analysis (RIPCHORD-TWA) (Boquet et al., 2017b; Cohen et al., 2016). RIPCHORD-
TWA is comprised of six major categories for classifying human factors related 
disruptions: 1) communication, 2) coordination, 3) equipment issues, 4) interruptions, 5) 
layout, and 6) usability. Further classification of the data into subcategories (i.e., minor 
categories, nanocodes) enables fine-grained analysis and provides the researchers with a 
greater level of detail associated with the observed threats (see Tables 2.2 and 2.3). 
  
A PROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATION AT A LEVEL II TRAUMA CENTER 36      
Table 2.2 RIPCHORD-TWA Taxonomy 
Communication (verbal and non-verbal) Interruptions (Other) 
Confusion Alerts 
Environmental Noise Distractions 
Ineffective Communication Equipment/Supplies 
Lack of Response Interaction with Biohazards 
Lack of Sharing Searching Activity 
Nonessential Communication Spilling/Dropping 
Simultaneous Communication Task Deviation 
 Teaching Moments 
Coordination Layout 
Charting/Documentation Connector Positioning 
Personnel Not Available Equipment Positioning 
Personnel Rotation Furniture Positioning 
Planning/Preparation Inadequate Space 
Protocol Failure Permanent Structure Positioning 
Unknown Information Wires/Tubing 
Equipment Issues Usability 
Anesthesia Equipment Barrier Design  
General Equipment Computer Design 
Perfusion Equipment Surface Design 
Surgeon Equipment Equipment Design 
 Packaging Design 
 Data Entry (non-computer) 
Design 
 
Table 2.3 RIPCHORD-TWA Definitions of the Six Major Categories and the 37 Minor 
Categories 
A PROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATION AT A LEVEL II TRAUMA CENTER 37      
Communication (verbal and non-verbal) 
Ineffective Communication – Communication between two or more individuals that 
does not achieve its desired goal (i.e. not covered by the other categories). 
o includes (example of when someone doesn’t know the name of someone else 
and can’t communicate efficiently with them) 
Lack of Response – The failure of an individual to respond to communication 
resulting in delay. 
o receive no answer regardless of follow up; this includes “did not respond, had 
to repeat” 
Confusion – Ambiguous or unclear communication resulting in a lack of 
understanding. 
o this category has to deal with comprehension not hearing 
Simultaneous Communication – Two or more individuals communicating at the 
same time resulting in the repetition of information and/or miscommunication. 
Nonessential Communication – Communication irrelevant to the procedure that is 
taking place during periods of time where attention should be focused on the task at 
hand.  
o this includes anything that is not professional in nature; also includes any non-
essential communication in the room regardless of who is involved  
Environmental Noise – The increasing sound level in the OR disrupts communication 
and/or adversely affects concentration on the current task. 
Lack of Sharing – Relevant information is withheld or not shared with other 
personnel. 
Usability 
Computer Design – Design issues associated with computer software/hardware and 
peripheral devices (e.g., programs, pointing devices, monitors, etc.). 
Equipment Design – Design issues associated with equipment other than computer 
systems.  
Surface Design – Design issues associated with textures, colors, and other design-
controlled attributes. 
Barrier Design – Design issues associated with donning protective equipment (e.g., 
gloves, gowns, etc.) and/or erecting barriers for maintaining sterile fields. 
Packaging Design – Design issues associated with unwrapping, untying, or 
opening/closing packaging containing supplies and instruments. 
Data Entry (non-computer) Design – Design issues associated with hard-copy data 
entry devices (e.g., forms, checklists, etc.). 
Layout 
Connector Positioning – Lack of outlets, connections and/or the inefficient use of 
existing outlets or connections such that movement and/or continuation of a task is 
hindered. 
o about where an outlet is placed or inefficient use of outlet 
Equipment Positioning – Medical devices, machines, and tools positioned such that 
movement and/or continuation of a task is hindered. 
o e.g. TEE machine, pump machine that is on the IV pole 
Furniture Positioning – Room furnishings (e.g., chairs, the patient bed, desks, trash 
can) positioned such that movement and/or continuation of a task is hindered. 
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o e.g. the ICU bed, trashcan, chairs, IV pole, Pyxis machine, 
Permanent Structures Positioning – The layout of permanent structures (e.g., 
doorways, light switches, etc.) such that movement and/or continuation of a task is 
hindered. 
o this category is reserved for items that always exist in the room (i.e. the room 
always has these items in it and are in a fixed location)  
Inadequate Space – Lack of sufficient space for personnel to operate effectively 
and/or the inefficient use of space through clutter, untidiness, congestion, and 
blockage.  
o this also includes not having a proper place to put particular equipment 
Wires/Tubing – The entanglement or misplacement of wires and tubes which 
interferes with movement and/or continuation of a task. 
Interruptions (Other) 
Distractions – Non-essential personnel and other interruptions that draw attention 
away from the current task. 
o includes things that can be ignored or something that diverts the attention of 
the person 
Teaching Moments – Staff may pause to deliver reprimands and/or corrective 
measures during the procedure.  
o at a teaching hospital, a teaching moment in and of itself is not a flow 
disruption unless the teacher elected an inopportune time to mentor 
Searching Activity – Miscellaneous items become missing in the OR and are pursued 
when they are needed immediately (e.g., missing sponges). 
Task Deviation – Personnel leaves the primary task to start another task.  
o includes texting, answering a phone call, when another personnel interrupts 
someone to do another task that is pertinent to the procedure  
Alerts – Human or technological alert to a potential hazard (this category includes 
false alarms). 
Equipment/Supplies- Equipment and/or supplies that must be retrieved due to an 
unforeseeable need (e.g., incorrect aortic valve size, supplementary equipment).   
Spilling/Dropping – When materials are dropped or spilled on the floor, resulting in 
the staff member being diverted away from their current task.  
Interaction with Biohazards – Incidents which involve the interaction of OR staff 
with sharps, cleaning up fluids (bodily or other), and contaminated equipment. 
Coordination 
Personnel Rotation – A break or disruption in the procedure caused by the planned or 
unplanned relief of personnel which unduly impacts the flow of the surgery.  
Personnel Not Available – Team members not present or otherwise unavailable 
during the procedure 
Unknown Information – Information which every staff member should be 
knowledgeable of yet forgets and interrupts others to obtain the information (e.g., 
lack of familiarity with equipment, procedures, or protocol). 
Protocol Failure – Break or breach in protocol that affects the ability of the group to 
function as a cohesive/efficient team. 
Charting/Documentation – Issues surrounding the documentation of patient care for 
a given medical procedure (e.g., medication dosing/labeling, lab values, etc.).  
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Planning/Preparation – The failure to establish a common set of goals and/or 
procedures to accomplish a given task (e.g., having the necessary equipment to 
complete the procedure).  
Equipment Issues 
Surgeon Equipment – Surgeon equipment which malfunctions during surgery. 
Anesthesia Equipment – Anesthesia equipment which malfunctions during surgery. 
Perfusion Equipment – Perfusion equipment which malfunctions during surgery. 
General Equipment – General (hospital) equipment which malfunctions during 
surgery. 
 
Taxonomies such as RIPCHORD-TWA are beneficial to healthcare research in 
that they offer the ability to conduct a fine-grained analysis, which provides an ideal level 
of resolution necessary to develop targeted interventions that address true problems in the 
system. Thus, it presents the opportunity to shift away from a reactive approach and 
towards a more proactive approach to aid in the understanding and reduction of potential 
threats impacting patient outcomes. Without a reliable method of measuring and 
identifying the threats that impair and interfere with a caregiver’s performance, it would 
be a challenge to truly drive any “real” local improvements. In aviation, this is called 
managing safety, which has been promoted to an advanced level, known as Safety 
Management Systems (SMS). Being proactive is one characteristic of an SMS, as 
explained by Stolzer, Halford, and Goglia (2008), “SMS practitioner in charge of such a 
program does not have to wait for events to happen, but rather uses every technique 
available to discover the information necessary to anticipate areas of increased risk, 
before they happen” (p. 35). 
Method 
Population 
 Experienced medical human factors researchers prospectively observed a sample 
of trauma cases at a Level II trauma center. All observations were collected at an East 
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Central Florida community hospital with 678 licensed beds and three dedicated trauma 
resuscitation bays (expandable to six) located in the Emergency Department (ED). The 
ED has a total of 110 treatment rooms. The trauma center serves two counties and has a 
catchment area of over 1,300 square miles. On average, the hospital receives 500-600 
trauma activation alerts annually. Below is a photograph of one of the trauma 
resuscitation bays (see Figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1. Trauma Resuscitation Bay 
Given the critical condition of incoming trauma patients, it was not possible to 
obtain their consent to participate in the study. The study was approved by the hospital’s 
Research Oversight Committee as a quality improvement project. It was considered 
exempt from Institutional Review Board (IRB) review as the focus was on disruptions 
involved in the trauma care process rather than clinical outcomes of the patient. In 
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accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 
1996 and Protected Health Information (PHI) Privacy Rule, all health information 
pertaining to the patient was protected. There was no effort made on the part of the 
researchers to collect personal and/or identifying information specific to either the 
patients undergoing treatment or the hospital personnel providing care. Data extraction 
beyond that which was collected on-site was performed by the Principal Investigators 
(PIs) holding clinical privileges at the hospital. Furthermore, all data extracted was de-
identified by the PIs in accordance with HIPAA guidelines and was concerned only with 
demographics and processes associated with the delivery of care. Hospital staff and 
trauma team members were aware of the presence and research goals of the observers. 
Specific demographics, including gender, age, mechanisms of injury (MOI), and 
Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) scores, were recorded for each patient. GCS is the most 
accepted clinical method for assessing the initial level of consciousness in trauma patients 
as well as trends in responsiveness, which is useful for prognosis after acute brain injury. 
It uses three categories, eyes (E), verbal (V), and motor (M), to summarize the severity of 
the patient's condition using a scale from 3 to 15. A numerical sum of 15 on the scale 
indicates the highest response observed in a patient and lower scores are associated with 
deep unconsciousness (Teasdale et al., 2014). 
Procedure 
Data collection. Experienced medical human factors researchers observed and 
recorded FDs during a total of 65 complete (“wheels in” to “wheels out”) trauma cases. 
FDs are deviations from the natural progression of a task that potentially compromise the 
safety of the process and/or task (Wiegmann et al., 2007). FDs were operationally defined 
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as those events that resulted in a disturbance in a team member’s progress or any other 
delay. Researchers had either medical and/or human factors background and underwent a 
comprehensive educational training process to ensure they could properly identify and 
capture FDs. In addition, the hospital adheres to strict ethical standards for the use of 
human participants in conducting research; therefore, researchers were required to 
complete the IRB training, an online training module through the Collaborative 
Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) Program. 
 Beginning on April 29, 2014, researchers observed trauma cases during normal 
and peak operational times. This hospital’s geographic location makes it subject to 
informally defined peak operational times, where the hospital experiences a potential 
influx of additional trauma patients as a result of an increase in the tourism population. 
Events that take place locally include Bike Week, Biketoberfest, various NASCAR 
racing events, and Spring Break. These special events can result in substantially higher 
trauma patient volume. 
Prospective data collection began at the time the patient arrived in the trauma 
resuscitation bay. The resuscitation bay is the designated area for providing emergency 
resuscitative efforts in order to stabilize the injured patients. Immediately following 
successful resuscitation efforts, the majority of trauma patients are taken to imaging. The 
imaging suite consists of a Computed Tomography (CT) scan room and viewing hallway 
where healthcare personnel wait while a CT scan obtains in-depth images of the patient. 
These images help providers gain a better understanding of the patient’s clinical status 
and injuries. Data collection continued throughout imaging and terminated upon 
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disposition to surgery, the medical floor unit, or the ED. Below are photos of the 
imaging/CT scan room and the viewing hallway (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3). 
 
Figure 2.2. Imaging/CT Scan Room 
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Figure 2.3. Imaging/CT Viewing Hallway 
Observers recorded the time the patient was wheeled into the trauma resuscitation 
bay and the time they were wheeled out. Likewise, the time was noted when the patient 
was wheeled into and out of imaging. For recording purposes, the patient’s transport time 
between resuscitation and imaging was still considered under the auspices of 
resuscitation since an official handoff to imaging had not yet occurred. 
FD observations were documented in real-time in a free-response format using 
paper and pencil or digitally recorded using an electronic tablet. Observations and time 
spent in resuscitation and imaging were then transferred to a Microsoft Excel Workbook 
for consensus coding and subsequent statistical analysis. 
Data coding and classification. FDs were classified using the human factors 
taxonomy, RIPCHORD-TWA (Boquet et al., 2017b; Cohen et al., 2016). RIPCHORD-
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TWA is comprised of six major categories for classifying human factors related 
disruptions: 1) communication, 2) coordination, 3) equipment issues, 4) interruptions, 5) 
layout, and 6) usability. There are multiple subcategories (i.e., minor categories, 
nanocodes) within each major category. 
At least two or more medical human factors researchers consensus coded each 
observation into the RIPCHORD-TWA taxonomy. The coding process was iterative and 
was carried out in an independent fashion for each observation recorded. First, 
researchers determined if the individual observation was considered an FD. The decision 
as to whether or not to code the observation as an FD in the first place was made in 
consensus. In other words, the researchers had to reach a unanimous agreement. Next, a 
specific major and minor RIPCHORD-TWA category was assigned for each FD via 
consensus coding. During the coding process, researchers consulted a table which 
included definitions and examples of the six major categories and the multiple minor 
categories (see Table 2.3). 
Data analysis. Descriptive statistics were calculated, including frequency of FDs 
and percentage of FDs by category and treatment area observed (resuscitation or 
imaging). Likewise, inferential statistics were calculated in regards to comparing 
frequency data between the clinical phases of care (resuscitation and imaging). The time 
elapsed during the case, whether in resuscitation or imaging, as well as the number of 
threats that occurred over an elapsed period of time were also calculated. In order to 
measure the potential impact of the observed threats, ratios were calculated to measure 
through-put: the cumulative number of disruptions observed overall as well as by phase 
(resuscitation and imaging), divided by the total elapsed time to treat a patient (patient 
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contact minutes) also broken down by phase (resuscitation and imaging). Ratios provided 
an estimate of how often FDs occurred per minute, as a means to gauge the “window of 
opportunity” for potential adverse events to occur. 
Results 
Analysis of FD Data 
Of the total sample of 65 trauma cases, the average age of the patient (male=50, 
female=15) was 41.2 (s=20.4). The mean GCS score of the sample cases was 12.78 
(s=3.9). A total of 38 (58.5%) of the trauma cases occurred during the first shift 
(7:00a.m.-7:00p.m.) and 27 (41.5%) occurred during the second shift (7:00p.m.-
7:00a.m.). A total of 32 (50%) of the trauma cases were observed during peak operational 
periods that correlated with special tourism events (i.e., Biketoberfest, Bike Week). 
Additionally, four (6%) of the observed cases were considered multiple traumas, meaning 
more than one trauma patient arrived at the same time and were treated simultaneously by 
multiple trauma teams. The breakdown for MOI was as follows: falls (15 or 23%), motor 
vehicle crashes (10 or 15%), motorcycle crashes (26 or 40%), stab wounds (1 or 1.5%), 
assaults (2 or 3%), gunshot wounds (3 or 5%), burns (1 or 1.5%), and other/unspecified 
(7 or 11%), which included cases such as a pedestrian struck by a motor vehicle, a suicide 
attempt, or a drug overdose, for example (see Table 2.4). 
A total of 1,137 disruptions were identified during the 65 observed cases (2,468 
patient contact minutes). This translated to nearly 17.5 disruptions per case (s=10.9), 
meaning approximately one disruption occurred every two minutes. The average total 
treatment time per patient was close to 38 minutes (s=17.6). A total of 545 disruptions 
were identified in resuscitation alone (1,068 patient contact minutes), with treatment time 
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averaging just over 16 minutes (s=11.46), which translated to more than eight disruptions 
per case (s=6.6). In imaging, a total of 592 disruptions were identified (1,400 patient 
contact minutes), with treatment time averaging 21.5 minutes (s=9.8), which translated to 
nine disruptions per case (s=6.6). Furthermore, the overall ratio of the number of FDs per 
minute, or the through-put measures, was 0.46 per minute. More specifically, the ratios 
were 0.51 per minute in resuscitation and 0.42 per minute in imaging. 
Table 2.4 Pre-Intervention Phase Patient Demographics 
Pt 
A 
g 
e 
S
e
x 
Mechanism 
of 
Injury 
G
C 
S 
E V M 
Event 
Multiple 
Trauma? 
Shift 
1 31 M Fall 6 4 1 1   1st 
2 16 M Fall – sports 15 4 5 6   1st 
3 40 M Fall 14 4 5 6   1st 
4 30 F Motor vehicle crash 14 4 4 6   1st 
5 48 F Fall 15 4 5 6   2nd 
6 8 F Fall 15 4 5 6   1st 
7 70 M Fall 3 1 1 1   1st 
8 58 M Fall 15 4 5 6   1st 
9 13 M Fall 11 4 1 6   1st 
10 28 M Laceration – machine tool 
(other/unspecified) 
15 4 5 6   1st 
11 58 M Motor vehicle crash 14 4 4 6   1st 
12 69 F Fall 15 4 5 6   1st 
13 70 M Fall 15 4 5 6   1st 
14 62 M Motor vehicle crash 15 4 5 6   1st 
15 71 M Other/Unspecified 15 4 5 6   1st 
16 27 M Motorcycle crash 15 4 5 6   1st 
17 26 M Scooter (motorized/ 
motorcycle crash) 
15 4 5 6   1st 
18 25 F Motor vehicle crash 15 4 5 6   2nd 
19 7 M Fall 15 4 5 6   1st 
20 65 M Motorcycle crash 3 1 1 1   1st 
21 44 M Motorcycle crash 14 4 4 6 Biketoberfest  2nd 
22 35 M Motorcycle crash 9 2 3 4 Biketoberfest  2nd 
23 1 F Burn 15 4 5 6 Biketoberfest  2nd 
24 24 F Motor vehicle crash 15 4 5 6 Biketoberfest  2nd 
25 63 M Assault 14 4 4 6 Biketoberfest  2nd 
26 28 F Motor vehicle crash 14 4 4 6 Biketoberfest  2nd 
27 26 M Fall 6 4 1 1 Biketoberfest  2nd 
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28 21 M Penetration (stab wound) 15 4 5 6 Biketoberfest  2nd 
29 52 M Motorcycle crash 14 4 4 6   2nd 
30 32 M Motorcycle crash 15 4 5 6 Bike Week  1st 
31 60 M Assault 15 4 5 6 Bike Week  2nd 
32 1 F Fall 15 4 5 6 Bike Week  2nd 
33 49 M Motorcycle crash 12 3 4 5 Bike Week Yes 2nd 
34 29 M Motor vehicle crash 15 4 5 6 Bike Week Yes 2nd 
35 38 F Vehicle vs. pedestrian 
(other/unspecified) 
15 4 5 6   1st 
36 72 M Motorcycle crash 15 4 5 6   2nd 
37 
21 
M Self-harm; blunt 
(other/unspecified) 
14 4 4 6   1st 
38 21 M Gunshot wound 14 4 4 6   1st 
39 
53 
M Hanging 
(other/unspecified) 
3 1 1 1   1st 
40 19 F Gunshot wound 15 4 5 6   2nd 
41 59 M Fall 15 4 5 6   1st 
42 16 M Motor vehicle crash 3 1 1 1   1st 
43 29 M Motor vehicle crash 7 1 2 4   1st 
44 58 M Fall 15 4 5 6   1st 
45 63 M Gunshot wound 15 4 5 6   1st 
46 37 M Motorcycle crash 8 1 1 6   1st 
47 31 M Motorcycle crash 15 4 5 6 Biketoberfest  1st 
48 77 M Motorcycle crash 15 4 5 6 Biketoberfest  1st 
49 55 M Motorcycle crash 14 4 4 6 Biketoberfest  2nd 
50 23 M Motorcycle crash 15 4 5 6 Biketoberfest  2nd 
51 69 M Motorcycle crash 14 4 4 6 Biketoberfest  1st 
52 54 M Motorcycle crash 6 1 1 4 Biketoberfest  2nd 
53 63 M Motorcycle crash 15 4 5 6 Biketoberfest  2nd 
54 27 M Motorcycle crash 15 4 5 6 Bike Week  1st 
55 39 F Motorcycle crash 3 1 1 1 Bike Week Yes 2nd 
56 37 M Motorcycle crash 15 4 5 6 Bike Week  2nd 
57 82 M Motorcycle crash 15 4 5 6 Bike Week  1st 
58 48 M Motorcycle crash 13 4 4 5 Bike Week  1st 
59 44 M Motorcycle crash 11 3 4 4 Bike Week  2nd 
60 50 M Motorcycle crash 14 4 4 6 Bike Week  2nd 
61 21 M Vehicle vs. pedestrian 
(other/unspecified) 
15 4 5 6 Bike Week  2nd 
62 30 M Motorcycle crash 15 4 5 6 Bike Week  2nd 
63 56 F Motor vehicle crash 15 4 5 6 Bike Week  1st 
64 30 F Vehicle vs. pedestrian 
(other/unspecified) 
3 1 1 1 Bike Week  1st 
65 69 F Motorcycle crash 15 4 5 6 Bike Week Yes 1st 
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Of these 1,137 disruptions, communication issues represented 32% of the total, 
interruptions made up 26%, and coordination issues were third most frequent at 21%. 
Layout, usability, and equipment issues comprised 14%, 5%, and 2% of the disruptions, 
respectively (see Figure 2.4). 
 
Figure 2.4. Overall Breakdown of Major Categories During the Pre-Intervention Phase 
Further analysis examined the difference in disruptions between resuscitation and 
imaging. While the pattern of results was similar to that seen during the preliminary 
analysis, some differences were observed. Although communication disruptions occurred 
evenly in both phases of care (32%), interruptions were observed more frequently during 
resuscitation (28%), whereas disruptions resulting from coordination problems were more 
prevalent in imaging (26%) (see Figure 2.5). 
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Figure 2.5. Overall Breakdown of Major Categories by Resuscitation and Imaging 
During the Pre-Intervention Phase 
 
In order to obtain a more detailed understanding of the types of disruptions 
populating each major RIPCHORD-TWA category, fine-grained analysis of the data was 
conducted. Within the major category of communication, disruptions largely consisted of 
the following three minor categories: nonessential communication (37%), lack of 
response (25%), and ineffective communication (24%). The remainder of disruptions 
observed were divided among confusion (5%), simultaneous communication (4%), lack 
of sharing (3%), and environmental noise (2%) (see Figure 2.6). 
 
Figure 2.6. Communication Breakdown During the Pre-Intervention Phase 
The two most heavily populated minor categories within interruptions were: 
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spilling/dropping (27%) and distractions (24%). These were followed by 
equipment/supplies (15%), teaching moments (11%), alerts (10%), searching activities 
(9%), task deviation (5%), and interaction with biohazards (0%) (see Figure 2.7). 
 
Figure 2.7. Interruptions Breakdown During the Pre-Intervention Phase 
Minor categories making up the majority of coordination issues consisted of: 
planning/preparation (34%), charting/documentation (22%), unknown information 
(18%), and personnel not available (16%). These categories were followed by protocol 
failure (9%) and personnel rotation (0%) (see Figure 2.8). 
 
Figure 2.8. Coordination Breakdown During the Pre-Intervention Phase 
Disruptions related to layout included wires and tubing (43%), inadequate space 
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(38%), equipment positioning (14%), connector positioning (2%), furniture positioning 
(2%), and permanent structures positioning (1%) (see Figure 2.9). The minor category 
distribution in the usability category was computer design (30%), data entry (non-
computer) design (28%), equipment design (24%), barrier design (15%), packaging 
design (4%), and surface design (0%) (see Figure 2.10). The only minor category 
populated in the major category of equipment issues was general equipment (100%) (see 
Figure 2.11). 
 
Figure 2.9. Layout Breakdown During the Pre-Intervention Phase 
 
Figure 2.10. Usability Breakdown During the Pre-Intervention Phase 
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Figure 2.11. Equipment Issues Breakdown During the Pre-Intervention Phase 
The table below provides specific examples of the types of observations coded in 
each respective RIPCHORD-TWA major/minor category (see Table 2.5). 
Table 2.5 Examples of Specific FDs Observed and Coded in RIPCHORD-TWA 
Major Category Minor Category Example 
Communication 
(verbal and 
non-verbal) 
 
Confusion 
Trauma surgeon says "bilaterally". "What side?" 
says the scribe 
Environmental 
Noise 
Trauma surgeon made a hand gesture to the 
charge nurse from across the room asking them to 
turn down the Vocera; charge nurse didn’t 
understand; trauma surgeon said “turn down the 
extraneous noise in the room.” 
Ineffective 
Communication 
Needed an X-ray of the forearm/wrist; radiology 
tech said “I’m going to do …., You want me to 
do ….?”; physician responded, “I want you to do 
the right stuff.” 
Lack of 
Response 
Scribe yelled out to team, “Do we have a BP 
reading?”; no response 
Lack of Sharing 
Scribe calls MRI on the unit phone that is directly 
across from CT scan only to find out that MRI is 
already aware of trauma patient on their way 
Nonessential 
Communication 
Nurses discussing a test they were studying for 
Simultaneous 
Communication 
Everyone trying to update the scribe with the 
medications they had given; scribe said “Hold on! 
Hold on! I am doing too many things!” 
Coordination 
 
Charting/ 
Documentation 
Scribe was asking trauma surgeon about 
“missing” information on flow sheet while patient 
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was in CT scan 
Personnel Not 
Available 
Team was looking for the trauma surgeon; asking 
about his whereabouts 
Personnel 
Rotation 
ED physician asked for radiologist to look at 
scans; operator went to look for radiologist; he 
returned to report that the radiologist was out to 
lunch 
Planning/ 
Preparation 
Resident and team were locked out of CT room; 
resident walked around to the side entrance of the 
imaging suite to let patient and team into room 
from the inside 
Protocol Failure 
Staff started to work on patient before report was 
done. Trauma surgeon asked them to “Wait, hear 
them out” 
Unknown 
Information 
Nurse asks if blood stays with the patient; ED 
physician responds “yes please” 
Equipment 
Issues 
Anesthesia 
Equipment 
[No specific events observed/recorded] 
General 
Equipment 
Nurse said, “[ED tech], I need a new pump and I 
need a new pump quick! This one’s broken.” 
Perfusion 
Equipment 
[No specific events observed/recorded] 
Surgeon 
Equipment 
[No specific events observed/recorded] 
Interruptions 
(Other) 
 
Alerts 
Trauma surgeon asked nurse to adjust the Foley; 
it was not in correctly 
Distractions 
The nurse was called on the Vocera to assist with 
another situation; she asked if they could call 
someone else because she was still with a trauma 
patient 
Equipment/ 
Supplies  
The runner (ED tech) was asked/told to go get 
more blood again 
Interaction with 
Biohazards 
Radiology tech asked another tech to wipe down 
machine because it had blood on it 
Searching 
Activity 
Team member asked radiology tech for a nasal 
cannula; radiology tech pointed out where they 
were in the CT hallway 
Spilling/ 
Dropping 
The surgical attending was kicking trash/stuff on 
the floor out of the way so that he could brace 
himself properly 
Task Deviation 
Scribe says "I need two units of blood now"; ED 
tech must stop blood draw to get blood from 
pharmacy 
Teaching 
Moments 
One radiology tech explaining to another 
radiology tech how to operate the X-ray machine; 
had to provide direction 
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Layout 
Connector 
Positioning 
Team had to move one IV pole/ stylus to get to 
another one; however, when they tried to pull on 
it they realized it wouldn’t move freely because it 
was connected to the outlet 
Equipment 
Positioning 
Someone has to move a cart out of the way to 
allow radiology tech to move out with equipment 
Furniture 
Positioning 
Difficulty opening Omnicell drawers all the way 
because a desk (not currently being used) was in 
the way 
Inadequate 
Space 
7 team members are crowded around monitor in 
corner by trauma bay #1 door looking at X-rays 
Permanent 
Structures 
Positioning 
As patient is leaving trauma bay to go to CT the 
bed gets snagged on door and has to be reversed 
Wires/Tubing 
Staff adjusting lines prior to transferring to CT 
machine 
Usability 
Barrier Design 
Team member is stuck in their Personal 
Protective Equipment (PPE) and needs someone 
to help her get it undone in the back 
Computer 
Design 
Radiology techs looking at images and questions 
if “[the patient’s] too low”; the other one says 
“No, I think you’re fine”; then radiology tech tells 
the one operating the computer that it’s not a 
touch screen; radiology tech says “Oh, that 
explains it” 
Data Entry 
(non-computer) 
Design 
Scribe visibly frustrated with the layout of the 
trauma flow sheet (regarding the location of 
certain items in particular) 
Equipment 
Design 
Belmont rapid infuser rate drops because it is 
running on battery 
Packaging 
Design 
A team member walked over to help the ED 
physician open/pull out the chest tube kit (in 
general there was a lot of equipment used and it 
took a lot of time to open each of these kits/sets 
of equipment) 
Surface Design [No specific events observed/recorded] 
 
Similar to the analysis of the major categories, the fine-grained analysis revealed 
some differences between resuscitation and imaging that are notable. The most prevalent 
types of communication disruptions observed in resuscitation were lack of response 
(36%) and ineffective communication (31%), which occurred almost twice as often in 
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resuscitation than in imaging (14% and 17%, respectively). On the other hand, 
nonessential communication (55%) represented the largest threat to communication in 
imaging, but was observed less frequently in resuscitation (28%) (see Figure 2.12). 
 
Figure 2.12. Communication Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the Pre-
Intervention Phase 
 
With respect to interruptions, the most frequently occurring disruption in 
resuscitation was spilling/dropping (40%) as compared to imaging (12%). Distractions 
posed the largest threat to the team in imaging (39%), but not during resuscitation (10%) 
(see Figure 2.13). 
 
Figure 2.13. Interruptions Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the Pre-
Intervention Phase 
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In both resuscitation and imaging, breakdowns in coordination most often took 
the form of issues related to planning/preparation (43% and 29%, respectively). However, 
issues with charting/documentation (29%) occurred just as often as those related to 
planning/preparation in imaging. Following planning/preparation issues, unknown 
information (22%) was the next largest coordination issue in resuscitation. In imaging, 
personnel not available (20%) was the next most frequently occurring disruption (see 
Figure 2.14). 
 
Figure 2.14. Coordination Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the Pre-
Intervention Phase 
 
There were several differences involving the specific types of layout issues 
involved in resuscitation and imaging. Inadequate space was the largest contributor to 
disruptions in resuscitation (48%) and it continued to be somewhat of a factor in imaging 
(28%) as well. On the other hand, wires and tubing issues comprised of 65% of the 
disruptions in imaging, whereas these issues were not as prevalent in resuscitation (20%) 
(see Figure 2.15). 
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Figure 2.15. Layout Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the Pre-
Intervention Phase 
 
  The final two major categories, usability and equipment issues were both lightly 
populated overall, representing only 5% and 2% of disruptions, respectively. With respect 
to usability, the most populated minor category was computer design (38%) in 
resuscitation, followed by equipment design (27%). However, the most prevalent 
disruptions in imaging were related to data entry (non-computer) design issues (71%) 
compared to only 8% in resuscitation (see Figure 2.16). Finally, equipment issues were 
made up entirely of general equipment issues for both resuscitation and imaging and 
occurred almost evenly in both treatment areas (see Figure 2.17). 
 
A PROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATION AT A LEVEL II TRAUMA CENTER 59      
 
Figure 2.16. Usability Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the Pre-
Intervention Phase 
 
 
Figure 2.17. Equipment Issues Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the Pre-
Intervention Phase 
 
Frequency Comparisons 
Frequency data was compared between the clinical phases of care (resuscitation 
and imaging) using chi-square statistic (x2) goodness of fit tests. Alpha levels were 
adjusted accordingly to maintain the family-wise error rate at p<=.05. The chi-square 
statistic (x2) refers to comparing the expected values (Ei) with the values that are 
collected (Oi) and is one way to show a relationship, or contingency, between two 
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categorical variables. A significant chi-square indicates that the two variables are 
significantly related. A chi-square test (x2) is the statistic of choice when the DV is a 
frequency count, however, it is sensitive to sample size in that no cell has an expected 
value less than one and no more than 20% of the cells can have an expected cell 
frequency less than five (Bordens & Abbott, 2014; Boslaugh & Watters, 2008). The 
formula for the chi-square statistic (x2) is depicted below (see Figure 2.18). 
 
Figure 2.18. Chi-square statistic (x2) 
 Major categories by phases of care (resuscitation and imaging). For the major 
category communication, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated there was not a 
significant difference in the frequency of communication disruptions identified in the 
resuscitation phase of clinical care (32%) as compared with the imaging phase (32%), x2 
(1, n=1137) =0.038, p=0.846. 
For the major category coordination, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated 
there was a significant difference in the frequency of coordination disruptions identified 
in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (17%) as compared with the imaging phase 
(26%), x2 (1, n=1137) =14.087, p=0.000. 
For the major category equipment issues, a chi-square goodness of fit test 
indicated there was not a significant difference in the frequency of equipment-related 
disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (2%) as compared with 
the imaging phase (2%), x2 (1, n=1137) =0.513, p=0.474. 
For the major category interruptions, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated 
there was not a significant difference in the frequency of interruption disruptions 
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identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (28%) as compared with the imaging 
phase (24%), x2 (1, n=1137) =3.385, p=0.66. 
For the major category layout, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated there 
was not a significant difference in the frequency of layout disruptions identified in the 
resuscitation phase of clinical care (15%) as compared with the imaging phase (14%), x2 
(1, n=1137) =0.052, p=0.819. 
For the major category usability, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated there 
was a significant difference in the frequency of usability disruptions identified in the 
resuscitation phase of clinical care (7%) as compared with the imaging phase (3%), x2 (1, 
n=1137) =9.626, p=0.002. 
Minor categories by phases of care (resuscitation and imaging). Once 37 
minor categories are broken down into treatment areas, the data sets become smaller or 
more sparsely distributed, therefore, in order to avoid skewing the data, the chi-square 
test included only those minor categories with an observed cell frequency of five or more.  
For the minor category ineffective communication, a chi-square goodness of fit test 
indicated there was a significant difference in the frequency of ineffective 
communication disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (31%) as 
compared with the imaging phase (17%), x2 (1, n=1008) =10.890, p=0.001. 
For the minor category lack of response, a chi-square goodness of fit test 
indicated there was a significant difference in the frequency of lack of response 
disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (36%) as compared with 
the imaging phase (14%), x2 (1, n=1008) =24.178, p=0.000. 
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For the minor category confusion, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated there 
was not a significant difference in the frequency of confusion disruptions identified in the 
resuscitation phase of clinical care (5%) as compared with the imaging phase (6%), x2 (1, 
n=1008) =0.006, p=0.940. 
For the minor category nonessential communication, a chi-square goodness of fit 
test indicated there was a significant difference in the frequency of nonessential 
communication disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (17%) as 
compared with the imaging phase (55%), x2 (1, n=1008) =35.633, p=0.000. 
For the minor category personnel not available, a chi-square goodness of fit test 
indicated there was a significant difference in the frequency of personnel not available 
disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (9%) as compared with 
the imaging phase (20%), x2 (1, n=1008) =10.477, p=0.001. 
For the minor category unknown information, a chi-square goodness of fit test 
indicated there was not a significant difference in the frequency of unknown information 
disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (22%) as compared with 
the imaging phase (16%), x2 (1, n=1008) =0.037, p=0.848. 
For the minor category protocol failure, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated 
there was not a significant difference in the frequency of protocol failure disruptions 
identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (14%) as compared with the imaging 
phase (5%), x2 (1, n=1008) =2.231, p=0.135. 
For the minor category charting/documentation, a chi-square goodness of fit test 
indicated there was a significant difference in the frequency of charting/documentation 
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disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (12%) as compared with 
the imaging phase (28%), x2 (1, n=1008) =14.493, p=0.000. 
For the minor category planning/preparation, a chi-square goodness of fit test 
indicated there was not a significant difference in the frequency of planning/preparation 
disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (43%) as compared with 
the imaging phase (29%), x2 (1, n=1008) =.013, p=0.909. 
For the minor category general equipment issues, a chi-square goodness of fit test 
indicated there was not a significant difference in the frequency of general equipment-
related issues identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (100%) as compared 
with the imaging phase (100%), x2 (1, n=1137) =0.280, p=0.597. 
For the minor category distractions, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated 
there was a significant difference in the frequency of distractions disruptions identified in 
the resuscitation phase of clinical care (10%) as compared with the imaging phase (39%), 
x2 (1, n=1008) =17.320, p=0.000. 
For the minor category teaching moment, a chi-square goodness of fit test 
indicated there was not a significant difference in the frequency of teaching moment 
disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (10%) as compared with 
the imaging phase (11%), x2 (1, n=1008) =0.430, p=0.512. 
For the minor category searching activity, a chi-square goodness of fit test 
indicated there was not a significant difference in the frequency of searching activity 
disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (11%) as compared with 
the imaging phase (7%), x2 (1, n=1008) =3.279, p=0.070. 
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For the minor category task deviation, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated 
there was not a significant difference in the frequency of task deviation disruptions 
identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (5%) as compared with the imaging 
phase (5%), x2 (1, n=1008) =0.099, p=0.753. 
For the minor category alerts, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated there was 
not a significant difference in the frequency of alert-related disruptions identified in the 
resuscitation phase of clinical care (7%) as compared with the imaging phase (13%), x2 
(1, n=1008) =0.751, p=0.386. 
For the minor category equipment/supplies, a chi-square goodness of fit test 
indicated there was not a significant difference in the frequency of equipment/supplies 
disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (16%) as compared with 
the imaging phase (14%), x2 (1, n=1008) =2.236, p=0.135. 
For the minor category spilling/dropping, a chi-square goodness of fit test 
indicated there was a significant difference in the frequency of spilling/dropping 
disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (40%) as compared with 
the imaging phase (12%), x2 (1, n=1008) =38.568, p=0.000. 
For the minor category inadequate space, a chi-square goodness of fit test 
indicated there was a significant difference in the frequency of inadequate space 
disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (48%) as compared with 
the imaging phase (28%), x2 (1, n=1008) =7.087, p=0.008. 
For the minor category wires/tubing, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated 
there was a significant difference in the frequency of wires/tubing disruptions identified 
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in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (20%) as compared with the imaging phase 
(65%), x2 (1, n=1008) =15.996, p=0.000. 
Discussion 
Analysis of data collected during the pre-intervention phase revealed that the 
trauma team experienced an average of 17.5 disruptions per case, translating to one 
disruption every two minutes. Communication related disruptions were most prevalent, 
followed by interruptions and issues related to coordination. These results were similar to 
related research in various healthcare domains (Blocker et al., 2012; Blocker et al., 2013; 
Catchpole et al., 2013; Catchpole et al., 2014; Shouhed et al., 2014; Wiegmann, et al., 
2007). Disruptions associated with layout, usability, and equipment comprised the 
remainder of disruptions.  
While the identification of the major types of disruptions is important, this alone 
does not provide the detail necessary to generate targeted, data-driven interventions. To 
accomplish this, a fine-grained analysis was performed by classifying the data into minor 
RIPCHORD-TWA categories. Additionally, in order to move away from the “one size 
fits all” paradigm, the data analysis was further separated by treatment phase 
(resuscitation or imaging).  
The fine-grained analysis revealed three categories that accounted for the majority 
of communication-related disruptions in resuscitation and imaging: nonessential 
communication, lack of response, and ineffective communication. Perhaps these issues 
are related to the inherent differences in training received by nurses and physicians. As 
explained by Thomas, Bertram, and Johnson (2009), nurses are generally taught to be 
descriptive in their thought and language while physicians are trained to be concise in 
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thought and speak using shorter narratives. For instance, lack of response and ineffective 
communication posed a greater threat during resuscitation, whereas nonessential 
communication occurred more frequently during imaging. This is not surprising, given 
the nature of the treatment during those phases. In resuscitation, a multidisciplinary team 
comprised of a minimum of 8-10 team members is responsible for stabilization of a 
critically injured patient. This process occurs at a fast pace and demands that multiple 
interactions occur concurrently, heightening the propensity for dropped requests. On the 
other hand, once the patient is stable and situated in the CT scanner, there is more down 
time, relatively speaking. This provides an interim of reduced intensity, which fosters a 
relaxed environment that is more conducive to nonessential communication. 
Nevertheless, the importance of remaining alert to sudden changes in patient status 
during this time cannot be emphasized enough.  
Within the major category of interruptions, the most populated minor categories 
were spilling/dropping and distractions. These categories not only accounted for the 
greatest number of disruptions, they were the most disparate between resuscitation and 
imaging. The spilling and dropping of items occurred much more often during 
resuscitation than imaging. The combination of fast-paced resuscitation efforts alongside 
team member’s interaction with various equipment and supplies may explain the 
prevalence of issues related to spilling/dropping. On the other hand, distractions 
represented a greater threat during imaging. This is consistent with the high volume of 
nonessential communication during this time. Additionally, team members wear a 
portable communication device around their necks called a Vocera Communication 
Badge, which is tied to a communication software platform that is internal to the hospital. 
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Oftentimes, trauma team members, and more specifically, nurses, were interrupted by 
their Vocera device with questions unrelated to trauma that were regarding their primary 
patients in the ED. A major difference between the trauma teams working in a Level II 
and Level I facility is the non-intact nature of the team. It is comprised of 
multidisciplinary group of individuals that must quickly leave their principal duties to 
respond to the unscheduled arrival of a trauma patient. Interestingly, these findings are 
similar to those of studies conducted at a Level I trauma center, which found FDs to be 
most prevalent during the imaging phase of patient care (Shouhed et al., 2014). 
Disruptions related to the retrieval of equipment and/or supplies due to an 
unforeseen need were the next most frequent issue in both treatment areas. It is difficult 
to stock or carry every imaginable item that may be necessary when caring for a dynamic 
and relatively unpredictable patient load. For example, in one trauma case, a pacifier was 
retrieved from another location for an infant who was crying during the CT scan. 
The importance of effective coordination is vital to the safe and efficient care of 
trauma patients. Coordination is difficult to manage in a hectic trauma environment, 
where space restrictions, time constraints, and the number of personnel involved pose 
unique challenges to providing optimal patient care. Overall, the fine-grained analysis 
indicated that planning/preparation issues occurred most frequently, with a substantial 
number of these issues observed during resuscitation, however, they continued to be 
present fairly often in imaging as well. This observation may again be a manifestation of 
the unique team structure within a Level II center that does not have an intact, dedicated 
trauma team. Therefore, at the outset of a trauma patient’s unscheduled arrival there may 
be no clear leader in the trauma suite until the trauma surgeon arrives, possibly up to 15 
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minutes later. Related research in aviation suggests that “rostered” teams (i.e., non-intact 
teams) are less effective than “fixed” teams. For instance, rostered teams, unlike fixed 
teams, do not call each other out on safety infractions (Barach & Weinger, 2007). 
Charting/documentation and personnel not available followed 
planning/preparation in terms of frequency, however, both issues were more prevalent 
during imaging. Unknown information disruptions occurred at about the same rate in 
both phases of care. Charting/documentation functions rest largely on the shoulders of the 
primary nurse/scribe, or nurse recorder. Trauma resuscitation efforts are complex and 
time-pressured during the initial evaluation and treatment of severely injured patients. 
Yet, the system relies heavily on handwritten records and manual data entry for recording 
and time stamping events. All the while, most of the information is conveyed verbally in 
an unorganized fashion (Sarcevic, 2010). It makes sense that during the time when the 
patient is in the CT scanner the primary nurse/scribe would tend to play catch up and 
often recruit the help of other team members to ensure that the trauma flow sheet (the 
only record of patient care) is as error-free as possible. 
Disruptions associated with personnel not available speak to one of the more 
significant differences between a Level I and a Level II trauma center. This may also 
account for the increase in disruptions related to personnel not available specifically in 
imaging. After the patient is stabilized in resuscitation, personnel enlisted from other 
departments may migrate back to their primary duty stations, rendering them unavailable 
should the need for their services arise again. This speaks to the previously discussed 
disruption related to equipment/supplies, which involves the need for personnel to 
temporarily leave to retrieve an item or a medication due to an unforeseeable need. 
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Disruptions related to wires and tubing issues posed the greatest threat to layout. 
There was a greater frequency of these types of disruptions in imaging as compared to 
resuscitation. This is consistent with the observation that medical personnel must not only 
physically move the patient into a confined space but also manage auxiliary clinical 
equipment. On the other hand, inadequate space and equipment positioning posed more 
of an issue during resuscitation than during imaging. This finding is understandable 
considering the large number of personnel operating in a limited space around the patient. 
This issue was exacerbated by the continuous need to reposition equipment (e.g., portable 
X-ray machines) so that medical personnel could accomplish their individual clinical 
tasks. 
 The last two major RIPCHORD-TWA categories, usability and equipment issues 
were substantially less populated than the other categories (54 and 20 total disruptions, 
respectively), which makes it difficult to draw definitive conclusions based on the results 
of the data analysis. 
Minor Categories Selected for Data-driven Intervention 
Systematic analysis of the data and guidance from experienced human factors 
researchers helped guide trauma administrators in deciding which types of disruptions 
would be selected for intervention development. Results were communicated to the 
Trauma Services Manager (TSM) and the Trauma Program Medical Director (TPMD) to 
help them make an informed decision. 
Overall, considering the rank of communication failures as the most populated 
major category for FDs, it was deemed beneficial to identify one or two of its minor 
categories to target for intervention development. Nonessential communication 
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disruptions (37%) occurred at the highest rates within communication. Therefore, it was 
recommended that nonessential communication be considered for future intervention 
development. Although lack of response was the next most frequently occurring minor 
category (25%), it was decided instead to explore interventions for ineffective 
communication disruptions (24%). It was postulated that targeting specific issues related 
to ineffective communication, which is formally defined in RIPCHORD-TWA as 
“communication between two or more individuals that does not achieve its desired goal 
(i.e., not covered by the other categories),” would most likely have a magnifying effect. 
Rather than focusing narrowly on a single, very specific type of communication issue, it 
was believed that efforts to improve communication in general would have a positive 
influence on other areas of communication, and therefore, deliver “bigger bang for the 
buck,” so to speak. 
The next most populated major category was interruptions and within this 
category, disruptions related to spilling/dropping (27%) occurred the most often overall 
but to a much lesser degree in imaging. Whereas distraction-related disruptions (24%) 
occurred only slightly less than spilling/dropping in general, it posed a greater threat 
during imaging. As mentioned previously, resuscitation efforts tend to be hurried and 
fast-paced, which may explain the prevalence of issues related to spilling/dropping in this 
treatment area. Perhaps the introduction of a large mobile trash container to encourage a 
more convenient way to throw away packaging and other materials may be a simple 
solution. On the other hand, distractions can be more insidious. It is formally defined in 
RIPCHORD-TWA as “non-essential personnel and other interruptions that draw attention 
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away from the current task.” Therefore, it was recommended to include distractions as an 
area to explore in regards to intervention development. 
Coordination was also a highly populated major category and the most prevalent 
disruption (37%) within coordination was planning/preparation. Planning/preparation is 
formally defined in RIPCHORD-TWA as “the failure to establish a common set of goals 
and/or procedures to accomplish a given task (e.g., having the necessary equipment to 
complete the procedure).” Therefore, it was recommended that planning/preparation be 
added to the list of minor categories that would be used to develop data-driven 
interventions. 
In summary, based on results of the fine-grained analysis and input from the TSM 
and the TPMD, four minor categories were ultimately selected for data-driven 
intervention development: 1) ineffective communication, 2) nonessential communication, 
3) distractions, and 4) planning/preparation. These four targeted areas were deemed to 
potentially have the greatest positive impact on quality and efficiency of patient care. It 
was determined that these categories were highest in priority and, due to time and 
practical limitations, should be the first and only four categories addressed in the initial 
stages of the iterative process. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERVENTION DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
Implementing quality improvement interventions and ensuring their success has 
always posed a challenge in healthcare. Case in point, two recent studies reported that 
mandated surgical checklists in Ontario, Canada and in Intensive Care Units (ICUs) in 
Brazil had no beneficial effect in reducing in-hospital mortality (Authors/Writing Group 
for the CHCKLIST-ICU Investigators and the Brazilian Research in Intensive Care 
Network (BRICNet), 2016; Urbach, Govindarajan, Saskin, Wilton, & Baxter, 2014). Yet, 
beginning with Haynes et al. (2009), which included Gawande, general and endocrine 
surgeon and author of The Checklist Manifesto, and a number of other studies conducted 
since that time, researchers have demonstrated that checklists are remarkably successful 
and have been shown to reduce surgical complications and mortality by more than 30% 
(Leape, 2014). Even so, it is not surprising that some quality initiatives fail due to 
breakdowns in the implementation process and a lack of understanding that the “how” is 
just as important as the “what” (Sundt, 2011; Wiegmann, 2015). Too often, 
organizational decision makers, consultants, researchers, and the like create solutions and 
deploy intervention ideas utilizing a “throw spaghetti at the wall and see what sticks” 
approach, rather than seeking out an in-depth understanding of the intervention itself as 
well as the complex and dynamic forces at work in the implementation process. 
Wiegmann (2015) proposed a sociotechnical systems approach, which involves 
dynamic interactions among system variables (i.e., people, tasks, technology, 
environment, workplace factors) and transitions through specific phases of development 
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to achieve intervention success. To sum it up, Leape (2014) labels intervention failures as 
“a social problem of human behavior and interaction” and suggests “…successful system 
change requires demonstrating the need for change, engaging institutional leadership, 
collecting data, and most important, providing training in teamwork so that everyone 
feels respected and accountable. The WHO [World Health Organization] recommends 
adapting the surgical safety checklist to suit local needs, an approach that furthers team 
building and a sense of ownership” (p. 1063). Leape (2014) offers this insight based on 
his familiarity with a number of successful patient safety initiatives over the years. In 
particular, he points to successful endeavors by Pronovost and colleagues with the 
Keystone ICU project (Pronovost & Goeschel, 2005) and catheter-related bloodstream 
infections (Pronovost et al., 2006). Pronovost and Goeschel (2005) outlined a five-step 
approach for the introduction of safer care interventions in the ICU that reduced the risk 
of medical errors. They contend that their model and interventions could be replicated in 
any setting, with any advocates willing to embrace major change (Pronovost & Goeschel, 
2005). 
Previous studies in a Level I trauma center (Blocker et al., 2012; Blocker et al., 
2013; Catchpole et al., 2013; Catchpole et al., 2014; Shouhed et al., 2014) studied FDs 
throughout the entire trauma care process (multiple trauma resuscitation bays, CT 
imaging rooms, and ORs) and attempted to apply a “total systems analysis” to deploy 
“complex subsystem interventions” (i.e., sociotechnical interventions), which included 
task-, team-, environment-, and equipment-related solutions (Catchpole et al., 2014, p. 
E2). Their analysis suggested targeted interventions related to coordination problems, 
communication failures, and equipment issues. In addition to using FD observations to 
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define problematic areas marked for improvement and to identify solutions, the 
researchers conducted process mapping, interviews, and safety culture questionnaires. 
From these interactions, a short list of subsystem interventions was developed and 
deployed such as equipment storage, medication packs, employing a whiteboard, pre-
briefing, and teamwork training. Observational measures were re-initiated to gauge their 
effectiveness. They found that this type of human factors subsystem approach reduced 
FDs, treatment time, and length of patient stay (Catchpole et al., 2014). 
Similarly, Hildebrand (2014) investigated the relationship between non-routine 
events (NREs) which can be defined synonymously with FDs and team briefing 
characteristics, in addition to variations in their communications in gynecological 
surgery. The findings indicated that improving orientation briefings prior to surgical 
procedures as well as variations within the team briefing (i.e., who was present, who led 
the briefing, the timing of the briefing, the amount of communication), were associated 
with fewer FDs observed during subsequent surgical procedures (Hildebrand, 2014). 
However, it is unknown if either of these studies experienced long lasting clinical 
benefits utilizing their respective interventional approaches. 
Another compelling framework for guiding the development of interventions is 
Haddon’s Matrix. This framework originated over 40 years ago and was used to apply 
basic principles of public health to the problem of traffic safety. It is a conceptual model 
that can be used to generate a list of prevention strategies in order to address a variety of 
injuries or other public health problems (Runyan, 1998). 
Just as this investigation has generated substantive data and empirical evidence, 
devising comprehensive interventions to mitigate identified inefficiencies should also 
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follow suit. In order to best capitalize on the unique potential for successful patient safety 
initiatives, an evidence-based, system-wide collaboration approach was decidedly 
paramount. Rather than using a traditional interventional approach, which tends to fall 
flat in the real world, the researchers utilized an interventional technique that is driven by 
empirical findings and relies on input from multidisciplinary healthcare professionals. 
This method allowed practitioners on the front line to implement customized 
interventions to problems they face on a regular basis. The benefit of this method was 
that it allowed the "people in the trenches," or those individuals who have intimate 
knowledge of existing threats to safety, to weigh in with respect to improving 
performance in their own workplace. Fortunately, a more systematic methodology for 
generating intervention and prevention strategies in this manner already existed. 
Human Factors Intervention Matrix (HFIX) 
 The Human Factors Intervention Matrix (HFIX) is a system based on human 
factor engineering principles that allows organizations to implement targeted, data-driven 
interventions with the ultimate goal of reducing human error. This concept was 
developed as an extension to the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
(HFACS) framework conceived by Wiegmann and Shappell (2003). HFACS analyses 
help identify underlying human factors issues that contribute to accident, incidents, and 
near-misses in aviation as well as a number of other complex systems. By using the 
HFACS framework to analyze aviation accidents one can identify areas in need of 
improvement, and then, begin to develop interventions to address those specific 
problems. This dynamic whole-systems approach to the safety management process, 
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which includes generating interventions and prevention strategies, is portrayed in a flow 
diagram below (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003) (see Figure 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.1. HFACS System Management Process 
 Shappell and Wiegmann (2006) also provided a comprehensive systematic 
methodology for identifying prospective interventions and ensuring the most expansive 
assortment of interventions were considered to address the weak areas being targeted. It 
is akin to the original Haddon Matrix method, which shows the host, agent, and 
environmental factors set against the time sequence of an incident (Haddon, 1972). 
Below is an illustration of the Haddon Matrix for a motor vehicle collision (Haddon, 
1972) (see Figure 3.2). 
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Host 
(person affected) 
Agent or vehicle 
Physical 
environment 
Social environment 
Pre-event 
(→ primary 
prevention) 
Driving skill; 
Time pressures  
(in a rush to get 
home?); 
Inebriated? 
Car design & 
handling; 
Anti-lock 
brakes, etc.; 
Maintenance of 
car 
Road design; 
Speed limits 
Reliance on 
private, rather than 
public 
transportation 
raises traffic load; 
Compliance with 
seatbelt laws 
During the 
event 
(→ secondary 
prevention) 
Wearing 
seatbelt? 
Air bags 
working? 
Size of car & 
crash resistance 
Weather 
conditions; 
ice on road? 
Quality of 
emergency 
assistance; 
Assistance from 
bystanders 
Post-event 
(→ tertiary 
prevention) 
Ability to call 
for help 
(phone 
available?); 
Knows first aid? 
Tendency of car 
to catch on fire 
Emergency 
vehicle access to 
collision site 
Continued funding 
for emergency 
services 
Figure 3.2. Haddon Matrix for a Motor Vehicle Collision 
The addition of a third dimension emphasized the multidisciplinary nature of potential 
interventions and provided value criteria (e.g., feasibility) in the decision-making process 
(Haddon, 1972; Runyan, 1998). 
 Along these same lines, the HFIX methodology ensures that factors affecting 
human performance are addressed at multiple levels from multiple directions, thereby 
promoting the development of effective interventions. This unique human factors 
engineering process of developing and implementing targeted, data-driven interventions 
utilizes SMEs. SMEs are those individuals on the front line of an organization as well as 
administrative personnel. Together, the SMEs generate (e.g., brainstorm) intervention 
strategies aimed at addressing specific human factors and accident causal issues. In other 
words, this tool provides a systematic way of forcing individuals and groups to think 
outside of the box (S. Shappell, personal communication, August 10, 2016). The HFIX 
framework pits identified threats against five different intervention approaches, also 
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known as traditional intervention approaches. These capture the underlying causal 
mechanisms of human error and serve as fundamental ways to address the root causes of 
errors and inefficiencies in systems design (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2006). The five 
intervention approaches, or dimensions, are as follows (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2006):   
1. Human/Crew-Centered: focuses on how the human can be improved or changes to 
affect performance and reduce errors 
2. Technology/Engineering-Centered: focuses on the use of tools/technology to 
replace or augment human performance 
3. Technical/Physical Environment-Centered: focuses on the threat to operational or 
personal safety posed by a situation, event, or hazard 
4. Task/Procedure-Centered: focuses on ways to change the nature of a task to reduce 
errors 
5. Organizational/Supervisory-Centered: focuses on how the organization can be 
changed to improve performance and reduce errors 
 While generating specific interventions participants are encouraged to be as 
specific, open, and free-thinking as possible and to not concern themselves with the 
“how’s,” cost, feasibility, or effectiveness of implementing the intervention ideas. 
According to Haddon (as cited in Runyan, 1998), “intervention feasibility” is an 
important consideration, but it should not be contemplated until all other elements have 
been thought out (p. 305). Haddon (as cited in Runyan, 1998) explained, “…by 
considering feasibility too early, creativity may be stifled and options excluded that may, 
in fact, be judged highly desirable by other criteria” (p. 305). 
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While HFIX may prove useful in generating a number of comprehensive 
intervention strategies, organizations cannot implement every single recommendation 
conceived. Consequently, evaluation of each individual suggested intervention is 
conducted during the next stage in the process. Participants in groups are asked to rank 
the intervention ideas using the following five criteria: 1) Feasibility, 2) Acceptability, 3) 
Cost, 4) Effectiveness, and 5) Sustainability (FACES). Each of these assessment criteria 
are rated on a 5-point Likert scale, where 1 indicates “worst” and 5 indicates “best”. 
FACES rankings can then be used to determine which interventions should be selected 
for implementation (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2006). The criteria used to assess the 
interventions is as follows (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2006): 
1. Feasibility refers to raters considering the question “Can it be done?” 
2. Acceptability refers to raters considering the question “Will operators accept it?” 
3. Cost refers to raters considering the question “Can we afford it?” 
4. Effectiveness refers to raters considering the question “Will it work?” 
5. Sustainability refers to raters considering the question “Will it last?” 
 This process is designed to operate similarly to that of a matrix, which is why it is 
so named. The final product is represented in a cubed structure such as the one presented 
here (see Figure 3.3). This figure represents the threats identified against the intervention 
approaches and evaluation criteria. Although this process may appear complex, in reality, 
organizational decision makers utilize this third dimension all the time. Applying this 
HFIX framework to map specific interventions onto a matrix can provide a broader 
perspective while also enabling a more structured approach to intervention development 
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2006). 
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Figure 3.3. Example of an HFIX Cube (HFIX3) 
  A key feature of the HFIX approach is to engender a feeling of investment and 
accountability, ultimately, promoting a sense of ownership of the intervention tool by all 
stakeholders in the process. The inability to include those at the “sharp end of spear,” or 
worse yet, intentionally excluding their input, is one of the reasons why quality initiatives 
often fail (Leape, 2014). For example, Leape (2014) responded to the Urbach et al. 
(2014) study with strong criticism—98% of the Ontario hospitals self-reported using a 
checklist, and of those who provided a copy of their checklist (92 out of 101 hospitals), 
90% used an unmodified checklist. Leape (2014) insists that one cannot just “tick” off 
items on a checklist instead it is more than that; it’s a tool for making sure teams 
communicate. He goes on to suggest that more needs to be done to support “local” efforts 
to implement checklists, including allowing those at the “sharp end” to make it their own 
(Leape, 2014). This represents a fundamental belief in a commitment to empowerment 
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and accountability for front line personnel (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008). It is 
imperative that researchers and developers design and apply the right tools and cultivate 
the right environment to help caregivers attain their full potential. To that end, it is 
evident that RIPCHORD-TWA is the “right” tool to employ to investigate FDs 
threatening the efficient delivery of patient care in a Level II trauma center. It has 
delivered on its promise to identify and classify disruptions in trauma care. With the 
application of HFIX, another “right” tool for the job, it is expected that the information 
gained from RIPCHORD-TWA can be used to develop targeted, data-driven 
interventions to address and potentially mitigate those disruptions. Rather than using 
HFIX to focus on accident investigation and error data, which was its original purpose, 
this framework could be used proactively to study the rates of precursor events, a much 
richer source of data, and ensure that organizations have sufficiently filled the gaps in 
their safety, quality, and efficiency programs. 
Method 
Multidisciplinary Knowledge Elicitation (MKE)/HFIX Activity 
 A multidisciplinary knowledge elicitation (MKE) exercise was conducted on June 
19, 2015 involving 19 SMEs and interdisciplinary personnel that included seven ED 
nurses, four trauma surgeons, four ED technicians, three administrative personnel, and a 
chaplain. Four human factors researchers facilitated the brainstorming exercise during 
which intervention strategies were developed aimed at reducing the occurrence of the 
four selected minor category threats to the trauma system: 1) ineffective communication, 
2) nonessential communication, 3) distractions, and 4) planning/preparation. On May 29, 
2015, an email was sent to ED staff inviting those interested in participating to attend the 
A PROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATION AT A LEVEL II TRAUMA CENTER 82      
upcoming brainstorming session (see Appendix A). Participants were required to notify 
the TSM if they were planning to attend. Participants were compensated with non-
productive pay by the hospital for their time. In advance of the meeting, respondents were 
assigned to five groups in an effort to ensure that each group was representative of a 
robust grouping of various hospital personnel and disciplines within trauma services. 
Table 3.1 shows the group assignments and their roles (see Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1 MKE Group Assignment and Roles 
 
Group 1 Group 4 
Trauma Surgeon (M.D.) ED Nurse (R.N.) 
ED Charge Nurse (R.N.) Patient Access Manager 
Chaplain Trauma Services Manager (R.N) 
ED Educator  
Group 2 Group 5 
Trauma Medical Director (M.D.) ED Nurse (R.N.) 
ED Nurse (R.N.) ED Technician 
Orthopedic Tech Manager (R.O.T.) Radiology Technician 
Trauma Registrar (R.N., Retired)  
Group 3  
Trauma Surgeon (M.D.)  
ED Nurse (R.N.)  
ED Educator  
ED Technician  
  
 
 HFIX forms were created for each of the four specific areas targeted: 1) 
ineffective communication, 2) nonessential communication, 3) distractions, and 4) 
planning/preparation. Each process inefficiency form included its RIPCHORD-TWA 
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taxonomy definition, a description of the HFIX dimension on which to focus on (Human, 
Technology, Task, Environmental, or Organization), space to write up to 15 intervention 
ideas, and columns to rank each intervention using the FACES criteria (see Appendix B). 
A Microsoft PowerPoint presentation was delivered to provide a brief overview of the 
research objectives as well as analyses and results of pre-intervention FD data observed. 
Also, the purpose of the MKE and the HFIX model was explained and instructions were 
given that included a detailed description of the five HFIX dimensions and FACES 
criteria. Examples of specific FDs observed were also provided for each specific area 
targeted and remained on the projector screen for reference throughout the exercise. 
Copies of a detailed description of the five HFIX dimensions were available for reference 
throughout the exercise (see Appendix C). Individual groups were asked to generate 
various types of remedial approaches that centered around a specific process inefficiency 
and were based on one of the five HFIX dimensions. Each group was given 
approximately 15 minutes to write down as many ideas as possible. The forms were 
rotated from one table to the next so that each group could repeat the process for a 
different minor category process inefficiency and dimension. After all groups had the 
opportunity to generate interventions for each specific process inefficiency and HFIX 
dimension, forms were rotated again and the groups were asked to rank the generated 
interventions on a 5-point Likert scale, from 1 being “worst” to 5 being “best” using 
FACES. They were given approximately five minutes to discuss their rankings of each 
intervention listed for a specific process inefficiency and dimension. The forms were then 
rotated to another table so that the next group could repeat the process on a different 
process inefficiency and dimension. After all groups had the opportunity to rank all of the 
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intervention ideas the meeting was adjourned. The entire process took approximately two 
hours to complete.  
 A schematic was developed based on the HFACS and HFIX intervention 
generation model to illustrate the unique process undertaken at this hospital. It was aptly 
called the Safety Systems Management Process (SSMP). It borrows from the insights of 
an effective SMS, which was grounded in quality management principles as well as 
quality tools and methods aimed at reducing accident rates. An SMS must be a closed-
loop system that requires constant monitoring, evaluation, and feedback into the system 
(Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008) (see Figure 3.4). 
 
Figure 3.4. Safety Systems Management Process (SSMP) 
The specific task of those participating in the MKE is represented in the HFIX 
Cube (HFIX3) as shown (see Figure 3.5). 
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Figure 3.5. Intervention Generation Task Represented in the HFIX Cube (HFIX3) 
Intervention ideas and rankings from FACES were transferred to a Microsoft 
Excel Workbook in rank order from highest to lowest. The highest-ranking qualitative 
data was analyzed by the human factors researchers to derive themes, or patterned 
responses, by comparing theme frequencies, identifying theme co-occurrences, and 
organizing relationships between the differing themes. Researchers also provided 
commentary regarding whether an idea represented a clear intervention targeted at the 
intended process inefficiency or if it was not specific enough. Finally, the file was 
reviewed with the TSM and the TPMD for intervention selection. 
Results 
MKE/HFIX Activity Results 
A total of 97 interventions were generated during the brainstorming portion of the 
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exercise. Based on results from the FACES ranking task, 34 potential interventions were 
considered for implementation. Table 3.2 lists the highest ranked intervention ideas 
targeting each specific minor category threat (see Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2 Highest Ranked Interventions Generated as a Result of the MKE 
Targeted Threat 
Group 
Submitting 
High Ranking Intervention 
Ineffective 
Communication 
Task 
EVAC report-charge nurse to give the latest report to 
trauma team prior to arrival; updates from the field 
Task 
Clear role identification-will be helped with role sticker; 
in cases increased staff to help with additional tasks 
Technical 
Scribe tablet Bluetooth to a large computer screen at 
patient's head of bed on wall for all individuals to see 
documented info 
Technical 
Mobile work space with tablet and printer for unit clerk in 
trauma bay and dump into Meditech 
Human 
Clear chain of command/leadership of physicians or 
nurses. Hierarchy of priorities/team captains 
Human Standard response to acknowledge communication 
Human 
Communication improvement of the organization to the 
Trauma staff. 
Nonessential 
Communication 
Task 
Leadership in the trauma room that addresses nonessential 
communication and refocuses task. Hold people 
accountable. Semi-sterile environment in terms of 
conversation. 
Task 
Pre-arrival checklist includes a point about giving a 
secondary contact for nurses involved in the trauma to 
prevent Vocera calls mid-trauma. "DO NOT DISTURB" 
button. 
Task 
After action review that includes assessment of 
nonessential communication (even in the absence of audio 
visual ability) 
Technical 
Calling center-to hold all non-emergency call or all other 
calls until a "All clear trauma"-avoid non-essential 
communications 
Technical 
CT contact person to walk in trauma room to get the 
essential info: what CT, essential lab values 
Technical I-stat results-to be given to CT staff by phlebotomist 
Human Roles of each team member defined 
Human 
Transition care-nurses stay for overlap with change of 
shift 
Organizational 
When MDs, lab, RAD, RN swipe badge a "clock in time", 
individuals name, and credentials show up on scribe’s 
tablet and on the large screen at patient’s head of bed wall 
A PROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATION AT A LEVEL II TRAUMA CENTER 87      
(reduces the scribes need to ask names) 
Planning/ 
Preparation 
Task 
Planning-pre arrival huddle/briefing. Charge nurse query 
for as many details as possible from EVAC prior to arrival 
Task 
Preparation-checklist for charge/triage nurse to get as 
much info as possible prior to arrival 
Task 
Coordination-letting scribe and staff know who was called 
AND were they summoned, time AND plan; T.S. 
role/requirement; Staff/team prompt T.S. if info missing 
Task Coordination-call list in CT; board or list 
Task 
Immediate debrief in ISC/nurses station-time permitting 
after a trauma for correctly and incorrectly done, 
opportunities for improvement 
Technology 
Large digital clock that talks and says, "5 min in", "10 
min in", etc. to keep track of time 
Technical Circulating nurse to grant or deny entry 
Technical 
Physical barrier that prohibits unnecessary/unauthorized 
entry to the area 
Organizational 
Make sure OR room is Always open for TA until "TA all 
clear" 
Organizational 
Needle-less system-to give tetanus, instead of drawing up 
meds 
Organizational Thyroid covers-increase number 
Distractions 
Technical 
Distractions-nonessential communication in CT-not 
allowed 
Technical 
Nonessential conversation in trauma bay-observers are 
silent; no conversation not related to patient-all team 
members to enforce 
Technical Charge nurse selects any nonessential personnel to remain  
Technical Garbage thrown in bin 
Organizational 
Charge nurse or foreman/circulator to manage capacity of 
the room 
Organizational 
Physician policy of refraining [from] usage of cell phones 
for non-trauma related purposes 
Organizational 
Vocera group for only trauma group. Pre-arrival you are 
removed from POD groups and have only trauma. Post-
departure you add yourself back to your POD groups. 
Vocera can do NOT DISTURB. 
 
For practical reasons, all 34 highest ranked interventions could not be introduced 
simultaneously. For robust evaluation purposes and at the request of the TPMD, it was 
established that no more than five interventions were to be implemented at one time. A 
thorough review of the 34 highest ranked interventions was undertaken to identify 
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recurring intervention ideas suggested by the MKE participants and to develop possible 
themes. 
A review of the highest ranked interventions included comparing theme 
frequencies, identifying repeated and recurrent themes, and organizing relationships 
between different themes. This thematic analysis revealed that 19 out of 34 interventions 
followed a pattern and revolved around four central themes. Table 3.3 depicts the 
clustering of individual highest ranked interventions that revolved around co-occurring 
themes (see Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3 Clustered Interventions Revolving Around Repeated and Recurrent Central 
Themes 
Targeted FD 
Group 
Submitting 
Intervention 
Theme 1: Identifying roles and clarifying duties of trauma team members; introducing a 
role identification system 
Ineffective 
Communication 
Task 
Clear role identification-will be helped with role 
sticker; in cases increased staff to help with 
additional tasks 
Nonessential 
Communication 
Human Roles of each team member defined 
Theme 2: Importance of leadership and leadership effectiveness within the trauma team 
Ineffective 
Communication 
Human 
Clear chain of command/leadership of physicians 
or nurses. Hierarchy of priorities/team captains 
Nonessential 
Communication 
Task 
Leadership in the trauma room that addresses 
nonessential communication and refocuses task. 
Hold people accountable. Semi-sterile 
environment in terms of conversation 
Distractions Technical 
Charge nurse selects any nonessential personnel 
to remain 
Distractions Organizational 
Charge nurse or foreman/circulator to manage 
capacity of the room 
Theme 3: Integrating a checklist to structure pre-arrival trauma patient information, 
including plan of action and expectations as well as the initiation of an after action review 
or debrief 
Ineffective 
Communication 
Task 
EVAC report-charge nurse to give the latest 
report to trauma team prior to arrival; updates 
from the field 
Nonessential 
Communication 
Task 
Pre-arrival checklist includes a point about 
giving a secondary contact for nurses involved in 
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the trauma to prevent Vocera calls mid-trauma. 
"DO NOT DISTURB" button 
Nonessential 
Communication 
Task 
After action review that includes assessment of 
nonessential communication (even in the absence 
of audio visual ability) 
Planning/Preparation Task 
Planning-pre arrival huddle/briefing. Charge 
nurse query for as many details as possible from 
EVAC prior to arrival 
Planning/Preparation Task 
Preparation-checklist for charge/triage nurse to 
get as much info as possible prior to arrival 
Planning/Preparation Task 
Immediate debrief in ISC/nurses station-time 
permitting after a trauma for correctly and 
incorrectly done, opportunities for improvement 
Theme 4: Utilizing specific and standard communication practices during trauma care 
Ineffective 
Communication 
Human 
Standard response to acknowledge 
communication 
Ineffective 
Communication 
Human 
Communication improvement of the 
organization to the Trauma staff 
Nonessential 
Communication 
Task 
Leadership in the trauma room that addresses 
nonessential communication and refocuses task. 
Hold people accountable. Semi-sterile 
environment in terms of conversation 
*This suggestion also overlapped with the theme 
surrounding leadership 
Nonessential 
Communication 
Technical 
Calling center-to hold all non-emergency call or 
all other calls until a "All clear trauma"-avoid 
non-essential communications 
Distractions Technical 
Distractions-nonessential communication in CT-
not allowed 
Distractions Technical 
Nonessential conversation in trauma bay-
observers are silent; no conversation not related 
to patient-all team members to enforce 
Distractions Organizational 
Physician policy of refraining [from] usage of 
cell phones for non-trauma related purposes 
 
 This review was presented to the TSM and TPMD, who selected the following 
four highest ranking interventions for implementation: 1) introduction of a role 
identification system utilizing stickers to identify team member roles and names; 2) a 
formal leadership and teamwork training; 3) a pre-arrival checklist/brief and debrief; and 
4) establishment of standardized communication protocols. 
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Intervention Development 
This phase of the study focused on the careful implementation of those specific 
interventions that received the highest rankings and underwent systematic evaluation. 
The data-driven interventions were: 1) introduction of a role identification system 
utilizing stickers to identify team member roles and names; 2) a formal leadership and 
teamwork training; 3) a pre-arrival checklist/brief and debrief; and 4) establishment of 
standardized communication protocols. 
Role identification and sticker system. The role identification system utilizing 
stickers to identify team member roles and names was implemented shortly after the 
MKE took place. The TSM created a .pdf. Microsoft PowerPoint file that explained the 
sticker system and provided background information and directions. It was distributed via 
email to all trauma team members on August 18, 2015. This was a common method for 
the TSM to distribute information to the entire trauma team. Indeed, there were also a 
number of other issues also discussed in the same distribution material. The Microsoft 
PowerPoint file included the following updates: 1) how to use the elevators properly 
when going to the Helipad; 2) backboard removal procedure; and 3) adoption of a more 
common role identification congruent with many trauma centers verified by the ACS, 
movement from Nurse A, B, and C to Primary Nurse, Fluids Nurse, and Procedures 
Nurse including a diagram identifying each member’s role and duties. Efforts to improve 
communication were also incorporated into this bulletin. Suggestions included addressing 
team members by name to improve the teams’ communication as well as the physicians’ 
ability to know who is on the team and to better identify the intended recipient of a 
request. In his book, The Checklist Manifesto, Gawande (2009) discusses the importance 
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of making sure that everyone on the team knows one another’s names. Teams who know 
members’ names work better together. Researchers found that when teams orientated 
themselves in this manner, the communication ratings went up significantly. This method 
of introducing themselves by name and role, especially with teams that are consistently 
adding new people who may have never worked together (i.e., non-intact teams), enabled 
team members to better assign roles and responsibility to avoid the tendency to work as 
isolated units and diffusion of responsibility, meaning no one tends to help because the 
responsibility is spread throughout the group (Darley & Latané, 1968). They also report 
that when nurses had the opportunity to say their names and mention concerns at the 
beginning of a surgical case, they were more willing to verbalize problems and offer 
solutions (Gawande, 2009). In summary, the implementation of a role identification and 
sticker system is a simple strategy that was put into practice to address those threats 
related to communication and coordination disruptions, specifically, ineffective 
communication and planning/preparation. 
Pre-printed label stickers that had designated roles printed on them and a line to 
write individual names were placed in the trauma resuscitation bay. A Sharpie pen was 
attached to the label dispenser for writing team members’ names on the stickers. The 
TSM discussed the sticker concept and reviewed the process and location of the stickers 
in the pre-shift huddles on multiple occasions. Time constraints prohibited staff from 
practicing the new procedure. Trauma surgeons were also given the same in-person 
overview. Since the implementation of the sticker system was somewhat limited and 
informal, the TSM decided the process needed to be covered more in-depth during the 
leadership and teamwork training, which was planned for a later date and became known 
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as the Nurse Leadership Training (NLT). 
Nurse Leadership Training (NLT), pre-arrival checklist/brief and debrief, 
standardized communication protocols. Following the MKE process and 
recommendations, researcher efforts focused on creating an evidence-based leadership 
and teamwork training. This training would be mandatory for all ED nurses since many 
of them also serve in the role of trauma nurse. The objective of the comprehensive two-
hour training was to improve communication and collaboration and to highlight the 
importance of enhancing nontechnical performance aspects of trauma care. Multiple 
studies suggest that effective leadership is associated with better processes of care in 
resuscitation and trauma care in general. For instance, studies have shown a correlation 
between strong leadership and improvements in basic ventilation, chest compressions, 
and more successful cardiopulmonary resuscitations. Trauma teams with a leader 
demonstrated higher rates of task completion of their primary and secondary surveys (i.e., 
standards of care for the initial assessment of trauma patients) and reduced transit time to 
CT (Ford et al., 2016). Additionally, teams with leaders who spend more time performing 
procedures rather than prioritizing and delegating tasks to other team members are less 
effective (Barach & Weinger, 2007). Moreover, since communication and coordination 
disruptions were so prevalent in imaging, it was hypothesized that proceeding to imaging 
with as much preparation and resources as possible such as a pre-arrival checklist/brief, 
would help to reduce the frequency of these types of disruptions. 
Most training programs do not address this broad spectrum of skills, and instead 
tend to focus on advancing a medical professional’s technical skills (Arora et al., 2012). 
These “soft skills” (communications, loss of situational awareness, problem 
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solving, decision making, and teamwork) became known collectively as CRM and were 
techniques embraced by aviation in the 1970s following a series of deadly accidents that 
were found to be caused by pilot/crew error (Flin, O’Connor, & Crichton, 2008; 
Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). Leadership and communication are essential 
nontechnical skills that can directly affect the function and success of teams (Awad et al., 
2005; Xiao, Seagull, Mackenzie, & Klein, 2004). Failures in teamwork and 
communication have been correlated with increased surgical errors and FDs in both the 
OR and trauma care (Blocker et al., 2012; Blocker et al., 2013; Catchpole et al., 2013; 
Catchpole et al., 2014; Shouhed et al., 2014; Wiegmann, et al., 2007). Strong leadership, 
teamwork, and communication skills have been identified as key components in high 
performing teams and improving patient outcomes (Leonard, Graham, & Bonacum, 
2004; Lingard et al., 2004). Furthermore, a meta-analysis conducted by Salas et al. (2008) 
maintained that team training is a relevant intervention for affecting team processes and 
performance. A more recent meta-analysis by Hughes, et al. (2016) indicated that team 
training is not only effective but also surpasses employees’ pre-training utility and 
enjoyment expectations, induces learning, transfers learned material to the job, and leads 
to improved organizational and patient results. Hughes et al. (2016) asserts, “Although 
team training may receive less attention from healthcare managers because it is perceived 
to be “soft skills” training, our results suggest that team training improves objective 
criteria such as patient mortality, and surprisingly, stronger transfer of team training to 
task performance than teamwork performance” (p. 25). 
The customized training curriculum for the NLT included elements from a variety 
of well-respected resources, including the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s 
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(AHRQs) TeamSTEPPS® (AHRQ, 2016), Trauma Team Dynamics (Gillman, Brindley, 
Blaivas, Widder, & Karakitsos, 2016), and Values Coach, Inc. (Tye, n.d.), all of which 
are composed of teachable, learnable skills. The course outlined the roles and 
expectations of the trauma nurses, introduced clearly defined tools to communicate and 
plan, and included illustrative videos and simulation-based scenarios for practice. 
Simulation-based training is a useful practice exercise to incorporate task and teamwork 
skills. Core concepts of leadership, teamwork, and communication were integrated with 
the science of human factors and its principles. Throughout the course, patient safety, 
organizational culture, and culture change were emphasized. The NLT covered the 
strengths and weaknesses of individual leaders in the trauma suite and how the trauma 
process lends itself to the interchangeable assignment of a leader (Flin, O’Connor, & 
Crichton, 2008; Sakran et al., 2012). This provided the opportunity to introduce a new 
concept, namely that the primary trauma nurse would now be expected to fill the role of 
team leader in the absence of the trauma surgeon. This designation was considered the 
most logical one, because they already serve as the scribe, or nurse recorder, considered 
the “coordinator” of the trauma suite, and is always present at the beginning of the case. 
Another essential component of the leadership training was establishing effective 
leadership goals, team expectations, and rules of engagement. Along those same lines, 
nursing roles and responsibilities were revisited with a key focus on what characterizes 
high-performing teams. This included the interplay between an individual’s positive 
attitude, exceptional behavior, and enhanced cognition, also known as the ABCs of 
teamwork (Salas, Rosen, Burke, & Goodwin, 2009; Weaver, Rosen, Salas, Baum, & 
King, 2010). 
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The training introduced specific communication protocols, information exchange 
strategies, and embedded performance tools (EPTs). These EPTs included: 1) a team 
readiness check-in checklist, 2) pre-arrival checklist brief/debrief, 3) call outs, 4) closed-
loop communication and read backs, 5) Concerned, Uncomfortable, Safety (CUS) 
technique, 6) two-challenge rule, 7) redundancy and choice vocabulary, and 8) sterile 
cockpit rule (i.e., elimination of nonessential communication) (see Appendices D-J). 
These are tactics used regularly in high reliability organizations (HROs) such as aviation. 
Research background as well as full descriptions, how-tos, examples, and practice 
guidelines are available on AHRQs TeamSTEPPS® website. TeamSTEPPS® is 
comprised of five core principles: 1) team structure, 2) leadership, 3) situation 
monitoring, 4) mutual support, and 5) communication. Within these principles a variety 
of skills, competencies, and tools are readily available to incorporate into training and 
practice (AHRQ, 2016). Gawande (2009) explained how checklists, a classic tool 
borrowed from aviation, can provide protection against such failures as faulty memory 
and distraction. Checklists ensure that a procedure is performed the same way every time. 
Recognizing the importance of adapting the checklist and pre-arrival brief to suit local 
needs, the TSM worked in collaboration with medical human factors researchers to 
customize the tasks on the checklist and verify that it was in line with human factors 
checklist guidelines. Supplemental information regarding the proper way to utilize a 
checklist, conduct an after action review, also known as a debrief, and avoiding 
debriefing pitfalls were provided (Tannenbaum & Cerasoli, 2013). A recent meta-
analysis by Tannenbaum and Cerasoli (2013) revealed effective debriefs boosted team 
performance by an average of 25%. 
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A key principle of the training was to address team dynamics and flatten the 
hierarchy among team members through the use of unique communication tools. These 
information exchange strategies were designed to empower individuals to speak up when 
a concern arose and offer solutions. These new skills were simulated and practiced during 
the training, using case scenarios, role-play, and prepared examples. Demonstrations 
were integrated into the NLT that recognized the need for teams to compensate for one 
another’s bias and weakness specifically in terms of how it relates to the concept of 
inattentional blindness (Chabris & Simons, 2010). Other high-risk industries (e.g., 
aviation, military, maritime, nuclear power, auto racing) were also brought in as 
exemplars and related to similar circumstances in trauma care (Catchpole et al., 2007; 
FAA, 2016; NOVA, 2007; NTSB, 1996). In summary, the development of a formal 
training program for trauma nurses, known as the NLT, that focused on the principles of 
leadership, communication, and teamwork, and included such interventions as a pre-
arrival checklist/brief and debrief and standardized communication protocols, was a 
strategic measure aimed at minimizing the frequency of threats in all four specific 
problem areas: 1) ineffective communication, 2) nonessential communication, 3) 
distractions, and 4) planning/preparation. 
NLT attendance was required for all ED nurses since many of them also serve in 
the role of trauma nurse. Training sessions were taught by the TSM and scheduled at 
various times to best accommodate the majority of employee schedules. Upon completion 
of the training, nurses received a unique Trauma/Acute Care Team recognition pin that 
communicated to others in the trauma suite that “I have taken the same leadership 
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training as you and we speak the same language.” Nurses were compensated with non-
productive pay for attending and earned Continuing Education Units (CEUs). 
Assessment of the NLT 
After five training sessions were taught and 20 participants had completed the 
training, the course contents and participants were assessed using a multi-method 
approach. Immediate assessments were administered both before and after the training. 
Participants completed a 12 question pre- and post-test to evaluate knowledge acquired 
(see Appendices K and L). The test included several questions obtained directly from the 
TeamSTEPPS® training curriculum (AHRQ, 2016). The TSM and medical human 
factors researchers created the remaining questions to reflect the content offered in the 
training. Responses to the pre- and post-tests were graded and recorded in a Microsoft 
Excel Workbook by the medical human factors researchers including the participant’s 
name and the date they attended the training. The average score for both the pre- and the 
post-test was calculated as well as the average improvement from pre-test scores to the 
post-test scores. 
 At the end of the training, participants completed an anonymous evaluation of the 
training program (see Appendix M). Their responses and comments were sent directly to 
the hospital’s CME Coordinator for processing. Overall results were compiled in order to 
provide an overview regarding participants’ reactions to the training program in terms of 
its content, delivery, and satisfaction on a 5-point Likert scale, in which 5 was “strongly 
agree” and 1 was “strongly disagree”. Evaluators were asked to check specific items 
related to what they learned from the presentation that would enhance patient care or 
change practices. The assessment also included a question regarding commercial bias as 
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well as a free response section. 
Additional Interventions Introduced 
Dating back to February 2015, a collection of system-wide interventions had been 
steadily introduced to the delivery of trauma care as part of a “trauma optimization 
project”, or TOP, as it was termed by the TSM. The presence of the ERAU researchers 
was a catalyst for many of these changes, and as a direct result, a series of these 
interventions were specifically identified during the MKE phase of the study and 
subsequently enacted mostly due to their ease of implementation. However, others 
evolved as a result of the ongoing review and discussion of FD observations and analyses 
as well as the trauma center’s continued progress towards national ACS accreditation. 
Table 3.4 includes a listing and description of the additional interventions introduced, 
when they were implemented, and if they were directly related to the MKE (see Table 
3.4). 
Table 3.4 List of Additional Interventions Introduced 
Count 
Date of 
Implementation 
Intervention Comments 
1 1/1/2014 EMS handoff This is the expectation that all 
team members should not move 
the patient until EMS has 
completed their report; this is 
not an official policy but is 
regularly emphasized; it was a 
previous complaint by EMS; 
has been "in place" since 
approximately 1/1/14  
2 2/1/2015 Required scribe to be an 
RN 
Smith stated on 11/6/15 that 
since putting an RN at the 
scribe position flow sheet 
documentation has improved 
significantly 
3 2/1/2015 3 RNs & 1 ED Technician  
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4 2/5/2015 Trauma Update I PPT sent out by Smith; included 
the following updates: minor 
changes to the flow sheet, 
difference between trauma 
activation levels 1 and 2 and to 
check box on flow sheet 
indicating which activation 
level, introduced new badge 
reader to assist with flow sheet 
documentation of team member 
arrival times, reminder to 
dispose of sharps properly, 
suggested good preparation and 
being well-familiarized with 
equipment, difference between 
massive transfusion protocol 
(MTP) and "Emergency 
Release" blood as well as 
processing procedures, and a 
reminder to wear PPE 
5 2/5/2015 Revised Flow Sheet I Per Smith: "the trauma flow 
sheet's been revised but the 
changes are very few and not 
significant in terms of flow" 
6 2/5/2015 Badge reader Timestamps time of entry 
7 2/19/2015 Lighted scribe bedside 
table in CT 
A small adjustable spotlight 
was permanently attached to the 
bedside table used by scribe in 
CT, which is dimly lit for 
monitoring viewing purposes 
8 3/6/2015 Large mobile trash can in 
resuscitation room 
 
9 5/1/2015 Clinical Coordinating 
Team 
Positioned in the ED to assist 
clinical staff with clinical skills, 
procedures, and equipment 
10 6/19/2015 Multidisciplinary 
Knowledge Elicitation 
(MKE) Meeting 
 
11 7/18/2015 
MKE-related 
Boostrix prefilled syringe This was the date we were 
notified via email Smith was 
ordering 
12 8/1/2015 Vocera App Mainly for physicians to share 
information with one another 
regarding patients; HIPAA 
protected; Smith stated he has 
the app installed on his phone 
A PROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATION AT A LEVEL II TRAUMA CENTER 100      
but has not learned to use it; to 
his knowledge the physicians 
are not currently using this 
technology 
13 8/12/2015 
MKE-related 
Trauma Update II PPT sent out by Smith; included 
the following updates: how to 
use the elevators properly when 
going to the Helipad, backboard 
removal procedure, and 
adoption of the more common 
role identification congruent 
with many trauma centers 
verified by ACS: movement 
from Nurse A, B, and C to 
Primary Nurse, Fluids Nurse, 
and Procedures Nurse, which 
also displayed a diagram 
identifying each member’s role 
and duties, efforts to improve 
communication, suggestions 
included addressing team 
members by their name to 
improve the teams’, and in 
particular, the physicians’ 
ability to know who is on the 
team and to better identify who 
to give an order to. This is 
where the role identification 
system utilizing stickers was 
first introduced. It was 
explained that pre-printed labels 
with every role in the room 
would be available with a spot 
to write individual names name 
on the sticker. A Sharpie pen 
would be tied to the label 
dispenser in order to easily add 
name as the team is gowning up 
with PPE. Since the information 
was distributed without direct 
guidance Smith decided to 
discuss the sticker concept and 
went over the process and 
location of the stickers in the 
shift huddles, however, they did 
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not entail actual practice due to 
time constraints. 
4 8/12/2015 Movement from trauma 
nurse A, B, & C to 
Primary Nurse, 
Procedures Nurse, and 
Fluids Nurse 
 
15 8/13/2015 
MKE-related 
Disposable pulse ox band 
aids 
Rec'd an email from Smith on 
this date "FYI: we added 
disposable pulse ox band aids to 
the trauma room today" 
16 8/18/2015 
MKE-related 
Sticker System & Role 
Identification 
Per Smith: "I’ve been 
discussing the label concept in 
the morning huddles.  They 
don’t entail actual physical 
practice due to time constraints 
but we do go into the trauma 
room to show them where they 
are and then discuss the 
process.  I’m meeting with the 
surgeons tonight to discuss with 
them also (or really to remind 
them!)." Covered in NLT 
17 9/1/2015 
MKE-related 
Ordered more thyroid 
covers 
There was a recommendation to 
order more thyroid covers, 
which Smith did and he thinks 
they were available in Sept. 
2015. Update: we had a 
discussion about this item on 
1/21/16 and it reminded him 
that he may need to order more 
because he hasn't seen team 
members wearing them lately 
18 9/11/2015 Trauma Rounds (re-
instituted) 
1100 in ISC Unit on Mondays, 
Wednesday, and Fridays 
19 11/11/2015 Helipad training safety 
items badge 
Since 9/21/2015 we have 
assisted Smith and the Aviation 
Unit with creating the badge 
and safety items 
20 11/20/2015 Revised Flow Sheet II Sent an email out to trauma 
team on 11/20/15 since they 
were running low on previous 
flow sheets so it couldn't wait 
until Nurse Leadership Training 
(NLT); minor changes 
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21 11/24/2015 
MKE-related 
Digital Stopwatch/clock 
(installed but not 
instructed on how to use 
remote yet) 
This device has a remote that 
someone has to be designated to 
start the clock; Smith states the 
instructions are not user-
friendly so it is not regularly 
used; need to get this device 
working again. Update: On of 
8/5/16 a PPT was sent out 
explaining its purpose, how to 
operate (instructions are in 
trauma bay) and designating the 
primary nurse to start 
22 11/24/2015 Applied for ACS 
consultative visit 
Which means the hospital has 
approximately 1 year to comply 
with ACS standards before 
ACS will schedule a visit and 
then within 6 to 12 months they 
will have a final review. 
Update: As of 2/7/17 Dr. James 
stated they are not ready for 
ACS verification 
23 1/18/2016 
MKE-related 
Two Barrier Arms 
installed in J-Pod and 
imaging hallway 
Update: As of 3/23/16 a 2nd 
Barrier Arm was installed in the 
South end of the hallway (the 
corridor leading to imaging) 
24 2/23/2016 
MKE-related 
Nurse Leadership 
Training (1st one) 
A total of 13 2-hour trainings 
offered; 88 nurses completed by 
6/21/2016 (last one) 
25 2/23/2016 
MKE-related 
Minimize nonessential 
communication in CT 
(initial email on 11/24/15)  
Covered in NLT/Sent an initial 
email out to trauma team on 
11/24/15 in response to a 
congestion issue in CT 
26 2/23/2016 
MKE-related 
Communication Protocol Covered in NLT 
27 2/23/2016 
MKE-related 
Team Readiness Check-In 
(Shift Huddles) 
Covered in NLT 
28 2/23/2016 
MKE-related 
Pre-arrival brief Covered in NLT 
29 2/23/2016 
MKE-related 
Debrief Covered in NLT 
30 3/1/2016 New CT Scanner installed 
in first room nearest to 
trauma 
Dr. Johnson explains it has 
better focus, clearer images, 
less CT time, better quality, less 
workstation work 
31 3/4/2016 Helipad training safety 
items poster 
Since 9/21/2015 we have 
assisted Smith and the Aviation 
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Unit with creating the badge 
and safety items 
32 5/16/2016 Helipad recurrent training First one ever created and 
instituted; plan to offer on an 
on-going basis throughout the 
year along with helipad training 
for new trauma team members 
33 6/7/16 & 7/5/16 Brief informal 
presentation of NLT at 
Trauma Committee 
Meetings 
Not all trauma surgeons present, 
importance of new protocols 
also mentioned by ED 
representative at meeting on 
8/2/16 and re-iterated by Smith 
and ERAU team; NLT 
Powerpoints have been sent 
multiple times to trauma 
surgeons 
 
NLT Results 
Beginning February 23, 2016, a total of 13 NLT training sessions were held at 
varying times to accommodate the majority of the nurses’ schedules. A total of 88, or 
99%, of trauma nurses completed the two-hour training. The number of participants 
attending each session ranged from one to 11 and participants had varying years of 
experience. Every course was taught by the TSM and was accompanied by at least one 
medical human factors researcher to help supplement the course information. 
Pre- and post-tests/knowledge assessments of NLT. A total of 68 (out of 88) 
pre- and post-tests were collected and scored. Two participant’s scores were excluded 
since they did not complete both tests. The average pre-test score was 74% (s=10.39) and 
the average post-test score was 94% (s=6.98), which resulted in an average improvement 
in the test scores of 20%. 
A t-test for correlated samples was used to compare the two groups (pre-test and 
post-test). The scores from these two groups encompassed basically two observations of 
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the same variable on the same participants. The two means being compared were not 
necessarily independent of one another, therefore, a dependent samples t-test took into 
account any correlation between the scores (Bordens & Abbott, 2014). A dependent 
samples t-test, was conducted to evaluate the difference between the pre- and post-test 
scores. The test indicated the post-test scores were significantly higher than pre-test 
scores, t (65)=-13.92, p ≤ .01, thus supporting the effectiveness of the training with 
respect to knowledge acquisition. 
On the post-test, Questions five and nine had a higher proportion of incorrect 
answers than the other 10 questions, which prompted a further review. Regarding 
Question five on the post-test, 21% answered the question incorrectly. Regarding 
Question nine on the post-test, 18% answered the question incorrectly. In other words, 
approximately 80% answered both questions correctly which does not justify eliminating 
the questions all together. 
Evaluation of NLT. The evaluation ratings on the quality of the course content 
were calculated and submitted by the hospital’s CME Coordinator based on the responses 
of individuals who attended the training program (see Appendix N). A total of 86 (out of 
88) participants completed the evaluation form immediately following the training. The 
questionnaire addressed four points in particular using a 5-point Likert scale where 5 was 
“strongly agree” and 1 was “strongly disagree.” The four points were as follows: 
1. Did the course meet the stated objectives? 94% responded that they “strongly 
agreed.” 
2. Was the course information current? 95% responded that they “strongly agreed.” 
3. Was the educational level appropriate? 95% responded that they “strongly agreed.” 
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4. Was the teaching method appropriate? 94% responded that they “strongly agreed.” 
Given the data, it is evident that the overwhelming majority of nurses who took 
the training felt that the information was relevant and useful to them in the performance 
of their duties. 
Discussion 
MKE/HFIX Activity 
New knowledge about how to precisely attempt to fix the obstacles these front 
line practitioners cope with in their day-to-day work, especially while performing safety 
critical tasks, was obtained by virtue of valuable SME input. The HFIX model proved to 
be a useful tool for the development of effective intervention strategies rather than a swift 
“knee jerk” reaction to fix a problem (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2006). This framework 
offers several unique strengths that may prove beneficial in directly targeting the problem 
areas. In comparison to other intervention strategies that have been publicized or touted 
in journals, there is no doubt that the total package put forth in this investigation that 
culminated with the application of the HFIX model stands out. First, HFIX offered a 
broader perspective and a more structured approach to thinking “outside the box” when it 
came to generating intervention ideas. It also ensured that a broad range of viable and 
effective intervention strategies were explored. Additionally, it provided the ability to 
map interventions onto five broad categories of interventions, which captures the 
underlying causal mechanisms of potential human error. Second, it is known that the 
prospective study identified the largest threats to safety within this trauma facility, which 
were: 1) ineffective communication, 2) nonessential communication, 3) distractions, and 
4) planning/preparation. HFIX helped to determine if the proposed and future 
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intervention strategies had the potential to address those problems as well as mapping 
exactly which types of human error might be affected by their implementation (Shappell 
& Wiegmann, 2006). Third, this approach allowed those on the front line, who have 
intimate knowledge of the existing threats to safety, to generate customized solutions to 
the problems they face on a regular basis on the “shop floor” (i.e., the trauma suite). 
Further, this approach fostered team building, a sense of ownership, and employee 
empowerment and accountability (Leape, 2014; Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008). 
Over 90 intervention strategies were conceived during the MKE, all of which 
represented tailored solutions aimed at reducing the four specific types of threats 
identified as most detrimental to the delivery of trauma care. The FACES ranking task 
and the three-dimensional nature of the matrix, which are unique strengths of the HFIX 
model, helped narrow down the list to 34 potential interventions. In other words, these 
final 34 intervention strategies afforded stakeholders the best opportunity to fix their 
identified problem areas and were based on both empirical findings as well as the 
philosophical views of the “experts” involved. Obviously, not all 34 interventions could 
be introduced simultaneously. Therefore, this number was reduced to a more manageable 
collection of interventions by identifying co-occurring intervention ideas suggested by 
the MKE participants and then developing central themes. This thorough review led to 
the grouping of 19 out of 34 of the highest-ranking interventions into four central themes, 
which were ultimately selected by the TSM and TPMD for full implementation. These 
selected interventions were: 1) the introduction of a role identification system utilizing 
stickers to identify team member roles and names; 2) a formal leadership and teamwork 
training; 3) a pre-arrival checklist/brief and debrief; and 4) the establishment of 
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standardized communication protocols. 
All of the intervention strategies generated in the MKE and the final four 
interventions selected for implementation revolved around a common theme. They are 
about changing patterns of behavior rather than attempting to modify the individual’s 
core personality. It is unacceptable for personality to be used as an excuse for unsafe 
behavior at work. Instead, the chatty extrovert may have to learn to talk less and listen 
more and the shy introvert may need to start sharing their thoughts about team goals and 
planned actions. Equally, the insecure millennial may have to gain the confidence and 
practice speaking up when they think the team leader is making an error (Flin, O’Connor, 
& Crichton, 2008). 
A comprehensive account of the development of these four highly specialized 
interventions slated for implementation are described next in detail. A multitude of 
resources were surveyed from psychological and human factors material as well as a vast 
amount of healthcare literature and guidebooks from a wide range of HROs (e.g., 
aviation, military, maritime, mining, nuclear power, auto racing), which are organizations 
who achieve exceptionally high levels of reliability (Hines, Luna, Lofthus, Marquardt, & 
Stelmokas, 2008). Most importantly, in order to achieve success, an in-depth 
understanding of the interventions as well as the complex interactions and dynamics 
involved in the process is essential (Wiegmann, 2015). 
By introducing these four data-driven interventions, the prospective collection of 
disruption data in the post-intervention phase should reflect a change in practice 
particularly as it relates to: 1) ineffective communication, 2) nonessential communication, 
3) distractions, 4) planning/preparation. Comparison of disruption frequencies between 
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the pre-intervention and post-intervention phases allowed researchers to gauge the 
effectiveness of these interventions through real-time monitoring in a quantitative, data-
driven manner. The thrust of this current study, and perhaps more important than the 
actual results themselves, is that this successful process may serve as a model for others 
to learn from and follow in their selection of appropriate intervention ideas and 
implementation strategies. The SSMP provides a reliable tool for organizations to 
measure their own risk so that they can begin thinking rationally and clearly while 
planning their implementation strategies (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008).  
Shappell and Wiegmann (2006) conclude their discussion of the HFIX model 
with a quote from Reason (2000) “[Human errors] are like mosquitos. They can be 
swatted one by one, but they still keep coming. The best remedies are to create defenses 
and to drain the swamps in which they breed” (p. 769). To take it a step further and 
drawing on an analogy from Shappell and Wiegmann (2006), the RIPCHORD-TWA 
taxonomy provides a view of the swamp and HFIX makes sure the right swamps are 
drained. 
Intervention Development 
First, it is important to note the “experimental laboratory” borrowed for this 
current study was a naturalistic setting where the researchers had little control over the 
setup, environment, and inner workings of the people’s behaviors observed, the specific 
tasks, or the future evolution of the project. The medical human factors researchers 
provided guidance to key decision makers/administrators where necessary and 
appropriate. For the most part, they were accommodating. However, ultimately, the 
project catered to their time schedule, needs, and final decisions. 
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The NLT course was created in an effort to improve communication and 
collaboration and incorporated important concepts such as strong leadership, teamwork, 
and communication. McCulloch, Rathbone, and Catchpole (2011) performed a systematic 
literature review on the beneficial effects of teamwork and communication training for 
healthcare staff and found weak evidence of improving safety or clinical care mainly due 
to disparate measurement techniques and design limitations. However, the researchers 
went on to suggest that those studies with a stronger intervention (i.e., high quality 
teamwork training) provided more positive results and lasting improvements in technical 
and clinical performance specifically in the reduction of errors. On the other end of the 
spectrum, teamwork training based on CRM principles, at the very least, seemed to 
improve cooperation and communication among team members over the long term (i.e., 
several months). There is no doubt that teamwork and communication training is a 
complex intervention, and at this time, there are no clear recommendations as to the type 
of training that should be provided and how (McCulloch, Rathbone, & Catchpole, 2011). 
Perhaps this current study provides the scientific evidence that data-driven interventions 
developed in a systematic manner will, in the end, produce real, trackable, and 
measurable benefits. 
The two-hour comprehensive course was designed using several resources which 
included human factors principles and evidence-based fundamentals, including AHRQs 
TeamSTEPPS® (AHRQ, 2016), Trauma Team Dynamics (Gillman et al., 2016), and 
Values Coach, Inc. (Tye, n.d.), in addition to well-recognized research in the field. First 
and foremost, the course illustrated the strengths and weaknesses of individual leaders in 
the trauma suite, including the lack of leadership, which was previously identified in the 
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pre-intervention phase of observation and data analyses as a possible source of observed 
coordination disruptions. The trauma surgeon is considered the discernible team 
“captain,” however, due the structure of this particular trauma system (i.e., Level II), the 
trauma team is considered non-intact. Therefore, the trauma process lends itself better to 
the interchangeable assignment of a leader, which lends to nomination of the nursing 
staff, specifically the primary trauma nurse, who is assigned the task of scribe, or nurse 
recorder (Flin, O’Connor, & Crichton, 2008; Sakran et al., 2012). This individual is 
always present at the beginning of the case, whereas the trauma surgeon may not be. 
Emphasis was placed on establishing rules of engagement, effective leadership 
goals, and team expectations, including re-visiting nursing roles and responsibilities, with 
a key focus on what comprises high-performing teams and the interplay between an 
individual’s positive attitudes, exceptional behaviors, and enhanced cognitions, also 
known as the ABCs of teamwork, during the delivery of trauma care (Salas et al., 2009; 
Weaver et al., 2010). A plethora of demonstrations were presented to foster the 
recognition of compensating for team members’ bias and weakness and how it relates to 
the concept of inattentional blindness (Chabris & Simons, 2010).   
Communication protocols and information exchange strategies were simulated 
and practiced during the course, which integrated case scenarios, role play, and prepared 
examples. The need for a nurse to assert communicative authority with hierarchical 
figures such as trauma surgeons and ED physicians was rehearsed with an opportunity for 
healthy feedback from both the instructor and peers. Other high-risk industries (e.g., 
aviation, military, maritime, nuclear power, auto racing) were looked to as exemplars and 
compared and contrasted with trauma care. In particular, EPTs, which are used regularly 
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to achieve high reliability and zero error rates, were introduced. These EPTs included: 1) 
a team readiness check-in, 2) pre-arrival brief/debrief, 3) call outs, 4) closed-loop 
communication and read backs, 5) CUS technique, 6) two-challenge rule, 7) redundancy 
and choice vocabulary, and 8) sterile cockpit rule (i.e., elimination of nonessential 
communication) (see Appendices D-J). Patient safety, organizational culture, and culture 
change were also themes that were emphasized throughout the course curriculum. 
In summary, the multiple methods employed to assess the NLT, the pre- and post-
tests and the evaluation questionnaire, provided supporting evidence regarding the 
effectiveness of the training. The difference between the pre-test scores and the post-test 
scores indicated that participants gained novel knowledge and learned new skills that will 
lead to enhanced patient care and/or changed practices. Furthermore, the high evaluation 
ratings and comments received indicated that attendees were very satisfied with the 
content and delivery of the training.  
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CHAPTER 4 
POST-INTERVENTION PHASE AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSES 
Introduction 
To determine the effects of the four data-driven interventions the pre-intervention 
threat windows data analysis was compared to data collected post-intervention. The 
overarching question was: Have those areas regarded as high in disruption frequency and 
most detrimental been mitigated by the systematic introduction of the selected 
interventions? In other words, were the interventions effective in addressing and 
potentially reducing those disruptions threatening the optimal delivery of trauma care? 
The post-intervention phase of the study focused on evaluating the effectiveness 
of the interventions put in place through prospective observation once again and 
conducting subsequent analyses of FD data to measure the overall changes post-
intervention. If the results revealed that the interventions were not effective, the SSMP 
model developed as part of this current study is iterative in nature, thus, researchers can 
pinpoint exactly where the problems lie, then go back to the drawing board to generate a 
series of new potential solutions in order to “try, try, and try again”, as the old adage 
goes. 
This prospective study previously identified several types of threats that are 
known contributors to patient harm, most notably communication failures, interruptions, 
and coordination breakdowns. Results of the pre-intervention phase indicated that these 
types of threats were occurring at unacceptable levels in a Level II trauma center. While 
the identification of the major types of FDs is clearly important, this alone does not 
provide the level of resolution necessary to generate data-driven interventions. The 
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researchers conducted a fine-grained analysis of the data by classifying it into minor 
RIPCHORD-TWA categories, separating the data by phase of care (resuscitation and 
imaging). Thus, four specific types of threats were isolated and deemed to have the most 
detrimental impact on quality and efficiency: 1) ineffective communication, 2) 
nonessential communication, 3) distractions, and 4) planning/preparation. In response, 
four evidence-based interventions were generated and implemented, aimed at mitigating 
those particular process inefficiencies threatening the delivery of optimal care to the 
critical patient. After implementing carefully designed and developed, data-driven 
interventions in a systematic manner, researchers anticipated observing, a quantifiable 
reduction in those most prevalent and detrimental threats. 
This current study emphasizes the utility of FD data in that it serves as an 
objectively measurable outcome as well as the basis for seeking continuous improvement. 
The FDs represented threat windows—left unchecked, these threat windows not only 
have the potential to become routine and commonplace in the system, but they may also 
negatively influence a caregiver’s ability to counteract subsequent disruptions or major 
events (Boquet et al., 2017b; Cohen et al., 2016; Palmer et al., 2013; Wong et al., 2007). 
Ultimately, this approach afforded researchers the ability to address inefficiencies 
proactively. This technique serves to eliminate, or at the very least mitigate, the breeding 
grounds for these threats, which have been correlated with the genesis of adverse events 
and errors in the first place. 
In recent years, the healthcare industry has placed great emphasis on analyzing 
adverse events and errors and their relationship to negative patient outcomes, focusing 
more on the outcomes than on processes. Despite enormous efforts, the medical 
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community still struggles to reduce patient morbidity and mortality directly related to 
preventable medical mistakes (James, 2013; Makary & Daniel, 2016). In other words, 
concentrating the focus solely on outcomes and adverse events has failed to make 
medicine “safer.” Naturally, the next step would be to understand why this is the case. 
First, while these measures are noteworthy, they focus on incidents after they 
have occurred and the patient has already been harmed (Hildebrand, 2014). This reactive 
course of managing errors and adverse events is no different than treating an already sick 
patient. It makes more sense to act proactively by identifying system weaknesses that 
precede errors, rather than waiting for errors to occur. Much like a true SMS, the most 
important role is not the analysis of a particular event, instead it is exposing the 
precursors of such an event (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008). Second, these reactive 
measures often require large-scale studies and a high number of participants to see 
significant results. Third, in the general scheme of things, sentinel events and reportable 
medical errors are rare. In contrast, disruptions and threats occur much more frequently 
and are observable during daily practice. Fourth, the stigma associated with the capture of 
adverse events and errors has the potential to lead to blame, which may stifle exploratory 
efforts by limiting the focus of the investigation to the “sharp end of the spear.” Finally, 
outcome measures such as reductions in medical errors, adverse events, and mortality are 
remote outcomes that are lagging indicators. Thus, they do not reveal much about the 
real-time complications occurring on the ground and the effectiveness of the 
interventions implemented (Hildebrand, 2014). 
If we are to overcome these limitations, and contribute lasting improvements to 
creating a safer healthcare system, the approach to solving the problem must change. 
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Improving the “communication culture,” remediating flawed coordination, and 
counteracting distractions are all imperative modifications because of their insidious 
nature and pervasiveness. Patients deserve a healthcare without the worry of being 
harmed by the system itself. Perhaps the approach taken in this current study, which is 
armed with both quantitative and qualitative results as well as an overall process for 
assessment, will inspire other healthcare domains to develop and support similar 
programs. 
Method 
Population 
 Experienced medical human factors researchers re-commenced observations at 
the same Level II trauma center, an East Central Florida community hospital. Due to the 
critical condition of incoming trauma patients, it was not possible to obtain their consent 
to participate in the study. The hospital’s Research Oversight Committee approved the 
study as a quality improvement project. It was exempt from IRB review as the focus was 
on disruptions involved in the trauma care process rather than clinical outcomes of the 
patient. In accordance with HIPAA and the PHI Privacy Rule, all health information 
pertaining to the patient was protected. There was no effort made on the part of the 
researchers to collect personal and/or identifying information specific to either the 
patients undergoing treatment or the hospital personnel providing care. Data extraction 
beyond that collected on-site was performed by the PIs holding clinical privileges at the 
hospital. Furthermore, all data extracted was de-identified by the PIs in accordance with 
HIPPA guidelines and was concerned only with demographics and processes associated 
with the delivery of care. Hospital staff and trauma team members were made aware of 
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the presence and research goals of the observers (see Appendix O). Specific 
demographics such as gender and age, MOI, and GCS scores were recorded for each 
patient. 
Procedure 
Data collection. Beginning on July 8, 2016 and continuing through December 26, 
2016 medical human factors researchers observed 52 complete (“wheels in” to “wheels 
out”) trauma cases during normal and peak (i.e., Biketoberfest) operational times. The 
researchers recorded FDs in the same manner in the previous 65 trauma cases observed. 
FDs were operationally defined as those events that result in a disturbance in a team 
member’s progress or any other delay. Researchers possessed medical or human factors 
background or both and underwent a comprehensive educational process to ensure they 
can properly identify disruptions and process inefficiencies. In addition, the hospital 
adheres to strict ethical standards for the use of human participants in conducting 
research, therefore, researchers were required to complete the IRB training, an online 
training module through CITI.  
Prospective data collection began at the time the patient arrived in the trauma 
resuscitation bay. Data collection continued through imaging and terminated upon 
disposition to surgery, the medical floor unit, or the ED. Observers recorded the time the 
patient was wheeled into the trauma resuscitation bay and the time they were wheeled 
out. Likewise, the time was noted when the patient was wheeled into and out of imaging. 
For recording purposes, the patient’s transport time between resuscitation and imaging 
was considered still under the auspices of resuscitation since an official handoff to 
imaging has not yet occurred. Lastly, observers were provided with an observational 
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template to assist them in documenting whether the implemented interventions were 
carried out during the observed case, namely: 1) role identification system utilizing 
stickers to identify team member roles and names, 2) quality of the pre-arrival brief, and 
3) communication protocols (see Appendix P). 
FD observations were documented in real-time in a free-response format using 
paper and pencil or digitally recorded using an electronic tablet. Observations and time 
spent in resuscitation and imaging were transferred to a Microsoft Excel Workbook for 
consensus coding and subsequent statistical analysis. 
Data coding and classification. Disruptions were classified once again using the 
human factors taxonomy RIPCHORD-TWA (Boquet et al., 2017b; Cohen et al., 2016) by 
at least two or more human factors researchers through consensus coding. 
Data analysis. Descriptive statistics were calculated, including frequency of the 
threats observed and percentage of disruptions by category. Likewise, inferential statistics 
were calculated in regards to comparing frequency data between baseline1/pre-
intervention and baseline 2/pre-intervention, pre-intervention and post-intervention 
phases, and clinical phases of care (resuscitation and imaging). The time elapsed during 
the case, whether in resuscitation or imaging, as well as the number of threats that 
occurred over an elapsed period of time were also calculated. These through-put 
measures provided an estimate of how often FDs occurred per minute, allowing 
researchers to gauge the “window of opportunity” for potential adverse events to occur. 
Additionally, observational data was reviewed to determine how often the role 
identification stickers with names were donned, if the pre-arrival brief was conducted, 
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and the quality of the pre-arrival brief. The pre-arrival brief was considered effective if 
Steps 1, 2, and 3 were completed (see Appendix E). 
Additional Interventions Introduced During the Post-Intervention Phase 
Throughout the post-intervention phase, system-wide interventions continued to 
be introduced as part of the “trauma optimization project,” or TOP. Table 4.1 includes a 
listing and description of the interventions introduced, when they were implemented, and 
if they were directly related to the MKE (see Table 4.1). One initiative that occurred 
during this phase of the study stands out because it involved a major change within the 
trauma program. Hospital administrators decided to end contractual services with the 
long-standing trauma surgeon group and contract with a new trauma surgeon group. This 
transition began on October 17, 2016, nearly halfway through the post-intervention phase 
observational period. It is important to note that two of the trauma surgeons from the 
original contracted group remained on staff, however, three new trauma surgeons joined 
the team. 
Table 4.1 List of Additional Interventions Introduced During the Post-Intervention Phase 
Count 
Date of 
Implementation 
Intervention Comments 
34 10/14/16 Emailed “Trauma at X: A 
Change in Practice and a 
Change in Culture”-a 
reminder of NLT 
practices 
Smith emailed to trauma 
surgeons and staff 
35 10/17/16 An administrative 
contractual review 
resulted in a transition 
from the long-standing 
trauma surgical team to a 
new trauma surgical team 
(2 original trauma 
surgeons remained on 
staff, however, 3 new 
trauma surgeons joined 
 
A PROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATION AT A LEVEL II TRAUMA CENTER 119      
the team) 
36 11/6/16 Created a “Welcome to X 
Trauma” standard email 
to introduce new trauma 
surgeons to trauma 
operating procedures and 
expectations  
Included brief information 
regarding sticker system, pre-
arrival brief and debrief, and 
communication protocols; 
described the trauma alert 
criteria, arrival time, and badge 
reader 
37 11/16/16 Revised Shift Huddle-
Readiness Check-In and 
an accompanying email to 
ED nursing staff 
explaining the new 
revisions to the Check-In 
and how to 
In response to team members 
who had not completed helipad 
training that were assisting with 
air transports on the roof; 
additionally, team members 
were occasionally being 
assigned to a trauma team w/o 
being TNCC trained 
38 1/12/2017 Transitioning outline 
created and sent to key 
administrators by Smith 
in anticipation of his 
resignation 
Email outlined expectations for 
continuing the helipad trainings, 
on-going chart review by the 
trauma medical director, 
“incentive shift” explanation, 
routine review of administrative 
policies and clinical practice 
trauma guidelines, and 
maintaining the 
Multidisciplinary Trauma 
Conferences, Trauma 
Committee meetings, and Peer-
Review meetings 
 
Post-Intervention Phase Results 
Analysis of FD Data 
Of the total sample of 52 post-intervention trauma cases, the average age of the 
patient (male=38, female=14) was 52.5 (s=19.7). The mean GCS score of the sample 
cases was 12 (s=5.1). A total of 32, or 62% of the trauma cases occurred during the first 
shift (7:00a.m.-7:00p.m.), and 20, or 38% occurred during the second shift (7:00p.m.-
7:00a.m.). Six of the trauma cases, or 12%, were observed during peak operational times 
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(i.e., Biketoberfest). Additionally, five of the observed cases, or 10%, were considered 
multiple traumas, meaning more than one trauma patient arrived at the same time and 
were treated simultaneously by multiple trauma teams. The breakdown for MOI is as 
follows: falls (11 or 21%), motor vehicle crashes (15 or 29%), motorcycle crashes (7 or 
13%), stab wounds (4 or 8%), gunshot wounds (1 or 2%), and other/unspecified (14 or 
27%). Two cases labeled “other” MOIs involved two simultaneous cases of trauma 
patients who were in a small airplane crash, one patient being the pilot, and the other 
being the passenger. Nine of these “other” cases involved pedestrians or bicyclists that 
were struck by a motor vehicle. The post-intervention phase data sample contained no 
cases involving assault or burn patients (see Table 4.2). 
A total of 939 disruptions were identified during the 52 observed cases (2,081 
patient contact minutes). This translated to 18 disruptions per case (s=7.5), or 
approximately one disruption occurred every two minutes. The average total treatment 
time per case was 40 minutes (s=16). A total of 486 disruptions were identified in 
resuscitation alone (954 patient contact minutes), with treatment time averaging just over 
18 minutes (s=12.5); this translated to more than nine disruptions per case (s=6.3). In 
imaging, there were a total of 453 identified disruptions (1,113 patient contact minutes), 
with treatment time averaging just over 21 minutes (s=9.89); this translated to almost 
nine disruptions per case (s=4.8). Furthermore, the overall ratio of the number of FDs per 
minute, or the through-put measure, was 0.47 per minute. More specifically, the through-
put ratios were 0.53 per minute in resuscitation and 0.42 per minute in imaging. 
 
 
A PROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATION AT A LEVEL II TRAUMA CENTER 121      
Table 4.2 Post-Intervention Phase Patient Demographics 
Pt 
A 
g 
e 
S
e
x 
Mechanism 
Of 
Injury 
G
C 
S 
E V M 
Event 
Multiple 
Trauma? 
Shift 
66 32 F Vehicle vs. 
pedestrian 
(other/unspecified) 
8 1 3 4    1st 
67 67 M Motor vehicle crash 15 4 5 6    1st 
68 25 M Motor vehicle crash 3 1 1 1    2nd 
69 68 M Scooter (motorized/ 
motorcycle crash) 
3 1 1 1    1st 
70 61 F Gunshot wound 3 1 1 1    2nd 
71 58 M Machine tool 
(other/unspecified) 
15 4 5 6    1st 
72 8 M Motor vehicle crash 15 4 5 6  Yes 2nd 
73 51 F Fall 3 1 1 1  Yes 2nd 
74 57 M Vehicle vs. bicycle 
(other/unspecified) 
15 4 5 6    2nd 
75 58 M Motor vehicle crash 3 1 1 1    1st 
76 44 M Motor vehicle crash 15 4 5 6    1st 
77 49 F Motor vehicle crash 3 1 1 1    1st 
78 86 M Penetration (stab 
wound) 
11 4 1 6    1st 
79 40 M Motor vehicle crash 15 4 5 6    1st 
80 57 M Unknown 
(other/unspecified) 
3 1 1 1    2nd 
81 22 M Motorcycle crash 3 1 1 1    2nd 
82 58 M Fall  15 4 5 6    2nd 
83 18 M Motor vehicle crash 15 4 5 6    2nd 
84 90 F Motor vehicle crash 15 4 5 6    1st 
85 71 F Motor vehicle crash 15 4 5 6    1st 
86 43 F Fall  13 4 4 5    1st 
87 53 M Fall  15 4 5 6    1st 
88 81 F Motor vehicle crash 15 4 5 6 Biketoberfest  1st 
89 23 M Vehicle vs. 
pedestrian 
(other/unspecified) 
15 4 5 6 Biketoberfest  1st 
90 16 M Sports 
(other/unspecified) 
15 4 5 6 Biketoberfest  2nd 
91 84 M Fall  15 4 5 6 Biketoberfest Yes 1st 
92 51 M Motorcycle crash 15 4 5 6 Biketoberfest  2nd 
93 45 F Motorcycle crash 15 4 5 6 Biketoberfest  1st 
New Contracted Trauma Surgeon Group Took Over 
94 65 M Motorcycle crash 3 1 1 1    1st 
95 63 M Vehicle vs. 3 1 1 1    1st 
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pedestrian 
(other/unspecified) 
96 52 M Penetration (stab 
wound) 
15 4 5 6    2nd 
97 51 M Pedestrian vs. vehicle 
(other/unspecified) 
15 4 5 6    2nd 
98 62 M Penetration/blunt 
force (stab wound) 
14 4 4 6    1st 
99 35 M Motorcycle crash 12 3 4 5    2nd 
100 68 F Fall  14 4 4 6    1st 
101 32 M Motorcycle crash 15 4 5 6    1st 
102 65 M Vehicle vs. 
pedestrian 
(other/unspecified) 
11 1 4 6    2nd 
103 74 M Vehicle vs. 
pedestrian 
(other/unspecified) 
15 4 5 6    1st 
104 31 F Vehicle vs. 
pedestrian 
(other/unspecified) 
3 1 1 1    2nd 
105 39 M Aircraft accident 
(other/unspecified) 
13 4 4 5  Yes 1st 
106 50 M Aircraft accident 
(other/unspecified) 
15 4 5 6  Yes 1st 
107 60 M Fall  15 4 5 6    1st 
108 23 F Motor vehicle crash 15 4 5 6    1st 
109 53 M Fall 5 1 1 3    1st 
110 61 F Motor vehicle crash 15 4 5 6    1st 
111 87 M Fall 15 4 5 6    1st 
112 63 M Motor vehicle crash 15 4 5 6    2nd 
113 59 M Vehicle vs. bicycle 
(other/unspecified) 
15 4 5 6    1st 
114 66 M Fall 13 4 3 6    2nd 
115 25 M Penetration (stab 
wound) 
15 4 5 6    2nd 
116 78 F Motor vehicle crash 3 1 1 1    2nd 
117 52 M Fall 15 4 5 6    1st 
Note. n=52 cases. 
Of these 939 disruptions, post-intervention communication issues represented 
32%, interruptions were comprised of 30%, and coordination issues were the third most 
prevalent at 18%. Layout, usability, and equipment issues included 15%, 2%, and 2% of 
the disruptions, respectively, in the post-intervention phase (see Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1. Overall Breakdown of Major Categories During the Post-Intervention Phase 
Further analysis examined the difference in the post-intervention disruptions 
between resuscitation and imaging. First, communication disruptions occurred less often 
in resuscitation (27%) than in imaging (38%). Post-intervention coordination issues were 
also less frequent in resuscitation (16%) than in imaging (21%). In fact, layout issues 
(18%) rose slightly in the post-intervention phase surpassing coordination-related 
disruptions in resuscitation. On the other hand, interruptions during the post-intervention 
phase were more prevalent during resuscitation (34%) than in imaging (26%). Layout 
issues (see Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.2. Overall Breakdown of Major Categories by Resuscitation and Imaging 
During the Post-Intervention Phase 
 
In order to obtain a more detailed understanding of the types of disruptions 
populating each major RIPCHORD-TWA category, a fine-grained analysis of the post-
intervention data was conducted. Within the major category of communication, 
disruptions largely consisted of the following two minor categories: nonessential 
communication (56%) and lack of response (25%). The remainder of the disruptions 
observed were distributed among ineffective communication (8%), simultaneous 
communication (5%), confusion (2%), lack of sharing (2%), and environmental noise 
(2%) (see Figure 4.3). 
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 Figure 4.3. Communication Breakdown During the Post-Intervention Phase 
 
The two most heavily populated minor categories within post-intervention 
interruptions were: distractions (29%) and spilling/dropping (22%). These were followed 
by teaching moments (15%), equipment/supplies (11%), alerts (11%), task deviation 
(7%), searching activities (3%), and interaction with biohazards (2%) (see Figure 4.4). 
 
Figure 4.4. Interruptions Breakdown During the Post-Intervention Phase 
The two minor categories making up the bulk of post-intervention coordination 
issues consisted of: planning/preparation (35%) and charting/documentation (35%). 
These categories were followed by unknown information (12%), personnel not available 
(11%), protocol failure (5%), and personnel rotation (1%) (see Figure 4.5). 
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Figure 4.5. Coordination Breakdown During the Post-Intervention Phase 
Post-intervention disruptions related to layout included inadequate space (40%), 
wires and tubing (37%), equipment positioning (13%), furniture positioning (6%), 
permanent structures positioning (5%), and connector positioning (0%) (see Figure 4.6). 
The minor category distribution in the usability category was computer design (55%), 
equipment design (20%), barrier design (15%), packaging design (10%), data entry (non-
computer) design (0%), and surface design (0%) (see Figure 4.7). The only minor 
category populated in the major category of equipment issues was general equipment 
(100%) (see Figure 4.8). 
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Figure 4.6. Layout Breakdown During the Post-Intervention Phase 
 
Figure 4.7. Usability Breakdown During the Post-Intervention Phase 
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Figure 4.8. Equipment Issues Breakdown During the Post-Intervention Phase 
Differences between FDs in resuscitation and imaging were also observed. The 
most prevalent type of post-intervention communication disruption observed in 
resuscitation was lack of response (41%), however, it was not observed as often in 
imaging (13%). However, in imaging, nonessential communication (76%) represented the 
largest threat to communication, but not nearly as much in resuscitation (28%). Finally, 
the next most prevalent communication issue was ineffective communication, but to a 
much lesser degree, occurring more in resuscitation (15%) than in imaging (3%) (see 
Figure 4.9). 
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Figure 4.9. Communication Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the Post-
Intervention Phase 
 
With respect to interruptions, the most frequently occurring post-intervention 
disruption in resuscitation was spilling/dropping (29%), however, it occurred less 
frequently in imaging (11%). Next, distractions posed the largest threat in imaging 
(44%), but not quite as often in resuscitation (19%). Equipment/supplies (14%) and alerts 
(14%) were the next most prevalent issues in imaging, occurring equally as frequently 
(see Figure 4.10). 
 
Figure 4.10. Interruptions Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the Post-
Intervention Phase 
 
In resuscitation, breakdowns in post-intervention coordination were mostly 
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related to planning/preparation (46%) as compared to 27% in imaging. On the other hand, 
issues surrounding charting/documentation occurred most frequently in imaging (51%) as 
compared to resuscitation (16%). Following planning/preparation issues, personnel not 
available was the next largest coordination issue in resuscitation (13%), whereas it 
represented 10% of the disruptions in imaging. Similarly, unknown information was the 
next most prevalent disruption in imaging (13%), while it represented 11% of the 
disruptions in resuscitation (see Figure 4.11). 
 
Figure 4.11. Coordination Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the Post-
Intervention Phase 
 
There were several differences involving the specific types of layout issues 
involved in post-intervention resuscitation and imaging. Inadequate space was the largest 
contributor to disruptions observed in resuscitation (57%), but was not necessarily a 
major factor in imaging (11%). On the other hand, wires and tubing issues made up 68% 
of the disruptions in imaging, whereas they were not as prevalent in resuscitation (18%). 
Equipment positioning disruptions occurred slightly more often in resuscitation (14%) 
than in imaging (11%). Finally, furniture positioning issues occurred evenly in both 
resuscitation and imaging (6% each) (see Figure 4.12). 
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Figure 4.12. Layout Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the Post-
Intervention Phase 
 
The final two categories, usability and equipment issues were both lightly 
populated, each representing only 2% of post-intervention disruptions. With respect to 
usability, the most populated minor category was computer design (59%) in resuscitation, 
followed by equipment design (18%), barrier design (12%), and packaging design (12%). 
However, the most prevalent disruptions in imaging were equally distributed among 
computer design, equipment design, and barrier design (33% each) (see Figure 4.13). 
Finally, equipment issues were made up entirely of general equipment issues with 
slightly more disruptions occurring in imaging (3%) than in resuscitation (1%) (see 
Figure 4.14). 
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Figure 4.13. Usability Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the Post-
Intervention Phase 
 
 
Figure 4.14. Equipment Issues Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the 
Post-Intervention Phase 
 
Pre-Intervention and Post-Intervention Phases Comparative Analysis 
Analysis of FD Data 
The table below presents a side-by-side comparison of the patient demographic 
data collected during both the pre-intervention and post-intervention phases (see Table 
4.3). 
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Table 4.3 Patient Demographics by Pre-Intervention and Post-Intervention Phases 
Patient Demographic  Pre-Intervention Post-Intervention 
Gender 
Male 50 (77%) 34 (73%) 
Female 15 (23%) 14 (27%) 
Mean Age  41.2 (s=20.4) 52.5 (s=19.7) 
Mechanisms of Injury 
(MOI) 
Fall 15 (23%) 11 (21%) 
Motor Vehicle 
Crash 
10 (15%) 15 (29%) 
Motorcycle 
Crash 
26 (40%) 7 (13%) 
Stab Wound 1 (1.5%) 4 (8%) 
Assault 2 (3%) 0 
Gunshot Wound 3 (4%) 1 (2%) 
Burn 1 (1.5%) 0 
Other 7 (11%) 14 (27%) 
Mean Glascow Coma Scale 
(GCS) 
 12.78 (s=3.9) 12 (s=5.1) 
Multiple Traumas  4 (6%) 5 (10%) 
Biker Events  32 (49%) 6 (12%) 
Work Shift 
1st (12 hr)  38 (58.5%) 32 (62%) 
2nd (12 hr)  27 (41.5%) 20 (38%) 
Note. Pre-Intervention n=65 cases. Post-Intervention n=52 cases. 
A total of 1,137 disruptions were identified during 65 observed cases (2,468 
patient contact minutes) in the pre-intervention phase. A total of 939 disruptions were 
identified during 52 observed cases (2,081 patient contact minutes) in the post-
intervention phase. This translated to nearly 18 disruptions per case, which was 
approximately one disruption every two minutes. This was slightly more than the average 
of 17.5 disruptions per case identified in the pre-intervention phase. The average total 
treatment time per case increased slightly between the pre-intervention and post-
observation phases (38 minutes and 40 minutes, respectively). Likewise, the average time 
spent in resuscitation also increased by two minutes between the pre-intervention and 
post-intervention phases (16 minutes and 18 minutes, respectively). However, the 
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average treatment time in imaging remained effectively the same between the pre-
intervention and post-intervention phases (21.5 minutes and 21.4 minutes, respectively). 
With respect to the overall ratio of the number of FDs per minute, or the through-
put measures, there was a slight increase in the overall ratio post-intervention compared 
to pre-intervention phase (0.46 and 0.47, respectively). Similarly, the ratio in 
resuscitation also revealed an increase during the post-intervention phase compared to the 
pre-intervention phase (0.51 and 0.53, respectively). However, the ratios calculated for 
imaging remained stable throughout both observational phases (0.42 and 0.42, 
respectively). 
The frequency of communication related disruptions during both the pre-
intervention and post-intervention phases was 32%, therefore, overall, this threat was not 
reduced. In the post-intervention phase, interruptions comprised 30% of the disruptions, 
which represented a 4% increase compared to the pre-intervention phase. Coordination 
issues continued to be the third most frequent disruption at 18% in the post-intervention 
phase, a 3% decrease compared to the pre-intervention phase. Layout, usability, and 
equipment issues comprised 15%, 2%, and 2% of the disruptions, respectively, in the 
post-intervention phase. Compared to the pre-intervention phase, layout increased 1%, 
usability decreased 3%, and equipment issues did not change (see Figure 4.15). 
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Figure 4.15. Overall Breakdown of Major Categories Comparing Pre-Intervention and 
Post-Intervention Phases 
Further analysis examined the differences in disruptions between resuscitation 
and imaging during the pre-intervention and post-intervention phases. Disruptions related 
to the major category of communication occurred 5% less frequently in resuscitation 
during the post-intervention phase, while there was a 6% increase in imaging. 
Alternatively, post-intervention interruptions experienced a 6% increase in resuscitation, 
and a 3% increase in imaging. Coordination issues observed post-intervention did not 
differ notably in resuscitation, but occurred 5% less frequently in imaging (see Figure 
4.16). 
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Figure 4.16. Overall Breakdown of Major Categories by Resuscitation and Imaging 
Comparing Pre-Intervention and Post-Intervention Phases 
 
In order to gauge the effectiveness of the interventions introduced, the four minor 
categories selected for intervention were examined more closely. The data points of 
interest were isolated and a fine-grained analysis of the data was conducted for further 
comparisons. 
Within the major category of communication, there was a stark difference 
between the data observed during the pre-intervention and post-intervention phases for 
the minor category, ineffective communication, resulting in a 16% reduction in 
disruptions. However, disruptions related to the minor category of nonessential 
communication increased by 19% in the post-intervention phase. Regarding the minor 
category of distractions within interruptions, there was an increase of 5% identified 
during the post-intervention phase. Within coordination, planning/preparation disruptions 
remained relatively unchanged as compared to pre-intervention data, only a minor 
increase of 1% (see Figure 4.17). 
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Figure 4.17. Breakdown of Selected Minor Categories Comparing Pre-Intervention and 
Post-Intervention Phases 
The fine-grained analysis revealed differences between resuscitation and imaging 
during the pre-intervention and post-intervention phases. First, regarding ineffective 
communication issues, there was a 16% decrease in post-intervention disruptions 
occurring in resuscitation, and in imaging, a 14% decrease. However, there was a 
substantial increase in the distribution of disruptions related to nonessential 
communication. Researchers observed a 12% increase in resuscitation and a 21% 
increase in imaging post-intervention. In regards to distractions, there was a 9% increase 
in resuscitation and a 5% increase in imaging post-intervention. Coordination 
breakdowns in the data indicated there was little change in planning/preparation issues in 
both resuscitation and imaging (see Figure 4.18). 
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Figure 4.18. Breakdown of Selected Minor Categories by Resuscitation and Imaging 
Comparing Pre-Intervention and Post-Intervention Phases 
 
Multiple-Baseline Comparative Analysis 
Analysis of FD Data 
Multiple measurements were made in an effort to establish a baseline and assess 
process changes. The baseline 1/pre-intervention consisted of an initial 34 cases (576 
disruptions). The baseline 2/pre-intervention consisted of the next 31 cases (561 
disruptions). Once again, the four minor categories selected for intervention were 
examined more closely. The data points of interest were isolated and a fine-grained 
analysis of the data was conducted for further comparisons. 
For the minor category ineffective communication, a decrease of 15% in 
disruptions was observed in baseline 2/pre-intervention as compared to baseline 1/pre-
intervention. However, disruptions related to the minor category of nonessential 
communication increased by 29% during the baseline 2/pre-intervention segment. 
Distraction-related disruptions increased 14% during the baseline 2/pre-intervention as 
compared to baseline 1/pre-intervention. Planning/preparation disruptions remained 
relatively unchanged between the baseline 1/pre-intervention and baseline 2/pre-
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intervention series, with a decrease of 2% (see Figure 4.19). 
 
Figure 4.19. Breakdown of Selected Minor Categories Comparing Baseline 1/Pre-
Intervention and Baseline 2/Pre-Intervention 
 
The fine-grained analysis revealed differences between resuscitation and imaging 
during the baseline 1/pre-intervention and baseline 2/pre-intervention series. First, 
regarding ineffective communication issues, there was a decrease of 8% in baseline 
1/pre-intervention disruptions occurring in resuscitation, and in imaging, a decrease of 
18%. There was an increase of 8% in the distribution of disruptions related to 
nonessential communication in resuscitation and an increase of 35% in imaging during 
baseline 2/pre-intervention as compared to baseline 1/pre-intervention. There was little 
change in the disruptions related to distractions in resuscitation between baseline 1/pre-
intervention and baseline 2/pre-intervention, a decrease of only 1%. However, a 25% 
increase in imaging occurred during the baseline 2/pre-intervention segment. 
Planning/preparation issues in resuscitation saw a decrease of 9% during baseline 2/pre-
intervention as compared to baseline 1/pre-intervention, however, in imaging these 
disruptions remained about the same, only a minor decrease of 1% (see Figure 4.20). 
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Figure 4.20. Breakdown of Selected Minor Categories Comparing Baseline 1/Pre-
Intervention and Baseline 2/Pre-Intervention 
 
Frequency Comparisons 
Frequency data for the four minor categories selected for improvement was 
compared between the pre-intervention and post-intervention phases overall as well as in 
resuscitation and imaging using chi-square statistic (x2) goodness of fit tests. Next, 
frequency data for the four specific areas targeted was compared between two waves of 
measurement prior to the implementation of interventions, known as baseline 1/pre-
intervention and baseline 2/pre-intervention, both overall and during the clinical phases 
of care (resuscitation and imaging) using chi-square statistic (x2) goodness of fit tests. 
Alpha levels were adjusted accordingly to maintain the family-wise error rate at p<=.05. 
Pre-Intervention and Post-Intervention Phases Analysis 
Overall. For the targeted minor category ineffective communication, a chi-square 
goodness of fit test indicated there was a significant decrease in the frequency of 
ineffective communication disruptions identified in the post-intervention phase (8%) as 
compared with the pre-intervention phase (24%), x2 (1, n=2076) = 24.412, p=0.00. 
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For the targeted minor categories of nonessential communication and distractions, 
a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated there was a significant increase in the 
frequency of both nonessential communication and distraction-related disruptions 
occurring in the post-intervention phase as compared with the pre-intervention phase, x2 
(1, n=2076) = 16.422, p=0.00; Pre (37%) < Post (56%) and x2 (1, n=2076) = 5.412, 
p=0.02; Pre (24%) < Post (29%), respectively. 
Finally, for the targeted minor category planning/preparation, a chi-square 
goodness of fit test indicated that there was no significant difference between the 
frequency of planning/preparation disruptions identified in the post-intervention phase 
(35%) as compared with the pre-intervention phase (34%), x2 (1, n=2076) = 2.664, 
p=0.103. 
Phases of care (resuscitation and imaging). For the targeted minor category, 
ineffective communication, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated that there was a 
significant decrease in the frequency of ineffective communication disruptions identified 
during the post-intervention phase for both the resuscitation and imaging phases (15% 
and 3%, respectively) as compared with the pre-intervention resuscitation and imaging 
phases (31% and 17%, respectively), x2 (1, n=1031) = 9.504, p=0.002 and x2 (1, n=1045) 
= 12.197, p=0.000, respectively. 
On the other hand, for the targeted minor category nonessential communication, a 
chi-square goodness of fit test indicated that there was a significant increase in the 
frequency of nonessential communication disruptions identified during the post-
intervention phase for both the resuscitation and imaging phases (28% and 76%, 
respectively) as compared with the pre-intervention resuscitation and imaging phases 
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(16% and 56%, respectively), x2 (1, n=1031) = 4.708, p=0.030 and x2 (1, n=1045) = 
19.654, p=0.000, respectively. 
Regarding the targeted minor category distractions, a chi-square goodness of fit 
test indicated that there was a significant increase in the frequency of distraction 
disruptions during the post-intervention resuscitation phase (19%) as compared with the 
pre-intervention resuscitation phase (10%), x2 (1, n=1031) =11.424, p=0.001. However, 
there was no significant difference between the frequency of distraction-related 
disruptions identified during the post-intervention imaging phase (44%) as compared 
with the pre-intervention imaging phase (39%), x2 (1, n=1045) = 1.296, p=0.255. 
Finally, for the target minor category, planning/preparation, a chi-square goodness 
of fit test indicated there was no significant difference between the frequency of 
planning/preparation disruptions identified during the post-intervention period for both 
the resuscitation and imaging phases (46% and 27%, respectively) as compared with the 
pre-intervention resuscitation and imaging phases (43% and 29%, respectively), x2 (1, 
n=1031) = 0.741, p=0.389); Pre-intervention (43%) < Post-intervention (46%) and x2 (1, 
n=1045) = 1.781, p=0.182); Pre-intervention (29%) > Post-intervention (27%), 
respectively. 
Multiple-Baseline Analysis 
Overall. For the targeted minor category ineffective communication, a chi-square 
goodness of fit test indicated there was not a significant difference in the frequency of 
ineffective communication disruptions identified in the baseline 1/pre-intervention (32%) 
as compared with baseline 2/pre-intervention (17%), x2 (1, n=1137) = 3.579, p=0.059. 
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For the targeted minor category nonessential communication, a chi-square 
goodness of fit test indicated there was a significant increase in the frequency of 
nonessential communication disruptions occurring in the baseline 1/pre-intervention 
(20%) as compared with baseline 2/pre-intervention (49%), x2 (1, n=1137) = 40.258, 
p=0.00. 
For the targeted minor category distractions, a chi-square goodness of fit test 
indicated there was a significant increase in the frequency of distraction-related 
disruptions occurring in the baseline 1/pre-intervention (16%) as compared with baseline 
2/pre-intervention (30%), x2 (1, n=1137) = 8.822, p=0.03. 
Finally, for the targeted minor category of planning/preparation, a chi-square 
goodness of fit test indicated there was not a significant difference between the frequency 
of planning/preparation disruptions identified in the baseline 1/pre-intervention (35%) as 
compared with baseline 2/pre-intervention (33%), x2 (1, n=1137) = 2.851, p=0.091. 
Phases of care (resuscitation and imaging). For the targeted minor category, 
ineffective communication, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated there was not a 
significant difference in the frequency of ineffective communication disruptions 
identified during the baseline 1/pre-intervention as compared with baseline 2/pre-
intervention for resuscitation (34% and 26%, respectively), x2 (1, n=545) = 1.239, 
p=0.266, as well as for imaging (29% and 11%, respectively), x2 (1, n=592) = 1.869, 
p=0.172. 
For the targeted minor category nonessential communication, a chi-square 
goodness of fit test indicated there was not significant difference in the frequency of 
nonessential communication disruptions identified during the baseline 1/pre-intervention 
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as compared with baseline 2/pre-intervention for resuscitation (13% and 21%, 
respectively), x2 (1, n=545) = 1.947, p=0.163. However, a chi-square goodness of fit test 
indicated there was a significant increase in the frequency of these disruptions during the 
baseline 2/pre-intervention as compared with baseline 1/pre-intervention for imaging 
(32% and 67%, respectively), x2 (1, n=592) = 38.091, p=0.000. 
Regarding the targeted minor category distractions, a chi-square goodness of fit 
test indicated there was not a significant difference in the frequency of distraction 
disruptions identified during the baseline 1/pre-intervention as compared with baseline 
2/pre-intervention for resuscitation (10% and 9%, respectively), x2 (1, n=545) =.002, 
p=0.962. However, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated there was a significant 
increase in the frequency of these disruptions during the baseline 2/pre-intervention as 
compared with baseline 1/pre-intervention for imaging (25% and 50%, respectively), x2 
(1, n=592) = 9.393, p=0.002. 
Finally, for the target minor category planning/preparation, a chi-square goodness 
of fit test indicated there was not a significant difference between the frequency of 
planning/preparation disruptions identified during the baseline 1/pre-intervention as 
compared with baseline 2/pre-intervention for resuscitation (47% and 38%, respectively), 
x2 (1, n=545) = 0.428, p=0.513), as well as for imaging (29% and 30%, respectively), x2 
(1, n=592) = 2.985, p=0.084). 
Discussion 
Analysis of data collected during the post-intervention phase revealed that the 
trauma team experienced an average of 18 disruptions per case, which translated to one 
disruption occurring every two minutes, roughly the same as the baseline phase. The 
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patients observed during the post-intervention phase were, on average, 11 years older 
than the pre-intervention sample (41.2 and 52.5, respectively). As the population ages and 
lives longer, older individuals are more susceptible to trauma. From 2000 to 2010, the 
age group that experienced the highest frequency of death due to traumatic injury was 45 
to 55 (Rhee et al., 2014). In fact, patients of advancing age have higher rates of 
complication and mortality than younger patients (Adams et al., 2012). 
During the post-intervention phase, there were slightly more motor vehicle 
crashes than during the pre-intervention phase (15 versus 10, respectively), but there were 
fewer motorcycle crashes (7 versus 26, respectively). During the pre-intervention phase, 
researchers observed trauma cases during four different biker events: Biketoberfest 2014 
and 2015 and Bike Week 2015 and 2016. In contrast, the post-intervention observation 
phase only encompassed one biker event: Biketoberfest 2016. Thus, not surprisingly, 
there were not nearly as many biker event-related cases observed as compared to the pre-
intervention phase (32 versus 6, respectively). 
The number of other/unspecified trauma cases doubled during the post-
intervention phase as compared to the pre-intervention phase. Two of these “other” MOIs 
involved patients who were in a small airplane crash and arrived simultaneously. Nine of 
these “other” MOIs were motor vehicle-pedestrian/bicyclist crashes, which was six more 
than the number of cases observed during the pre-intervention phase. Factors related to 
these types of injuries and their severity could have contributed to the higher rate of 
disruptions experienced by the trauma team. Previous research has found that higher risk 
cases are potentially more affected by disruptions and generate a greater number of minor 
failures than lower risk cases (Blocker et al., 2012; Blocker et al., 2013; Catchpole et al., 
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2007). A report prepared by the Governors Highway Safety Association (as cited in 
Retting & Schwartz, 2017) found fatal pedestrian accidents increased by 11% in 2016, 
which was the largest increase in more than two decades. According to the same report, 
distracted driving and walking such as cellphone use and other electronic devices, was 
the main cause of pedestrian fatalities (Retting & Schwartz, 2017). 
The reported GCS scores, which are an indication of injury severity and level of 
consciousness, remained relatively stable over both the pre-intervention and post-
intervention phases. Gender, work shift distribution, and number of multiple traumas also 
remained fairly steady in comparison. 
It is likely a sufficient level of stability in the pattern of disruptions was 
established overall especially considering the improved design of adding a multiple-
baseline analysis. Any change in the DV (FDs) was able to be evaluated relative to the 
baseline values (baseline 1/pre-intervention and baseline 2/pre-intervention) and also 
relative to a change in the comparison series (post-intervention phase). Specifically, as it 
relates to ineffective communication there were no changes in the pre-intervention 
observation data series, therefore, a change in FDs following the intervention may indeed 
be due to the intervention introduced. Also, the sample of trauma cases captured during 
both the pre-intervention and post-intervention phase seemed to represent the typical 
“parent” trauma population with respect to patient demographics (e.g., age, gender, MOI, 
GCS, work shift, event). 
The role identification sticker system was one of the targeted interventions 
developed in an effort to improve ineffective communication and help address 
planning/preparation issues. In the majority of post-intervention phase trauma cases, the 
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trauma team members complied with the request to don a sticker that identified their role 
and included their name. In 43 out of 52 cases (83%), most, if not all, trauma team 
members wore a role identification sticker. In 40 cases out of 52 cases (77%), most, if not 
all, trauma team members also included their name on the sticker. An example of one of 
these observations states, “Dr. [X] reminded team to use the stickers (2-4 stickers were 
applied as a result of this reminder); ultimately 6 persons wearing stickers, all with names 
written down.” On the other hand, there were six cases, or 11.5%, where it was observed 
that team members were not wearing stickers at all or, at best, only one or two members, 
were wearing stickers. For example, it was observed and noted, “Most everyone was 
wearing their PPE, but no stickers; although noticed tech [A] and tech [B] had stickers 
on.” In three cases, or 6%, it was unknown (i.e., not recorded) if the team members 
donned a sticker. 
Next, the implementation of conducting a pre-arrival brief and debrief was one of 
the targeted interventions developed in an effort to improve ineffective communication 
and help address planning/preparation issues. Out of 52 trauma cases, it was observed in 
24 cases (46%), that a partial pre-arrival brief was completed or attempted, meaning only 
one or two of the three required steps were conducted (see Appendix E). An example of 
one of these observations stated, “Nurse [X] mentioned doing briefing. Briefing was 
completed a few minutes after nurse [X] mentioned that it would be a good idea; nurse 
[X] prepped the team by giving details of the injury including mechanism, locations, and 
severity of blood loss.” In six cases (11.5%), all three elements of a pre-arrival brief 
(Steps 1, 2, and 3) were completed (i.e., an effective pre-arrival brief was conducted by 
the team). For example, it was observed and noted, “Complete pre-arrival brief conducted 
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w/ checklist in hand.” In 17 cases (33%), there was no pre-arrival brief conducted at all. 
For instance, the observation simply stated, “Pre-arrival brief not conducted.” It was 
unknown if a pre-arrival brief was conducted in five (10%) of the cases. This was due to 
observers accompanying the trauma team to the helipad or arriving just prior to the 
patient arrival, but not necessarily in time to witness whether a brief was conducted in the 
trauma resuscitation bay. In other words, in just over half of the observed cases, a pre-
arrival brief was conducted effectively or at least attempted. 
Since observations began from the time the patient arrived in the trauma 
resuscitation bay through imaging and ended upon disposition to surgery, the medical 
floor unit, or the ED, researchers were unable to observe the team’s debriefing activities. 
However, on two separate occasions researchers observed the team initiate a debrief 
while awaiting the CT scan results. The debrief was conducted in the viewing hallway of 
the imaging suite. Additional debriefs may have theoretically been conducted at the 
conclusion of a trauma case post-surgery, or after the patient was transferred to the 
medical floor unit or the ED. However, because researchers did not continue to follow the 
patient beyond imaging, it is unknown how often a debrief occurred in these locations. 
The rate of communication-related disruptions post-intervention continued to be 
the most frequent, followed by interruptions and issues related to coordination. These 
results were similar to those of others conducting related research in various healthcare 
domains (Blocker et al., 2012; Blocker et al., 2013; Catchpole et al., 2013; Catchpole et 
al., 2014; Shouhed et al., 2014; Wiegmann, et al., 2007). 
Most notably, disruptions involving ineffective communication were relatively 
nonexistent in the post-intervention observations, which may speak directly to the 
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information exchange strategies presented in the NLT such as the simulation-based 
practice scenarios, and the positive results of the training program (see Appendices G-J 
and N). 
The fine-grained analyses revealed that the majority of communication-related 
disruptions in resuscitation and imaging continued to involve nonessential 
communication, which occurred much more frequently during imaging. This was not 
surprising, as previously discussed, given the distinct nature of trauma care during each 
of these phases. Within the major category of interruptions, distractions continued to 
represent more of a threat during imaging, which corresponds to the high frequency of 
nonessential communication that also occurred during this time frame. Although 
planning/preparation occurred equally as much during the post-intervention phase, 
planning/preparation issues still persisted more often in resuscitation. 
There were several factors that contributed to the decision to complete 
observations by December 26, 2016. As previously mentioned, there was a major change 
that occurred within the trauma program two and a half months after post-intervention 
observations began. The long-standing contracted trauma surgeon group was replaced by 
a new contracted group that consisted of mostly new trauma surgeons (only two trauma 
surgeons from the original group remained on staff). By the end of the year, the number 
of cases observed were almost evenly distributed between the two groups: 28 cases with 
the previously contracted group and 24 with the new group. 
Also, traditionally, there is a substantial amount of bedside nurse turnover in the 
beginning of each new year at most hospitals. Consequently, it was presumed that at least 
some out of the 88 ED/trauma nurses who participated in the NLT may either no longer 
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be employed with the hospital or may have transferred to other units. The national nurse 
turnover rate continues to rise, exceeding the national hospital turnover rate, which 
leveled off in 2015. The nurse turnover rate increased to 17.2% in 2015, up from 16.4% 
in 2014. Nurses working in emergency care experience one of the highest turnover rates 
(NSI Nursing Solutions, Inc., 2016). 
Additionally, the TSM submitted his resignation effective January 13, 2017. It 
was unknown if the hospital anticipated asking the new manager that would be filling the 
vacant position to present the NLT to new ED hires. 
To capture a trauma activation from start to finish, researchers were scheduled to 
be “on call” at the hospital around the clock in an attempt to observe as many cases as 
possible. However, the sporadic nature of the trauma patient volume at this Level II 
trauma center and researchers’ school schedules contributed to a lengthy process. This, in 
addition to the overall time constraints and unforeseen circumstances specific to the 
naturalistic setting of this current study posed significant challenges to the observational 
research design and limited the overall sample size of the cases. Consequently, there were 
13 fewer trauma cases observed post-intervention as compared to the pre-intervention 
phase. 
In addition to the “changing of guard”, or the replacement of the long-standing 
contracted trauma surgeon group, another important factor to consider when comparing 
results is the recipients of the training intervention. First, the physicians (i.e., trauma 
surgeons, ED physicians, anesthesiologists, radiologists) did not receive the NLT content 
in the same format as the ED nurses. Instead, the trauma surgeons and ED physicians 
received the NLT content through Microsoft PowerPoints via email. Anesthesiologists 
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and radiologists did not receive the training in any format. Also, at the request of the 
TPMD, medical human factors researchers presented an abridged version of the NLT on 
two separate occasions during the monthly Trauma Committee Meetings (June 7, 2016 
and July 5, 2016). Unfortunately, not all the trauma surgeons were in attendance during 
those meetings. When evaluating the results of the interventions, an important factor to 
consider is that physicians need to be part of the whole process, from development to 
rollout and any training in between. As noted by Thomas and Galla (2013), if physicians 
do not “buy in” to the process, engage as champions, and believe in the value and 
importance of teamwork, any attempts at team training will suffer. 
Furthermore, ED technicians, who serve a key role as fundamental members of 
the assembled trauma team, did not receive the NLT training at all. A number of other 
team members such as lab, orthopedic, respiratory, and radiology technicians also did not 
receive the NLT training as well. Thus, all technicians that were part of the trauma team 
were, for all intents and purpose, unaware of the expectations presented in the training 
concerning leadership, teamwork, and communication. This deficit in training may have 
been most disadvantageous from the standpoint of the imaging phase of patient care. 
Although trauma care requires multiple caregivers from varying disciplines to work 
together as an effective team with the goal of saving a life and preventing harm, the 
trauma team must enter and coordinate patient care while operating under the auspices of 
the radiology unit in nearly every trauma case. In a sense, organizationally, it is the 
radiology technicians and radiologists who “lead the charge,” so to speak, during this 
phase of care. 
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Providers from many different disciplines bring with them their own expectations, 
norms, attitudes, and cultures and, in order to achieve effective team communication, 
teams must overcome these barriers (Barach & Weinger, 2007). One way to achieve this 
goal is to participate in team training. As previously mentioned, Salas et al. (2008) found 
that team training was an effective intervention for influencing team processes and 
performance. The increase in disruptions related to nonessential communication and 
distractions observed in imaging may have been a direct result of the lack of team 
training for every member of the team. Also, the stability of team membership is an 
important aspect to consider since “team effect”, in a sense, may have indirectly 
influenced the results. Recall that a Level II trauma team is non-intact, meaning the 
makeup of the team is fluid, so it was not uncommon to observe, on average, only two to 
three core members present in a case. 
The good news, however, was that despite the lack of an intact team and 
comprehensive team training, ineffective communication remained low throughout the 
post-intervention phase. As part of the NLT curriculum, trauma nurses practiced team 
communication and teamwork skills using low-fidelity simulation-based training as well 
as role-playing in a relevant context. Embedding simulation training into the didactic 
curriculum may explain why these desired team competencies, which included 
communication protocols and information exchange strategies, transferred so well to the 
floor of the trauma suite. Shapiro et al. (2004) found that simulation training improves 
teamwork skills and behavior in the clinical environment and offers the opportunity for 
participants to sustain the lessons they learned. 
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Although the overwhelming majority of nurses who participated in the NLT felt 
the information was relevant and useful to them in the performance of their duties and the 
pre-post-test scores supported the effectiveness of the training with respect to knowledge 
acquisition, the changes observed were not expected and not consistent with the proposed 
hypothesis in this current study. The data-driven interventions appeared to improve only 
one selected minor category, ineffective communication, however, similar levels of 
improvement were not observed in the other targeted areas. 
 Combining data-driven interventions and team training together led to marked 
improvement post-intervention in the ineffective communication typically relied on by 
the team members. These positive findings indicated a consistent pattern as far as the 
implemented interventions having an effect on team performance and their non-technical 
communication skills (i.e., ineffective communication). Yet, no significant difference was 
found in the planning/preparation process before and after intervention. Even worse, 
there was a trend towards increasing the process inefficiencies, or threats, experienced by 
the team as it related to nonessential communication and distractions in the post-
intervention phase. The disruption data identified and classified suggested the NLT and 
the data-driven interventions actually increased the rates of nonessential communication 
and distractions substantially. 
The initiatives introduced in the NLT were not “written in blood” by any means. 
In other words, there was no enforcement of these new protocols from an organizational 
standpoint. Case in point, the role identification stickers and names were worn during the 
majority of the cases post-intervention, however, a pre-arrival brief was conducted 
effectively or attempted in just over half of these cases. The pre-arrival brief was 
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specifically implemented to address issues having to do with planning/preparation. Lack 
of follow-through regarding the pre-arrival briefing may explain why there was little 
change in the frequency of this threat.  
By the same token, team members’ cell phones were not confiscated, nor were the 
hospital communication devices (i.e., Voceras) turned off during the course of care for a 
trauma patient. These are essential tools, but also tools that were routinely involved in 
many of the distractions the trauma team experienced during any given case. To illustrate 
this point, a count of how often the words “phone” and “Vocera” were found in the 
Microsoft Excel Workbook yielded 200 entries, indicating healthcare professionals are 
clearly experiencing multiple potential threats related to their personal electronic devices 
in each case. The casual use of these personal communication devices introduces new 
distractions in an already complex, high-stakes environment. While it may be difficult to 
measure exactly how disruptive ringing phones, scrolling through Facebook, or Vocera 
pages are to highly trained healthcare providers, there is no question these events break 
their concentration and threaten situation awareness (SA). Smith and Hancock (1995) 
defined SA as an “adaptive, externally directed consciousness” (p. 138). It is a dynamic 
factor in an operator’s task environment that has the capacity to externally direct 
consciousness and influence behavior. Within an operator’s multi-dimensional “risk 
space” there are a number of elements that compromise safety (Smith & Hancock, 1995). 
This is where these distraction-related threats have their greatest impact. Boquet and 
colleagues (2017a) investigated a similar concept within surgical team performance 
called “error space.” They proposed that these disruptions represented an aggregated 
space, which disconnects the team from the task at hand, thus, increasing the demands on 
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the cognitive resources healthcare providers need to stay better focused on the patient 
status and the central task (Boquet, Cohen, Reeves, & Shappell, 2017a). One disruption 
in isolation may not pose a threat to the delivery of trauma care, however, when these 
disruptions accumulate, they create a window of opportunity for errors to occur (Boquet 
et al, 2017b; Cohen et al., 2016). 
In reality, each of the implemented interventions fell short of obtaining full 
compliance to some extent. There is no ignoring the fact that this partial compliance 
likely had a direct effect on the final results of the study. 
Treatment time was not specifically pursued as an outcome measure or DV in the 
study. However, results indicated that there was not a reduction in overall time elapsed 
per case following the implementation of interventions. Treatment time increased by two 
minutes on average in the post-intervention phase as compared to the pre-intervention 
phase. Since there was not an overall reduction in FDs, it is not necessarily surprising that 
length of case time followed suit. This provides further support for the assertion that an 
excessive number of minor disruptions may increase the duration time of treatment. 
When teamwork, leadership, communication, and coordination are improved 
upon, it typically positively influences team outcomes in terms of their ability to 
communicate, plan, and make decisions. One would expect these improvements to result 
in more effective and timely patient care (Salas, Rosen, Burke, & Goodwin, 2009; 
Weaver, Rosen, Salas, Baum, & King, 2010). Results of this current study indicated the 
opposite effect in terms of duration of care. Although high performing teams may deliver 
better quality care and improved patient outcomes, perhaps this trauma team, in 
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particular, took more time to do so in the form of “good practices,” information exchange 
strategies, correcting, informing, protocol compliance, clinical/technical proficiency, etc. 
Nevertheless, results of this current study found that during the post-intervention 
phase there were notable improvements, team members made special efforts to 
communicate more clearly and unambiguously. This finding was related to the lower 
incidence of ineffective communication disruptions observed during the post-intervention 
phase. This improvement in the process inefficiency related to ineffective communication 
are encouraging, particularly from a training standpoint. The results suggested that 
RIPCHORD-TWA was able to detect improvements after team training. Considering the 
brevity, feasibility, and success of the training, this provides support for a more wide-
scale implementation of an inter-professional team training program. 
Previous studies utilizing FDs as an outcome measure as well as attempting to 
design distinct interventions to reduce their occurrence, reported promising results 
(Catchpole et al., 2014; Hildebrand, 2014). However, little is known of the long-term 
sustainability of these positive outcomes. The prospective study in trauma was conducted 
in a Level I trauma center. Because of their unique differences, it is reasonable to assume 
that process inefficiencies observed at a Level I trauma center may not generalize to 
reflect those observed in a Level II trauma center. Therefore, this empirical study in a 
Level II trauma facility broadens the scope of inquiry and increases the understanding of 
potential interventions that these types of facilities can employ to improve life-saving 
trauma services. Furthermore, these studies did not investigate multiple subcategories 
within major categories. In the study, the minor categories of RIPCHORD-TWA lend 
itself to a fine-grained analysis, allowing for greater resolution of the disruptions 
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threatening the system. The robust, subcategory taxonomy recognizes the subtle 
differences between underlying causes, thereby provides a richer source of data with 
which to develop effective interventions. 
What also makes this current study so unique lies not only in better delineating 
the “what” that is being fixed, but also the “how”, and then, orchestrating the “who” that 
is directing the fix (i.e., those on the front lines). It is well known that many quality 
improvements do not succeed because program administrators, and the like, fail to realize 
that the “how” is just as important as the “what” (Sundt, 2011; Wiegmann, 2015). 
Routinely, they create solutions and preside over interventions by “simply closing their 
eyes and hoping to hit the bullseye.” Instead, program administrators should have an in-
depth understanding of the intervention itself, increasing buy-in, and involving those at 
the “sharp end of the spear” to better guide their focus and further guarantee hitting the 
target. 
Furthermore, findings from this current study were informative and made a 
methodological contribution because they provided empirical evidence obtained from 
direct observations in order to generate potential interventions. Since it is known that 
errors are the consequences of systemic breakdowns, focusing on systemic factors may 
be more fruitful than approaches that focus solely on who committed the error, an 
individual’s clinical skill, or on the error itself. For obvious reasons, the systems 
perspective is much more widely accepted by healthcare professionals especially when it 
concerns prospective observations. By referring to individual events as FDs and not 
errors, researchers are better equipped to study the real-time dynamics that threaten the 
optimal delivery of patient care. 
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Limitations 
There were a number of limitations to this current study, most of which are 
related to an ITS design and the drawbacks that affect both internal and external validity. 
 First, it is possible that the mere presence of the observer(s) confounded the 
normal trauma team work flow. This is called the Hawthorne effect or observer effect, a 
phenomenon in which individuals modify an aspect of their behavior in response to being 
observed and are, therefore, less likely to behave naturally (Rice University, 2014). Some 
steps were taken to deliberately diminish this effect. For example, observers’ uniforms 
consisted of medical scrubs in order to blend in as much as possible. They attempted to 
be as inconspicuous and unobtrusive as possible by observing the case and taking notes 
from a distance to reduce the awareness of their presence. 
Second, this current study was not double-blinded, meaning the researchers who 
designed the study, also served as the observers, and were privy to the expected results. 
This lack of blinding, may have led to observer bias and a potential overestimation of the 
positive effects while ignoring the negative aspects during subsequent observations. 
Attempts were made to combat this type of bias by thoroughly training observers in terms 
of establishing clear criteria for what was to be recorded (Rice University, 2014). 
Third, becoming more adept at recognizing FDs over time may have led to 
capturing more detail and disruptions during the baseline 2/pre-intervention and the post-
intervention phase compared to the baseline 1/pre-intervention. Observers, especially 
those who have been observing the trauma care process since the beginning of the study, 
nearly three years in all, were able to “catch” a lot of disruptions at this point due to sheer 
expectation, knowing clinically how a case progresses, and where the “hang ups” tend to 
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occur. For instance, two of the researchers had been observing for all three years, one had 
been observing for two and a half years, and one other had two years of observing 
experience. 
It is worth noting that the prospective post-intervention observations 
demonstrated that the interventions were not employed all of the time. However, it could 
be that they were deployed in the cases that the researchers did not directly observe. 
In addition to utilizing human observers, human coders, although well-trained, 
categorized the observations into a human factors taxonomy, RIPCHORD-TWA. Their 
idiosyncrasies, biases, and inconsistencies may have affected the results as well. 
Attempts to sustain the changes introduced by the training involved multiple 
strategies aimed at reinforcing the core principles addressed during the training. For 
example, researchers intended to hang a large poster on the wall in the trauma 
resuscitation bay displaying the pre-arrival brief. This poster would have served as a 
continuous visual reminder to use the preparation tools and communication protocols 
introduced during the training. Unfortunately, the hospital’s marketing department made 
numerous mistakes during the drafting stage of the poster, which delayed production. 
Consequently, the poster was not completed or displayed in the trauma resuscitation bay. 
On a related note, with the deployment of interventions targeting specific problem 
areas, there is always a concern that a fix in one area may lead to an unforeseen 
provocation somewhere else in the system. As specific FDs were targeted and possibly 
mitigated, other marginal threats may have begun to take their place and occur more 
frequently. Thus, the occurrence of threats may never be eliminated completely. Worse 
yet, they could be replaced by other more potentially vexing issues. Data collected during 
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the study points to a good example of this dilemma. Post-intervention 
charting/documentation disruptions increased by 23% in imaging as compared to the pre-
intervention phase. Perhaps efforts to improve team communication and ensure that 
everyone on the team knows one another’s names meant they were also more willing to 
verbalize patient information directly to the primary nurse/scribe than ever before. 
Reciprocally, the team may have been more willing to support the tasks of the primary 
nurse/scribe and ensure that information was documented efficiently and accurately. 
Lastly, regarding external validity, the prospective investigation was limited to a 
single medical facility. Thus, the ability to generalize the results to other hospitals 
housing Level II trauma centers might be restricted due to differences in emergency 
services systems. Also, this medical facility is located in an area with a unique population 
demographic and serves a considerable number of transient clientele. It resides in the 
“World’s Most Famous Beach” in the South, where a number of elderly and homeless 
individuals live and bikers and tourists visit. Thus, patient population demographics may 
limit the ability to generalize the results to other hospitals and their Level II trauma 
centers. 
Generally, a host of issues related to real-world conditions, non-compliance, and 
organizational apathy, jeopardized the sustainability of the changes introduced by the 
interventions. In and of themselves, these complications imparted their own set of 
limitations to the follow-through of interventional implementation. It is difficult to 
definitively say how much these types of limitations directly impacted the results. It is 
believed that having had more control over the environment during the study could have 
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widened the gap in the distribution of the data between the pre-intervention and post-
intervention phases. 
Future Research and Direction 
With the departure of the TSM, the hospital’s proposed plan for continued 
training efforts is unknown at this time. It was planned for the future to include a 
mandatory leadership/team training and orientation for new ED nurse hires. Plans also 
included an annual mandatory refresher to support ongoing process improvement and aid 
in the retention of knowledge, skills, and attitudes. Additionally, future plans considered 
the development of a training program for all trauma team members (e.g., physicians, 
technicians) with the intent of clarifying specific performance expectations and 
presenting a clear message that patient safety is the highest priority. Also, it was 
recommended by the human factors researchers that the department consider executing 
unannounced mock drills for team members to practice their newly gained skills or to 
strengthen skills. The novel information exchange protocols and pre-arrival 
briefs/debriefs can be difficult and awkward at first because healthcare professionals have 
been trained using a variety of communication styles. Practice allows them to move from 
the awkward beginning stage of call outs and read backs to the point where effective 
communication becomes second nature. 
The results of this current study support the importance of implementing policies 
and procedures restricting the use of cell phones and Voceras as well as imposing a 
sterile cockpit rule in any procedural area of the trauma suite. The ACS’ Committee on 
Perioperative Care (2008) issued a statement on the use of cell phones and personal 
devices in the operating room and the distractions that can arise from this technology. 
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From a human factors perspective, adopting formal policies, enforcement, and reporting 
non-compliance are simple strategies to solving a pervasive problem. 
Post-intervention phase observations indicated that the role identification sticker 
system had become almost as standard for the trauma team as “gowning up” in their PPE. 
However, many of the other interventions were far from being hard-wired into their 
operations. Ongoing promotion, positive reinforcement by administration, and buy-in and 
active participation on the part of the physicians will go a long way to help hard-wire the 
process. Identifying nurse “champions” and empowering trauma nurses to transfer their 
newly learned skills, potentially fostering cultural change to the entire ED, will also 
improve these system processes. As change takes hold and these initiatives are adopted 
consistently, all trauma team members will conduct operations in the same manner every 
time, “no matter what the weather.” 
The researchers have successfully adapted a robust human factors taxonomy, 
previously used only in the CVOR, to identify and classify disruptions encountered in an 
entirely different healthcare domain. As it currently stands, the descriptions of the FDs, 
which may be applicable to other disciplines, cater to disruptions found in surgery 
specifically the CVOR. Nevertheless, the RIPCHORD-TWA framework provides a 
universal blueprint that concentrates on the human factors elements of a system. Future 
studies should focus on the generic modification of this methodology across all 
healthcare disciplines. Of special note, RIPCHORD-TWA does not distinguish between 
“good” and “bad” disruptions, yet one may consider some minor pauses (e.g., clarifying 
communication mix-ups, alerts, on-the-job training) as advantageous or “good practices”. 
In fact, skilled teams often use these temporary halts to prevent adverse events. An 
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example of this is a “time out,” which is performed in the OR just prior to the induction 
of a patient or an invasive procedure. It involves active communication among surgical 
teams using a standardized checklist. The “time out” checklist was part of an effort to 
eliminate sentinel events such as wrong site and wrong person surgeries and is essential 
for ensuring quality of care, reducing risk, and improving patient safety (Joint 
Commission, 2017). 
To illustrate this point, an example of what could be considered a “good” 
disruption is an observation that was coded as a teaching moment under interruptions: 
“Nurse begins to insert a Foley, trauma surgeon stops her and explains that best practices 
require Foley to be inserted in ICU and why, trauma committee recommendation, etc.” It 
was not documented how many of the disruptions observed in the study overall 
represented “good practices.” Nor, were these types of disruptions singled out. Instead, 
per the operational definition of FDs, “good” and “bad” FDs were combined together as 
one and the same, although the argument could be made that not all FDs are created 
equally. 
The role of the primary nurse/scribe is the most complex and challenging in the 
broader context of trauma teamwork. Perhaps future research should consider their work 
requirements and the designing of technologies (e.g., computer-based data entry, 
electronic medical records (EMRs)) that are better able to support the nurse recorder in 
the documentation process. Developing more functional, accurate, and effective work 
practices centered on the recorder’s tasks are essential not only for the primary 
nurse/scribe, but also for the other team members who are busy with patient care. 
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Along these same lines, researchers may also be interested in examining the 
influence of a given FD on the trauma team by attempting to measure the length of 
disruptions (i.e., how long it took to resolve the disruption), the impact on surrounding 
team members, and relationship to a specific discipline type (e.g., trauma surgeon, ED 
physician, fluids nurse). They could also examine whether the FD can be directly linked 
to an overt error or patient outcome as well as the mental effort required by the provider 
to overcome the disruption (e.g., workload assessments, structured interviews, 
metacognition debriefs). 
One future study already underway involves using isolated communication and 
coordination FD data to examine where the major threats lie. Based on this rich source of 
information, the critical skills that should be directly targeted can be clearly determined. 
The focus is on developing a more comprehensive and effective training program that is 
compatible with the measurement tool and assessment model presented in the study. 
Ultimately, this investigation will help engineer even more quality into the system and 
provide on-going feedback from the process about the system deficiencies to enhance 
team performance through improved training efforts. 
Specified patient demographics were obtained for each case observed. Future 
studies may utilize regression analyses to explore the significance of relationships 
between FDs and various demographics collected, including patient age, gender, GCS 
score, MOI, biker-related events (annual Bike Week and Biketoberfest), work shift, 
physician providing care, air transport versus ground, multiple trauma patients received, 
etc. For instance, investigating whether cases with critical patients with a poor prognosis 
are correlated with a higher number of FDs would be a worthwhile analysis. Research 
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indicates that case complexity requires a greater need for resources and higher pressures 
on the team, which may accompany more severely injured patients (Shouhed et al., 
2014). 
An abundance of qualitative data was collected in the format of unstructured, 
free-response observational notes. These comprehensive notes provide a more in-depth 
look at the problems facing the trauma teams during the continuum of patient care. The 
narrative provides additional insights into the nature of the interactions and also reveals 
numerous “good practices” among trauma team members. This data may provide the 
foundation for further exploratory research as well as generate ideas for future 
quantitative research. 
A follow-up survey could be created and administered to gauge how well the 
interventions are working from the perspective of hospital personnel. The purpose of the 
survey would be to evaluate trauma team members’ perceptions, opinions, and awareness 
of the trauma optimization project and obtain a better idea of whether the interventions 
introduced are being sustained in practice. Survey questions may include the following: 
1) Are the interventions improving your work? 2) Are they effective? 3) Do other staff 
members comply? 4) Is there a real and noticeable difference in the frequency of process 
inefficiencies occurring during care of a trauma patient? This survey would attempt to 
address the subjective nature of the effects of the interventions. Quantitative results, or 
the number of disruptions occurring per case, do not necessarily parallel the qualitative 
consequences of intervention implementation. This survey would attempt to capture the 
more abstract differences experienced by members of the trauma team. In other words, do 
team members “feel” the difference? Do they truly perceive that they are operating in a 
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more efficient manner and as a well-coordinated team? Could there be improvements to 
the process? If so, what specifically would they suggest doing to mitigate process 
inefficiencies they are experiencing? Elements of patient safety and quality, culture 
change, leadership, communication, and teamwork could also be assessed using this 
questionnaire. The hospital may choose to re-administer the survey over different points 
in time to examine trends in patient safety initiatives and culture change. 
In today’s technological world, combining video recording and big data analytics 
is a viable data collection instrument that has significant advantages over prospective 
observation. Intelligent video analytics, 360-degree video cameras, and social sensing 
technology provide powerful tools for capturing workflow disruptions. Options include 
expanded analytic hardware and software for detection, movement, and tracking, 
repeated replays, and useful real-time feedback. Best of all, the video gathered can be 
used as an effective learning and training tool for quality improvement. Audio and video 
recording in the healthcare environment has its own set of challenges such as acceptance 
from clinicians, medico-legal issues, patient confidentiality, privacy, employee 
performance risks, and commiserating audiovisual capabilities. Some of these obstacles 
can be overcome by properly introducing the system and encouraging participation, 
especially by using clinician reviews, developing trust, reporting feedback, as well as 
involving multidisciplinary experts (Mackenzie & Xiao, 2003). This innovative 
technology has the potential for autonomous observation and coding, essentially 
removing the human element from the data collection, measurement, and analysis. The 
platform could also support additional technologies. For example, radio-frequency 
identification (RFID) can be simultaneously introduced to identify and track individuals, 
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objects, and any relevant biometrics (physical and behavioral characteristics), which 
could deliver a wealth of information. 
This prospective investigation has produced a promising model that may prove 
helpful for any healthcare organization wishing to embark on their own journey towards 
improvements in the process of patient care. The key to this current study was the 
development of a measurement tool and assessment model, both of which generated 
specific feedback that could be used to gauge and enhance team performance, based on 
the foundations of safety science. Whether they are a public, community hospital such as 
this one, a large-scale hospital system, or a small labor and delivery unit, front line staff 
and administrators alike could benefit from tailoring aspects of this trauma optimization 
project towards their own quality improvement projects to aid them in ensuring that they 
are deploying the right interventions. 
Considering the healthcare industry is still struggling to reduce patient morbidity 
and mortality directly related to preventable errors and adverse events, it is evident that 
current problem solving approaches must change. Systematically identifying threat 
windows and presenting FDs as aggregates and multiplying the threats to safety and 
quality of care exposes process inefficiencies earlier in the chain of events, thereby 
affording researchers the opportunity to intervene well before a potential error or adverse 
event occurs. This approach provides data-derived evidence for motivating action and 
directing decision making regarding the “what” and the “how” to pursue improvement. 
The “who” comes from engaged participants acting locally and focusing on fixing the 
problems they encounter in the system where they must work. Improvements do not 
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happen overnight or with one big fix, instead, it is a continuous, systematic cycle of “If at 
first you don’t succeed, try, try, and try again.” 
The Safety Systems Management Process (SSMP) model provides a visual guide 
for others to use as they assess their own programs targeting process inefficiencies. 
SSMP ensures that they are deploying the right interventions while aiming for real local 
improvements (see Figure 4.21). 
 
Figure 4.21. Safety Systems Management Process (SSMP) 
  
A PROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATION AT A LEVEL II TRAUMA CENTER 169      
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
As threats accumulate, along with the absence of adverse events associated with 
them, these seemingly minor events begin to be perceived as unrelated to safety and 
efficiency. Healthcare professionals working day-to-day with these process inefficiencies 
may easily ignore their presence since they fail to blatantly exhibit any inherent potential 
for detrimental consequences. They become an accepted way of doing things. To borrow 
logic from Reason (1990) and Dekker (2006), at the end of the day this unknowing 
intransience increases the likelihood of “drift” towards disorder. 
The most important role for risk managers, and the like, of the future will not be 
their retrospective analysis of a particular event and making a guess of how to prevent it 
from reoccurring, instead it will be uncovering the precursors of such an event, obtaining 
the information necessary to anticipate areas of increased risk, measuring the process, and 
engineering quality into the system to intervene before errors and adverse events occur 
(Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008). 
This research has attempted to re-conceptualize FDs as potential threats to safety 
and efficiency in a healthcare system. This approach gives standalone merited weight to 
these events. By doing so, it reframes the problem in a manner that encourages healthcare 
providers to intervene before these disruptions manifest into catastrophic errors that 
reaches the patient. 
However, this information has no value unless the organization learns from it. 
Although healthcare aspires to be an HRO, it clearly has not adopted a “highly reliable” 
systematic approach to accomplish this goal. To best drive prevention and reduce 
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systematic medical errors, healthcare has to first move away from fear of retribution and 
its punitive nature. Rather than a retrospective review of patient safety events and 
reporting errors and near misses after the fact, or focusing on outcome-based initiatives, a 
new process should be implemented that looks at all the factors that may cause an event 
to happen in the first place. There is no question that healthcare providers are much more 
amenable to this process and more willing to use this information to drive prevention. 
The SSMP provides an audit trail for threats that have been discovered during the 
analyses process. This discovery should lead to a preventative/corrective action to reduce 
future threats. The SSMP offers a language for healthcare professionals to detect and 
discuss the everyday process inefficiencies threatening the system in which they work as 
well as a framework to generate their own ideas of how to mitigate them.  
Compared to the pre-intervention data, the success was evident in regards to 
ineffective communication and deploying targeted, data-driven interventions in a 
systematic manner. Despite experiencing multiple real-world challenges that attempted to 
despoil any potential change for the better, ineffective communication remained low 
throughout. That is the beauty of the SSMP model. It is a living, breathing document that 
can present the data in real-time. This comprehensive, systematic methodology allows 
researchers, personnel, risk managers, quality regulators, and administrators to track and 
monitor results in a quantitative, data-driven manner. How can an organization (or 
individual, for that matter) truly improve if they do not know the baseline from which to 
grow? Ultimately, the principal strength of this current study, and perhaps more 
important than the actual results themselves, is combining science and practice by 
employing RIPCHORD-TWA, the HFIX framework, and including multidisciplinary 
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SME input, which may prove more successful and lasting in mitigating the real threats to 
the delivery of trauma care. The benefit of this method is that it allows practitioners on 
the front line to implement customized interventions to problems they face every day. 
Next generation improvement must persistently gather data on the problems and rely on 
tracking information and failures—for what can be measured can be managed. 
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Appendix A 
 
5/29/15 
 
Dear Colleagues: 
 
As many of you know, X Health has been engaged in a trauma optimization project with the Human 
Factors Doctoral Program of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU).  To date, the ERAU team 
has collected large amounts of data surrounding the concept of flow disruptions in trauma care.  And 
now, wait 'till you see these data! 
 
Data collected from trauma observations has been sorted and we have arrived to the point at which we 
need team members in all the trauma-related disciplines to convene and come up with "interventions" 
that might better optimize our delivery of trauma care here at X.  We're asking for trauma care 
volunteers to participate in a two-hour meeting on Friday, June 19th from 1:00pm - 3:00pm. 
 
While we will indeed show you the data in this meeting, it won't end up being a lecture-type meeting; 
instead, it will be an active, collaborative, and working meeting to "brainstorm" on ideas/processes that 
we can implement to make trauma care better.   How about we formally call this a "Multidisciplinary 
Knowledge Elicitation" trauma meeting!  That sounds cool, doesn't it? 
 
If you are interested, please reply to this email and we will add your name to the list of potential 
volunteers for selection.  The deadline for submission is (preferably) June 15th.  You will receive non-
productive pay for participating in this meeting.  To ensure we have a well-balanced group of 
disciplines, you will be notified via email if you are chosen to participate. 
 
Thank you in advance for your participation. 
 
Mr. Smith 
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Appendix B 
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Appendix C 
 
TASK/PROCEDURE 
Focuses on ways of changing operators’ task to reduce errors and 
improve safety (task characteristics, timing, work pressures, feedback, 
etc.) 
How can the task be restructured so that it requires less reliance on 
human memory (i.e., use checklists or technology that signals next step in 
task)? 
If the task is done simultaneously with other tasks (divided attention), can 
it be done by itself? How can the mental workload/timesharing be 
reduced? 
How could errors in performing the task be reduced by having another 
team member check/verify important steps in the procedure? 
How could checklists be developed to guide the task or verify that the task 
has been performed properly? 
How could immediate feedback be integrated into the task to allow 
operators to know when they have done things correctly or incorrectly? 
How can procedures or checklist be redesigned to be clearer or more 
user-friendly? 
If the task allows for easy short-cuts, how could it be redesigned to 
eliminate these shortcuts or reduce the likelihood that they are done? 
How could procedures be re-written so that they are less ambiguous or 
inapplicable to the safety critical tasks operators perform? 
How could procedures be developed that restrict the performance of 
safety critical tasks when there is time pressure to complete it? 
When operators switch tasks, what procedures could be developed to 
reduce negative transfer? 
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If compliance with safe work practices goes unrewarded, how can a 
reward system be developed to ensure that compliance is reinforced? 
If a task is repetitive, monotonous, or boring, how could it be made more 
interesting? How could “time on task” be changed to reduce vigilance 
decrements or mental lapses in attention? 
Could operators be rotated off the tasks, checked for errors, or monitored 
more closely? Could the pacing or ordering of a particular task be 
modified to reduce opportunities for error? How could a task be modified 
to reduce the demands on the operator’s physical or perceptual 
limitations? 
 
How could the task be redesigned so that its requirements are within 
reasonable bounds/limits of all persons performing the job (e.g., force, 
speed, precision, requirements, etc.)? 
Are the various tasks performed appropriately grouped into jobs? How 
could similar tasks be more effectively grouped/assigned to operators so 
that they are performed by operators with the same skills? 
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Appendix D 
 
Trauma Team Readiness Check-In 
 
To be Conducted by Primary Nurse during shift huddle 
with Trauma Teams 1 & 2 in the Trauma Resuscitation Suite 
 
• Who is the trauma team today?  
• Who are the on-call trauma physicians today? 
• Confirm the Daily Checklists: Trauma Suite (Primary Nurse); 
Helipad (ED Tech) 
• “Does anyone have anything to add or any concerns? If so, speak 
up!?” AND “Is everyone in agreement?” 
 
Introspective questions to consider:  
Is your fellow trauma colleague… 
• Punctual? Prepared? 
• Does s/he contribute or just disengaged? 
• Does s/he disagree? 
• Is s/he committed to decisions? 
• Does s/he support the team’s decisions after the fact? 
• Is s/he toxic to the mission, values, and vision of the trauma team? 
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Appendix E 
 
Pre-Arrival Brief 
 
1. First statement: Team member introductions (names/roles): “I am 
NAME and my role is ROLE.” 
2. Case Preparation 
• Mechanism of injury / predicted injury patterns 
• Anticipated treatment plan 
• Alert other areas (e.g. Blood Bank, CT)  
3. Last statement: “Does anyone have anything to add or any 
concerns? If so, speak up!?” AND  “Is everyone in agreement?” 
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Appendix F 
 
Debrief 
 
1. Set the stage 
“This is a quick opportunity for learning and continuous improvement. 
Let’s take a look at how we handled the case.” 
2. Ask the team for their observations 
• What happened? 
• What did we do well? 
• What challenges did we face? 
• What should we do differently or focus on next time? 
• What could help us be more effective?  
3. Add your observations/recommendations and confirm understanding 
4. Summarize any agreed upon actions or focus for the future 
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Appendix G 
Call Outs 
 
• A strategy used to communicate to the entire team simultaneously 
(in the following example, used to communicate with one person, 
specifically the scribe)  
• Helps team members anticipate next steps 
• Helps create a shared mental model 
• Receiver (with name) should either verbally or non-verbally 
acknowledge the transmission, such as with a nod of the head 
• With eye contact! 
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Appendix H 
Closed-loop Communication & Read Backs 
 
• Require the sender to verify the information that is being 
received by the other team member 
 
• Some communication takes place during times of escalating 
stress, such as in a rapid response event. In these sorts of 
situations, effective and efficient communication is crucial for 
successful patient outcomes.  
• Receivers repeat back requests 
• Senders request check backs and acknowledge the 
information is correct 
• With eye contact! 
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Appendix I 
 
CUS Technique 
 
• Concerned, Uncomfortable, Safety 
• Provides a framework  
• When used, everyone understands the issue and the 
magnitude. 
• State your concern first. Then state why you are 
uncomfortable. If the conflict is not resolved, state that there 
is a safety issue. If the safety issue is not acknowledged, a 
supervisor should be notified. 
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Appendix J 
 
Two Challenge Rule 
 
• Invoked when an initial assertion is ignored. 
• You are hereby empowered to question any potential breach 
of safety. 
• It is your responsibility to assertively voice your concern at 
least two times to ensure that it has been heard. 
• The member being challenged must acknowledge. 
• If the outcome is still not acceptable 
• Take a stronger course of action 
• Use supervisor or chain of command. 
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Appendix K 
 
 
 
 
TRAUMA NURSE LEADERSHIP COURSE 
PRE TEST 
 
 
 
1. In the concept of leadership, the assignment of a leader is not interchangeable 
under any circumstances? 
 
True 
False 
 
2. Why is assertive authority an important skill to learn and demonstrate when 
appropriate during the resuscitation of the severely injured patient? 
 
A. Because the physician doesn’t really know what he or she is doing so the nurse 
has to tell them, especially if they aren’t board certified. 
B. Because a nurse might observe something unsafe which other hierarchical 
members of the team do not identify. 
C. Because studies have shown the nurses are right more times than physicians so 
it’s important to come down on the physicians with more authority. 
D. Because the aerospace and aviation fields do it, so that really means we should.  
Everything in aviation works in medicine anyway.  
 
3. In the interest of care, quality, and safety, it is expected and mandatory that:  
 
A. Conflict is avoided at all cost. 
B. People always do the right thing. 
C.  Members speak up if they are concerned. 
D.  Leaders not make mistakes. 
 
4. Who is the leader in trauma teams? 
 
A. Doctor 
B. Nurse 
C. Patient 
D. It depends on circumstances 
 
5. The best communication tool or method to get critical information to the whole 
team is: 
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A. Call Out 
B. Read Back 
C. Write it on the white board 
D. Write it in the orders 
 
6. After a trauma case, the most helpful pathway towards team performance 
improvement involves: 
 
A. The leader telling everyone what they did wrong. 
B. Meeting as a team to debrief the event. 
C. Attending the autopsy. 
D. Blaming the people who made the mistakes.  
 
7. Why is it important to rely on the skills, knowledge, and abilities of the other team 
members? 
 
A.  Because it’s less work with more people (aka social loafing). 
B. Because you know who to go to later on when you need to borrow money.  
C. Because others’ contributions can compensate for your inattentional 
 blindness. 
D. It doesn’t matter, good teamwork is not important at all.  
 
8. Choose the best option below that best describes the communication strategy of 
CUS? 
 
A. Communication, Unilateral decision making, Superiority. 
B. Concerned, Utilitarian, Satisfactory 
C. Communication, Understanding, Safety 
D. Concerned, Uncomfortable, Safety 
 
9. Which of the following statements regarding the use of checklists in the delivery 
of acute trauma care is FALSE? 
 
A.  A well-designed checklist can be completed by a trauma team in less than 
two minutes. 
B.  Checklists are designed for new procedures or practitioners with 
relatively low experience. 
C.  Checklists create standardization of quality but not technique. 
D.  Checklists help ensure that every item is completed every time. 
 
10. The team is making great progress with the procedure until the nurse recognizes 
that the doctor is clearly making a dangerous mistake and asking for an unusually 
high dose of Gentamycin.  Very concerned, the Procedures Nurse asks the doctor if 
he’s sure if that is what’s wanted.  Giving her a nasty look, he growls “well, that’s 
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what I asked for, isn’t it?”  Confident that the dose is way off base, her next action 
should be to: 
 
A. Say, “I’m very concerned about the safety of that dose, doctor.  It’ much 
higher than I’ve ever seen given.” 
B.  Walk away and indicate discouragement at being treated so rudely. 
C.   Say loudly, “That’s a huge mistake, doctor.  Nobody uses a dose like that!” 
D.   Not say anything out of fear in making the doctor more angry. 
 
11. For the real life situation in the previous question, the doctor did not 
acknowledge the Procedure Nurse’s concern and ignored her questioning.  Now, the 
nurse should take the following course of action. 
 
A. Say loudly, “You’re off your rocker!” 
B. Not say anything out of fear in making the doctor even more angry. 
C. Prepare the medication and say to the doctor, “Here you push this med.” 
D. Challenge the doctor with assertive authority at least two times to 
ensure your concern has been heard. 
 
12. During the acute care delivery of a Trauma Alert case, the doctor utters: “Let’s go 
ahead and give ‘em a little more Diprivan.”  Having heard this, the nurse should? 
 
A. Prepare for immediate administration of propofol because the patient 
obviously needs it. 
B. Ask the doctor to clarify the dose and then insist on a read back 
technique to verify the information. 
C. Call pharmacy and give the phone to the doctor. 
D. Pass the ambiguous order on to the oncoming procedures nurse because it’s 
0659 and you’ve got Happy Hour plans right after work.   
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Appendix L 
 
 
 
 
TRAUMA NURSE LEADERSHIP COURSE 
POST TEST 
 
 
 
1. In the concept of leadership, the assignment of a leader is not interchangeable 
under any circumstances? 
 
True 
False 
 
2. Why is assertive authority an important skill to learn and demonstrate when 
appropriate during the resuscitation of the severely injured patient? 
 
A. Because the physician doesn’t really know what he or she is doing so the nurse 
has to tell them, especially if they aren’t board certified. 
B. Because a nurse might observe something unsafe which other hierarchical 
members of the team do not identify. 
C. Because studies have shown the nurses are right more times than physicians so 
it’s important to come down on the physicians with more authority. 
D. Because the aerospace and aviation fields do it, so that really means we should.  
Everything in aviation works in medicine anyway.  
 
3. In the interest of care, quality, and safety, it is expected and mandatory that:  
 
A. Conflict is avoided at all cost. 
B. People always do the right thing. 
C.  Members speak up if they are concerned. 
D.  Leaders not make mistakes. 
 
4. Who is the leader in trauma teams? 
 
A. Doctor 
B. Nurse 
C. Patient 
D. It depends on circumstances 
 
5. The best communication tool or method to get critical information to the whole 
team is: 
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A. Call Out 
B. Read Back 
C. Write it on the white board 
D. Write it in the orders 
 
6. After a trauma case, the most helpful pathway towards team performance 
improvement involves: 
 
A. The leader telling everyone what they did wrong. 
B. Meeting as a team to debrief the event. 
C. Attending the autopsy. 
D. Blaming the people who made the mistakes.  
 
7. Why is it important to rely on the skills, knowledge, and abilities of the other team 
members? 
 
A.  Because it’s less work with more people (aka social loafing). 
B. Because you know who to go to later on when you need to borrow money.  
C. Because others’ contributions can compensate for your inattentional 
 blindness. 
D. It doesn’t matter, good teamwork is not important at all.  
 
8. Choose the best option below that best describes the communication strategy of 
CUS? 
 
A. Communication, Unilateral decision making, Superiority. 
B. Concerned, Utilitarian, Satisfactory 
C. Communication, Understanding, Safety 
D. Concerned, Uncomfortable, Safety 
 
9. Which of the following statements regarding the use of checklists in the delivery 
of acute trauma care is FALSE? 
 
A.  A well-designed checklist can be completed by a trauma team in less than 
two minutes. 
B.  Checklists are designed for new procedures or practitioners with 
relatively low experience. 
C.  Checklists create standardization of quality but not technique. 
D.  Checklists help ensure that every item is completed every time. 
 
10. The team is making great progress with the procedure until the nurse recognizes 
that the doctor is clearly making a dangerous mistake and asking for an unusually 
high dose of Gentamycin.  Very concerned, the Procedures Nurse asks the doctor if 
he’s sure if that is what’s wanted.  Giving her a nasty look, he growls “well, that’s 
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what I asked for, isn’t it?”  Confident that the dose is way off base, her next action 
should be to: 
 
B. Say, “I’m very concerned about the safety of that dose, doctor.  It’ much 
higher than I’ve ever seen given.” 
B.  Walk away and indicate discouragement at being treated so rudely. 
C.   Say loudly, “That’s a huge mistake, doctor.  Nobody uses a dose like that!” 
D.   Not say anything out of fear in making the doctor more angry. 
 
11. For the real life situation in the previous question, the doctor did not 
acknowledge the Procedure Nurse’s concern and ignored her questioning.  Now, the 
nurse should take the following course of action. 
 
A. Say loudly, “You’re off your rocker!” 
B. Not say anything out of fear in making the doctor even more angry. 
C. Prepare the medication and say to the doctor, “Here you push this med.” 
D. Challenge the doctor with assertive authority at least two times to 
ensure your concern has been heard. 
 
12. During the acute care delivery of a Trauma Alert case, the doctor utters: “Let’s go 
ahead and give ‘em a little more Diprivan.”  Having heard this, the nurse should? 
 
A. Prepare for immediate administration of propofol because the patient 
obviously needs it. 
B. Ask the doctor to clarify the dose and then insist on a read back 
technique to verify the information. 
C. Call pharmacy and give the phone to the doctor. 
D. Pass the ambiguous order on to the oncoming procedures nurse because it’s 
0659 and you’ve got Happy Hour plans right after work.   
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Appendix M 
Program Evaluation Form 
 
You must stay for the entire length of the program as partial credit will not be given. You must 
sign-in at the front table before the start of the program and return this completed evaluation form 
to the same location to receive credit. The Educational Services Department reserves the right to 
deny credit to participants who do not meet these criteria. 
 
Trauma Nurse Leadership Training 
Mr. Smith 
Feb-May 2016 
 
ACTIVITY EVALUATION 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
The activity met the stated objectives 5 4 3 2 1 
The information was current 5 4 3 2 1 
The educational level was appropriate 5 4 3 2 1 
The teaching method was appropriate 5 4 3 2 1 
SPEAKER EVALUATION 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
The panel was knowledgeable 5 4 3 2 1 
The panel was effective 5 4 3 2 1 
I would recommend this class again 5 4 3 2 1 
 
 
Did you notice any commercial bias in speaker or the presentation material?          Yes          No 
 
 
What did you learn from the presentation that will enhance your patient care or change how you 
practice?  
(Choose all that apply.) 
 
_____ Improve patient safety       _____ Improve communication    
_____ Change practice related to diagnostic interpretation _____ Enhanced coordination of care 
_____ Update plan of care to evidence based standards   _____ Regulatory process/changes 
_____ Improved team coordination     _____ Improved teamwork capabilities 
_____ Knowledge to reduce medical errors     _____ Other (please describe) 
 
Other Comments: 
 
What other topics would you like to see presented? 
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Appendix N 
Program Evaluation Form 
 
You must stay for the entire length of the program as partial credit will not be given.  
You must sign-in at the front table before the start of the program and return this 
completed evaluation form to the same location to receive credit.  The Educational 
Services Department reserves the right to deny credit to participants who do not meet 
these criteria. 
 
Trauma Nurse Leadership Training 
Mr. Smith 
Feb 23 to June 21, 2016 
 
 
Activity Evaluation 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
The activity met the stated 
objectives 
81 5    
The information was current 82 4    
The educational level was 
appropriate 
82 4    
The teaching method was 
appropriate 
81 5    
Speaker Evaluation 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
The speaker was knowledgeable 82 4    
The speaker was effective 82 4    
I would recommend this speaker 
again 
81 5    
 
 
Did you notice any commercial bias in the presentation (verbal, print, or electronic)?          
Yes          (No) 
 
What did you learn from the presentation that will enhance your patient care or change 
how you practice:  
 
(72) Improve patient safety     (80) Improve communication 
   
(41) Change practice related to diagnostic interpretation 
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(68) Enhanced coordination of care 
(47) Update plan of care to evidence based standards(51) Regulatory process/changes 
(77)   Improved team coordination   (78) Improved teamwork capabilities 
(55) Knowledge to reduce medical errors   (9) General topic overview / Other 
 
Comments and/or what topics would you like to see in the future? 
 
Excellent- love the team readiness checklist! 
Great class- maybe do a mock-trauma in the room with Belmont, etc if possible! 
Very helpful information! 
The role of staffing lends to + versus – outcomes! 
Very informative class! 
This class was very informative and helpful! 
I would like to see a presentation on skills used while in trauma (use of kits, chest 
tube tray, thoracotomy tray, etc.) 
Tour of trauma room and procedure set up! 
This class should be mandatory for surgeons and ED physicians! 
Great forum to openly discuss leadership! 
Keep track of time! 
Very good presentation and evident of that by the way everyone felt they could 
speak up and be heard. I think the presentation gives everyone a breath of fresh air 
and helps remind us why we’re here! 
The program was excellent but also applicable to some everyday high stress 
situations (like codes, stroke alerts, etc.). Thank you again! 
Good class- helpful information! 
All members of the Trauma Team should take this course! 
Good information! 
Thank you! Very helpful! 
Great presentation (as usual) by Mr. Smith! 
Mr. Smith is the best instructor ever! 
How a trauma is meant to be run!  
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Appendix O 
 
7/8/16 
 
Dear Colleagues, 
 
Likely, you will begin to see the human factors staff from Embry-Riddle returning to prospectively 
observe trauma cases, and there may be some new faces as well.  As usual, they will be out of the 
way on the far north end of the room and you probably won’t even know they’ll be there.  Now that 
99% of RNs working trauma have taken the trauma nurse leadership course, please employ what 
you’ve learned and practiced from the course. 
 
Let me know if any questions. 
 
Thank you for caring and for helping to optimize the care of the injured patient at X. 
Mr. Smith  
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Appendix P 
 
Items to Capture    
Trauma surgeon (name on whiteboard)    
~Number of people in trauma bay before pt arrives    
Is ED physician present? Is trauma surgeon present? (If not, note the time when they arrive)    
Number of people NOT wearing a sticker or no name on it. Number of people NOT wearing PPE   
Team activities before pt arrives. Pre-arrival brief completed? (If so, document who completed it 
& was it properly done, meaning Steps 1, 2, & 3)    
Is barrier arm (trauma in progress) in place?    
Exact time the pt is rolled into trauma bay     
As best you can, pt detail and mechanism of injury     
Was stopclock started?    
Team activities while EVAC is giving report    
~Number of people in the trauma bay/pt field at the time the pt arrives    
~Number of people in the trauma bay/pt field during course of treatment     
Location of large trashcan/Is trashcan being used?    
Exact time pt leaves the trauma bay     
Exact time pt enters the CT scan room     
~Number of people in the CT scan room at the time the pt arrives    
Is scribe using special spotlight attached to table?    
~Number of people in the CT scan room/during course of treatment    
Exact time the pt leaves the CT room    
Overall were standardized communication protocols used (call outs, read backs, etc.)?    
Ask the primary nurse/scribe & the Trauma Surgeon as pt is being wheeled out of CT:  How 
would you rate the efficiency of this case on a scale from 1-10? Low, 1=very inefficient, High, 
10=highly efficient (document rating and any comments)     
  
